INSTITUTE OF
INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES
IN HUMANITIES
AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Addleton
Academic
Publishers
NEW YORK



Journal of Research in Gender Studies

Volume 3(2) • 2013

OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE ASSOCIATION • NEW YORK

Journal of Research in Gender Studies

VOLUME 3(2) • 2013

ADDLETON ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS • NEW YORK

Journal of Research in Gender Studies
An international peer-reviewed academic journal
Volume 3 / Number 2 / 2013
Copyright © 2013 by the Contemporary Science Association, New York

Journal of Research in Gender Studies is a peer-reviewed bilingual interdisciplinary journal that aims to publish critical and theoretical constructive contributions across the large spectrum of humanities – literature, law, history, philosophy, religion, and visual and performing arts (including music and theatre), anthropology, area studies, communication studies, cultural studies, and linguistics, social sciences, behavioral sciences, medicine and public health, science and technology, democracy studies, women's studies, men and masculinity studies, queer studies. All submissions should be written in English or French. • Acceptance Rate (2013): 18.62%

Journal of Research in Gender Studies is published twice a year (July and December) by Addleton Academic Publishers, 30-18 50th Street, Woodside, New York, 11377. All papers in this journal have undergone editorial screening and anonymous double-blind peer-review. ISSN 2164-0262**,** OCLC Number: 780797930.

Publishing Executive Editor: Ramona Mihaila. Online submissions to: ramona.mihaila@addletonacademicpublishers.com

Consulting Editor: Onorina Botezat, botezat@addletonacademicpublishers.com
Book Review Coordinator: Carmen Ghinea, ghinea@addletonacademicpublishers.com
Editorial Assistant: Silvia Tita, tita@addletonacademicpublishers.com
Project Editor: Julie Paulesc, paulesc@addletonacademicpublishers.com
Assistant Editor: Gabriela Iliuta, iliuta@addletonacademicpublishers.com
Assistant Editor: Elizabeth Edgecomb, edgecomb@addletonacademicpublishers.com

Journal ranking: **A** on a seven-point scale (A+, A, B+, B, C+, C, D).

Addleton Academic Publishers is an imprint of RIOTS, New York.

Please direct subscription, contributions, back-issue requests, and address changes to editors@addletonacademicpublishers.com

Produced in the United States of America

MARKETING

The marketing strategy for ***Journal of Research in Gender Studies*** is designed to maximize *the* Journal's profile, reach and readership. This is achieved through: targeted electronic marketing to relevant contacts; promotion at conferences globally; highlighting the best content in the Journal; and attracting the best authors to publish in the Journal.

MANUSCRIPT CATEGORIES

Journal of Research in Gender Studies publishes research papers, review papers, conference papers, short communications, and book reviews.

INDEXING AND ABSTRACTING

Journal of Research in Gender Studies is indexed and/or abstracted in CEEOL, Contemporary Science Association Databases, DeepDyve, EBSCO, Gale, HeinOnline, Index Islamicus, ProQuest, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, and Universe Digital Library.

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Anna Babka University of Vienna
Marianne Baudin Université Paris-Sorbonne, Paris XIII
Bouchra Benbella University Mohamed I, Oujda
Rena Bivens Carleton University
Mónica Bolufer University of Valencia
Hedva Braunstein-Bercovitz Academic College of Tel Aviv Yaffo
Olga A. Burukina Moscow State Linguistic University
Frédéric Canovas Arizona State University
Claire M Crabtree University of Detroit
Krisztina Dankó Teacher Training College, Debrecen
Zoe Dirse Sheridan College Toronto
Corrine Fournier-Kiss University of Fribourg
Arianne M. Gaetano Auburn University
John Heath University of Vienna
Susanne Hochreiter University of Vienna
Nancy Honicker Université de Paris VIII
Nancy Isenberg University of Rome III
Alenka Jensterle Doležalová Karlovy University
Mihaela M. Johnson University of Pennsylvania
Yoshihiko Kadoya Nagoya University
Greg Kucich University of Notre Dame
Justine Legrand Paris Sorbonne University
Hélene Lenz Université de Strasbourg
Ma Li Nesna University College
Isabel Lousada Nova University, Lisbon
Miho Matsugu DePaul University
Pamela McCauley Bush University of Central Florida
Montserrat Serrano Mänes Universidad de Granada
Anne Marie Miraglia University of Waterloo
Mechthild E. Nagel State University of New York, Cortland
Barbara Nelson University of Bucharest
Efstratia Oktapoda Université Paris-Sorbonne, Paris IV
Arnaud Paturet CNRS/ENS, Paris
Katja Mihurko Poniz University of Nova Gorice
Raluca Radulescu University of Bangor
Najib Redouane California State University, Long Beach
Klas Roth Stockholm University
Rui Shen United States Naval Academy
Shuko Shikata Hokusei Gakuen University
George Sipos University of Chicago
Marie Nedregotten Sørbø Volda University College
Sabbar Sultan Middle East University, Amman
Brigitte Urbani Université de Provence, Aix-en-Provence
Susanne Maria Weber Philipps-Universität Marburg

Carolyn Wells Kraus University of Michigan, Dearborn
Chuanhong Zhang University of Oxford, China Centre

Scholars whose papers have been published in *Journal of Research in Gender Studies* include:

Kiikpoye K. Aaron University of Port Harcourt
Anna Babka University of Vienna
Bouchra Benbella Dhar El Mehraz Fes
Yolanda Beteta Complutense University of Madrid
Jacques Brunet-Georget Université Bordeaux III
Josefina Bueno Alonso Université d'Alicante
Sümeyra Buran Ataturk University
Frédéric Canovas Arizona State University
Laura Ceia California State University, Long Beach
Peter Clar University of Vienna
Claire Crabtree University of Detroit
Carmen Cusack University of Alaska Southeast
S. A. Dada Ekiti State University, Ado-Ekiti
Zoe Dirse Sheridan College, Toronto
Kim Anh Duong University of Waikato
Mukadder Erkan Ataturk University
Çimen Günay Erkol Özyeğin University, Istanbul
Jessica Ezekiel-Hart Ignatius Ajuru University of Education
John Heath University of Vienna
Susanne Hochreiter University of Vienna
Nancy Honicker Université de Paris VIII
Bobbi Hopkins University of New England, Armidale
Katherine Hunt University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Şima Begüm İmşir Özyeğin University/Istanbul University
Magdalena Koch Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan
Carolyn Kraus University of Michigan-Dearborn
Shyama Kumari Birla Institute of Technology, Mesra Ranchi, Jharkhand
Karen Larwin Youngstown State University
Justine Legrand Université Paris-Sorbonne
Inés Sánchez de Madariaga Technical University of Madrid
James M. Magrini College of Dupage, Glen Ellyn
Montserrat Serrano Mänes Universidad de Granada
Artemis Michailidou Hellenic Military Academy
Anne Marie Miraglia University of Waterloo
Ramey Moore University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
Crk Murthy Indira Gandhi National Open University
Barbara Nelson Michigan State University
Dzung Kieu Nguyen State University of New York, Albany

Efstratia Oktapoda Université Paris-Sorbonne, Paris IV
Omolara Kikelomo Owoeye Ekiti State University, Ado-Ekiti
Arnaud Paturet CNRS, Paris
Farideh Pourgiv Shiraz University
Mizanoor Rahman Bangladesh Open University
Najib Redouane California State University, Long Beach
Rabia Redouane Montclair State University
Alison Rice University of Notre Dame
Miri Rozmarin Tel-Aviv University
Parisa Shams Shiraz University
Shraddha Shivani Birla Institute of Technology, Mesra Ranchi, Jharkhand
Anne Soronen University of Helsinki
Sabbar S. Sultan Middle East University, Amman
Sabina Yeasmin Bangladesh Open University



Chawton House Library Visiting Fellowships 2014–15
in partnership with the Faculty of Humanities at
the University of Southampton



Applications are invited for one-month Visiting Fellowships at Chawton House Library (CHL) to be taken up between October 2014 and the end of August 2015 (please note: no Visiting Fellowships will be awarded during December 2014 and January 2015). Deadline for applications: **7 April 2014.** All Fellows will be offered accommodation and office space in the main Library building. They will also be given library rights at the University of Southampton, including access to both electronic and archival resources at the Hartley Library.

Chawton House Library is an independent research library and study centre focusing on women's writing in English from 1600 to 1830. Accommodated in the Elizabethan manor house that once belonged to one of Jane Austen's brothers, in the village of Chawton in Hampshire, the library's main aim is to promote and facilitate study in the field of early women's writing. The magnificent library collection of early editions from the period is freely accessible to members of the public, while the Library also runs a programme of events and activities relating both to the historical house and the focus of the collection. For more information please see www.chawtonhouse.org

The University of Southampton has particular strengths in the long eighteenth century. The Southampton Centre for Eighteenth-Century Studies (SCECS) runs a successful interdisciplinary MA, and organizes seminars and conferences throughout the year. All visiting fellows will be encouraged to take part in SCECS activities, and will be invited to present short papers of their work in progress at an afternoon seminar during their time at CHL. For more information about SCECS, including the research interests of individual members, please see http://www.soton.ac.uk/scecs/ For information about Special Collections at the Hartley Library, see http://www.southampton.ac.uk/archives/about_us/index.html

The aim of these Fellowships is to enable individuals to undertake significant research in the long eighteenth century. In keeping with the mission of CHL and the special qualities of the library's collection, projects that focus on women's writing or lives during the period are warmly welcomed. Any proposal, however, that promises significant research on the long eighteenth century will be given careful consideration. We

would also welcome applications from groups of up to four scholars who wish to pursue a joint project while in residence.

The Fellowships would be of particular interest to members of university and college faculties on leave from their institutions, but we welcome applications from candidates at all stages of their academic careers. All Visiting Fellows would be expected to be in residence in Chawton for the duration of their fellowship, and will find the tranquillity of the location especially conducive to their work.

We are unable to offer visiting fellowships to any scholar who has already held a Fellowship in the previous 3-year period, even if the proposed period in residence is for a new research project.

Please note that we are unable to offer funding towards travel costs.

How to Apply

Please send 5 copies of the following documents:

• A one-page covering letter, giving full contact details, and stating clearly the desired month of residence.
• A proposal for the work you intend to carry out as a Visiting Fellow – to be no more than two pages in length and typed in double line spacing.
• Your CV - to be no more than three pages in length.
• One confidential letter of recommendation to be **emailed** separately by the referee before the deadline.

(Please allow sufficient time for your documents to arrive, particularly if you are posting from overseas). The documents should be posted to:

Sandy White, English Department
University of Southampton
Avenue Campus
Southampton
SO17 1BF.
Email: sw17@soton.ac.uk


Documents should arrive no later than 7 April 2014. Any late or incomplete applications will not be considered.

All applicants will be advised of the outcome of their application by early July 2014.

The scheme is run on behalf of the University of Southampton and Chawton House Library, and the selecting committee is made up of colleagues from both institutions.

The Library catalogue is online and can be accessed via the library website: http://www.chawtonhouse.org/library/index.html

Visiting Fellows will be expected to donate a copy of the manuscript or published work resulting from their stay at Chawton House Library to the Library collection, and to publish a short article in the Library newsletter, *The Female Spectator*.


cost
WomenWriters
huygens ing
WomenWriters
Repository
author ⇠ work ⇢ reader
person ⇢ work ⇢ person ⇢ work
Erna Juel Hansen
Ina Blenda
Augusta Lange
Amalie Skram
Selma Lagerlöf
ARKIVET
Virtual
Research
Environment
Recording translations
Sharing annotations
@note
CARTAS
PERUANA

COST Action IS0901

Women Writers In History

Digital Humanities 2012

Data Sharing, Virtual Collaboration, and Textual Analysis: Working on Women Writers In History.

The European COST Action "Women Writers In History" plans to give women their due place in transnational literary historiography, from the Medieval period up to the early 20th century. Six Action members illustrate the collaboration as going on in and around a data repository.

1. Data Sharing

Hilde Hoogenboom, Arizona State University

Different kinds of large-scale sources contain information about these authors' early reception, and provide the data we work on. They include in particular *bio-bibliographic compilations* of European women writers, compiled after the example of Boccaccio's *Famous Women* (1361-75) as the databases of their time. They allow us to understand and describe the presence of women authors (as a category, or taken individually) over the centuries both using numbers and studying the tropes by which these women are represented.

WomenWriters, the only transnational database of women writers that brings together the whole spectrum of sources for literary markets and literary fields of small and large nations, can itself be considered as the ultimate bio-bibliographical compilation.

2. Structuring Research

Suzan van Dijk and Gertjan Filarski, Huygens ING The Hague

The WomenWriters database helps researchers to generate *new knowledge* about women's impact on their contemporary readers. Thanks to large-scale data entry about their works' reception, without focusing on particular authors, we "provoke" serendipitous findings about authors we often did not know as yet. The tool currently contains over 20.000 manually processed reception data, which we will gradually complement by using technological solutions, and collaborating with other online projects. The *WomenWriters* database is currently being developed into a broader Research Environment. The present data model, which focuses on the communication between Author and Reader through the Work, will be replaced by a model presenting literary communication as being a series of texts generating each other through the intervention of a *Reader* turned *Writer*. At the same time interconnectivity will be created with related projects, such as the two shown here (see 3 and 4).

3. Comparative Textual Analysis

Jenny Bergenmar and Leif-Jöran Olsson, University of Göteborg

For *WomenWriters* it is important to include as many data as possible on the production and reception of those authors who may have been role models for writers all over Europe – in particular as these data already exist in digital form and are interconnectible.

The *Selma Lagerlöf Archive* aims to create such a broader (gender) historical context that includes the intensive contacts within networks of European translators and writers that were important for Lagerlöf's success in Europe. These can in particular be traced thanks to our participation in the COST-WWIH Action, which has facilitated, and will continue to do so, the discovery of unknown connections between European women and Lagerlöf. Standardizing the different entities will allow, by way of micro services currently developed, exchanging information on these levels.

4. Sharing Annotations

Amelia Sanz, Complutense University Madrid

Complutense University teams are now testing *@Note*, an annotation tool capable of supporting collaborative work on texts, using women's European reception as a case study.

This innovative annotation method will be used in the collaborative project for specifying and formulating significant relationships between the texts we are studying. These texts can be annotated using a shared annotation schema; adding new terms and relationships to the schema as they are required during the annotation process; making it possible for authorized users to edit and to restructure the schema.

As an example, we present the outcome of an experience of collaborative annotation, with the help of students, of the Spanish translation of Françoise de Graffigny's famous novel *Lettres d'une Péruvienne* (1747): *Cartas de una Peruana* (1792, 1823) by María Romero, both translations available in Google Books and Hathi Trust, and included in the *WomenWriters* database.

European Cooperation in Science and Technology

www.cost.esf.org

Action IS 0901 — 2009 - 2013

Women Writers In History

Participating countries: BE,BG,CH,CZ,DE,DK,ES,FI,FR,EL,IE,IL,NL,NO,PL,PT,RO,RS,SE,SI,TR,BA,UK,HR,IT

Chair of the Action: Suzan van Dijk, NL, suzan.van.dijk@huygens.knaw.nl

COST Science Officer: Geny Piotti, Geny.Piotti@cost.eu

www.costwwih.net

ISCH



Figure 1: Margareta Carrbon, translator and translated author.

Objectives:

- To create international networked collaboration between researchers in women's literary history.
- To renew women's literary historiography by using a transnational perspective, dodging the biases of the national canons.
- To develop electronic tools and create a virtual collaboratory for the investigation of the international reception of women writers.
- To create the technical conditions for a more systematic analysis and use of online editions of / data about women writers.
- To produce a roadmap outlining future large scale research into women writers' role in European culture.
- To promote a more accurate perception of their historical participation in the public sphere and the literary field.

Working Group 1

This WG ("Models and Theories") provides a theoretical framework to be used within the ICT tool where quantitative and qualitative study of women's literary history is to take place. Appropriate terminology is discussed, which is needed in view of the structure of the tool (itself developed in connection with WG 2). Definitions and research questions are prepared in view of classifying and investigating the source material selected in WG3: how is female authorship to be defined? what (gendered) modalities of transnational reception and circulation should be investigated?

Working Group 2

WG 2 ("Tools and Interconnectivity") contributes to the development of the online database *WomenWriters* into an appropriate Virtual Research Environment. This should support different types of workflow, and allow researchers to approach their own source material within the larger context of European women's literary production. Through visualizing of the material it will help generate and handle new research questions. WG 2 members are the ideal test users, commenting upon the structure, and comparing it to other database systems.

Working Group 3

WG 3 ("Selection and Use of Relevant Sources") inventories, classifies and prioritizes, per country, the broad variety of source material necessary to study women's participation in the literary field from the reception side. In Training Schools, Early Stage Researchers will learn use the ICT tool to handle these sources and model the data in function of their research questions. Particular attention is being given to the category of paratextual sources.

Working Group 4

WG 4 is responsible for the "Dissemination and Extension of the Research Network". Dissemination concerns both the technological and the historical aspects. Use of an online tool for addressing literary-historical questions is innovative, and is presented as such in relevant conferences. Anticipating on future outcome and "new knowledge" about women's role in literary Europe, activities addressing a larger audience are also prepared: teaching material, a (virtual) exhibition and series of lectures in different countries.

Main Achievements:

- Consciousness created of the need of putting together individual research about individual women authors, and using electronic tools for this Humanities research normally approached on a much smaller scale.
- Collaborations created between colleagues in Eastern and Western Europe, and working on authors as well known as Jane Austen and as little known as Talvj.
- New collaborative and sub-projects in women's literary history generated in Slovenia, Serbia, Portugal, Spain, Romania, Netherlands.
- Started creating interconnectivity between eight online projects in women's literary history.

COST is supported by the EU RTD Framework Programme

ESF provides the COST Office through an EC contract



www.aeihm.org

The Spanish Society for Women's History (Asociación Española de Investigación de Historia de las Mujeres-AEIHM) was founded in June 1991 as a development of the National Commission of the IFRWH (International Federation for Research in Women's History), federation of which it is now a member. For over twenty years, it has developed many activities in order to promote research, teaching and dissemination of women's and gender history, as well as the theoretical and methodological renewal of the historical discipline, through conferences and seminars, workshops, publications, awards, dissemination of its own and others' activities through website and mailing list and participation in collective actions. It has currently 300 members.

Its aims are to promote and spread women's and gender history through research, teaching at different academic levels, and outreaching to society at large. On an annual basis, and continuously since 1993, AEIHM has been held international conferences and seminars for discussion between national and foreign specialists in women's and gender history.

The last ones held are: Salamanca (2012): *XVI International Symposium AEIHM*. "Eating the Forbidden Fruit: Women, Science and Creation through History;" Madrid (2011): *IV International Seminar AEIHM*. "Foucault's Influences in Historiography. Powers, Bodies and Desires;" and Bilbao (2010): *XV International Symposium AEIHM*. "Women and History. Dialogues between Spain and Latin America."

To these regular meetings it should be added the co-organization of: Gender and Postcolonial Studies in Question (s). III European Meeting (Barcelona, June 2012), in collaboration with: Fédération de Recherche sur le Genre (RING), Institut Interuniversitati d'Estudis de Dones i Gènere; Grup de Recerca Consolidat Multiculturalisme i Gènere (Universitat de Barcelona).

AEIHM announces two awards, both on a biennial basis: Doctoral Thesis Award (sixth edition awarded in 2012); Research Award for Women's History (AEIHM-AHS, Asociación de Historia Social) (sixth edition convened in 2013).

Publications: Series "History and Feminism," in collaboration with Icaria publishers. Last published volumes: Pilar Perez-Fuentes Hernández (ed.), *Between Two Shores: Women in the History of Spain and Latin America*, Icaria, Barcelona, 2012, ISBN: 978-84-9888-310-7. Pilar Perez-Fuentes Hernández (ed.), Subjectivity, material culture and gender: dialogues with Italian historiography, Icaria, Barcelona, 2010, ISBN: 978-84-9888-279-7. Gloria A. Franco Rubio (ed.), *Debates on Motherhood from a Historical Perspective (XVI-XX Centuries)*. Icaria, Barcelona, 2010, ISBN: 978-84-9888-233-9. Forthcoming: Isabel del Val Valdivieso and Henar Gallego (eds.) *Foucault's Influences in Historiography. Powers, Bodies and Desires*.

SUBMISSION INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

With a covering letter to the Editors, send an original copy with name(s), institutional affiliation and full address (with e-mail if possible), plus two copies bearing *only* the paper title. This latter is for 'blind' review purposes; no name(s) of author should appear on the opening page, last page or in page headers. The suggested length for ***Journal of Research in Gender Studies*** papers is 4,000 to 8,000 words, or about 10 to 20 double-spaced, typewritten pages, with about one inch margins on all sides. References should be typed double-spaced in a separate section, and numbered consecutively. They will be printed at the end of the paper. No part of a paper can be rewritten in galley or page proofs. Any addenda on galley proofs other than corrections of typographical errors may be disregarded at the discretion of the Editor. Special conventions, if followed consistently, are permitted where formal language is used. Diagrams, tables, and illustrations should be on separate sheets with their desired position in the text clearly indicated. Symbolic formulae appearing as separate lines should be clearly distinguished in the text. Foreign letters (Greek, German, etc.), special symbols, as well as zero and capital O and prime marks should be indicated in the margin. Materials to be printed in italics, especially single letters in text or in formulae, should be underlined. Failure to follow house style requirements, provide disk or electronic copy, an abstract and institutional affiliation details may delay review process, publication schedule and citation. All submitted manuscripts are independently refereed by readers recommended by the Editors in consultation with the Editorial Advisory Board. Anonymity is assured. Decisions to publish or not, to request revisions, if necessary resubmission, and/or extra adjudication, are entirely at the discretion of the Editors. Format acknowledgement may take up to one month, full consideration may take up to six months. Copyright and all rights therein are retained by authors. Permission for papers to be reprinted can only be granted by authors, who should be contacted directly. Due acknowledgement of source and authorship where applicable, and copyright clearance of cited matter in the articles are the express responsibility of the authors. The Editorial Advisory Board and the publishers accept no responsibility for any lapses or infringements. Endnotes are preferred to foot-notes. They should be flagged in text by a superscript note number at the appropriate point (not via name and date). References within numerically ordered endnotes should follow Harvard style rather than Oxford style, i.e. last name, initials of author, title of book or article, name of journal or collected work, followed by publisher (excepting journals) and place of publication, year of publication and exact page citation (e.g. 82, 86−87). Abstracts, of between 50 and 100 words, must be included. Longer quotations should be set in separate paragraphs, so as to be printed in small type. In the manuscript they should still be typed double-spaced, but separated from the remainder of the manuscript by a small space before and after. Quoted sentences should be indicated by double-quotes (“). Words or phrases mentioned should be single-quotes (‘).Single quotes are acceptable inside double when used for a quote within a quote.

CONTENTS

Social and Cultural Approaches to Gender Identity, Sexuality, and Patriarchy
Approches sociales et culturelles de l'identité du genre, de la sexualité et du patriarcat

Everything Else Is Drag: Linguistic Drag and Gender Parody on *RuPaul's Drag Race* [15]
RAMEY MOORE

Postpatriarchy [27]
DZUNG KIEU NGUYEN

The Servants of the Devil. The Demonization of Female Sexuality in the Medieval Patristic Discourse [48]
YOLANDA BETETA MARTÍN

Sexuality, Performativity, and 'Gender Trouble' in Literature and Culture
La sexualité, la performativité, et le «Trouble du genre» dans la littérature et de la culture

L'Écriture *Née en France* pour traverser les frontières [67]
ANNE-MARIE MIRAGLIA

Genre intime et genre sexuel dans l'œuvre gidienne [76]
JUSTINE LEGRAND

Gender Trouble in *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf* [85]
PARISA SHAMS, FARIDEH POURGIV

Borders and Spaces: Political Thought, Epistemological Culture, and Social Behavior
Les frontières et les espaces: la pensée politique, la culture épistémologique et le comportement social

The Epistemological Culture of Western Philosophy's Curriculum: *A Phenomenological Move toward Conceiving a Holistic and Inclusive Understanding of Knowledge-Forms through Alternative Media* [101]
JAMES M. MAGRINI

Gender Politics and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Western Balkans [128]
IOANA-BIANCA BERNA

Gender Differentiation in Cognition and Social Behavior [134]
AUREL PERA

Guest Interview
Entretien

Interview with Sue Thomas on the TechnoFeminist Approach and *Correspondence* [140]
MUKADDER ERKAN, SÜMEYRA BURAN

Book Reviews
Compte-rendu

***Pythagorean Women: Their History and Writings* [147]**
GEORGE LĂZĂROIU

***Transnational Identities of Women Writers in the Austro-Hungarian Empire* [149]**
CORINNE FOURNIER-KISS

***Gender Studies: The Woman Inside and Outside the Box* [151]**
BARBARA NELSON

Addleton Academic Publishers
Journal of Research in Gender Studies
Volume 3(2), 2013, pp. 15–26, ISSN: 2164-0262

EVERYTHING ELSE IS DRAG: LINGUISTIC DRAG AND GENDER PARODY ON *RUPAUL'S DRAG RACE*

RAMEY MOORE
ram015@uark.edu
University of Arkansas-Fayetteville

ABSTRACT. The potential for parody, and the dialogue across the naturalized borders of gender identity, inherent in drag practice has been one of the keystones of academic research into both communities of drag queens and drag kings, and there are some indications that drag has begun to enter into wider cultural dialogues about sexuality, gender, and identity. *RuPaul's Drag Race*, an on-going reality television show, broadcast on the LOGO network, is one emergent feature of this wider engagement. The show takes the form of a competition amongst a group of drag queens, presided over by RuPaul, who are competing for a number of prizes and the title of America's Next Drag Superstar. Utilizing the episode "Here Comes the Bride" (2010) from the third season of *RuPaul's Drag Race* as a case study, this paper seeks to address the ways in which the drag queens featured on the show use ways of speaking and performing gender and identity to create hybrid spaces where naturalized boundaries between male and female bodies can be bridged. Using Judith Butler's conception of gender parody, Pierre Bourdieu's theories of habitus, and Jacques Derrida's theories regarding the nature of presence and absence in language, this paper seeks to interrogate the ways that the discourses, linguistic constructions, and episode structure itself serve to create hybrid, mobile, and dynamic discourses about gender identity that collapse, confound and call into question the borders between gender binaries. This paper offers the concept of *linguistic drag* as a way of understanding this form of gender performance and parody. It is hoped that this paper, and specifically the concept of *linguistic drag*, may serve to expand and clarify future research into the ways that gender identity is both constructed and performed, both by members of drag communities, as well as within other cultural milieus.

Keywords: drag; drag queen; reality television; gender parody; gender performance; *RuPaul's Drag Race*; homosexuality; gender identity; sexuality

"You're born naked and the rest is drag."
-RuPaul's Twitter Tagline

1. Introduction

For those of you just tuning in, a siren goes off in the work-room. The gathered contestants, still in their street clothes: name-brand t-shirts, a few hoodies, distressed blue jeans. The contestants are chatting idly, cattily, in front of their huge vanity mirrors. Tatiana, who won the main challenge in the last episode, applies fingernail polish as she discusses the contest with Jessica Wild, one of her competitors (*RDR* 2010). A siren sounds, accompanied by a mellifluous voice, "Ooooh, girl! You've got She-Mail" (*RDR* 2010). At that signal the room full of men gathers around a television screen where a woman with huge teased hair addresses the room,

> Hey, dolls. To prove to me that you are the next drag superstar you are going to need to make a *real* commitment, one that could last a lifetime, or at least until the next best thing comes along. Pull yourself together and you can have your cake and eat it too. When it comes to RuPaul's drag race we've only just begun. (*RDR* 2010)

While this video plays reaction shots of the men's faces are played to highlight certain words and phrases. A quizzical expression on JuJuBee's face accompanies the word 'real,' and a knowing smile plays on the face of Pandora Boxx at the phrase "at least until the next best thing comes along" (*RDR* 2010). At the end of the video a door opens, and the 'real' RuPaul is revealed. Now, however, he is no longer in her *eleganza*[1] drag attire, but in a tailored white suit jacket, pink oxford-style dress shirt, and thick black framed glasses. This transformation, with the magic of pre-recording, takes but a split second. For viewers, the split-second nature of this transition may be novel, but for the drag queen contestants of *RuPaul's Drag Race* (*RDR*), referred to as 'drag racers,' or just 'racers,' these kinds of transformations are represented as commonplace feature of their public selves.

This paper argues that through the technologies of drag *RDR*'s viewers can see de-naturalized gender performances, which are not the site of a collapse of identity, but instead the point of articulation for the fully realized threads of identity which are woven into a perceived whole. Further, I argue that in spite of Judith Butler's claim, following Monique Wittig, that "gender itself is naturalized through grammatical norms," the language and grammar of *RDR* represents methods of speaking that are themselves in drag. While Butler's fears of the ultimately obfuscating nature of clarity are well-founded in terms of politics and the academy, these fears should not prevent us from recognizing that real practices and counter-discourses can succeed in disrupting hegemonic and univocal gender discourse without resorting to a revision of fundamental received linguistic, grammatical, and discursive formations. This paper focuses on the nature of drag and language

that is based on the third season of *RDR*, and primarily highlights the fifth episode entitled "Here Comes the Bride" (*RDR* 2010). This paper will begin with a basic introduction to the ways in which drag has been discussed in the literature in order to contextualize *RDR* within the larger praxis of drag. For now we will simply define drag as the wearing of clothing that contradicts the gendered norms of dress within a given culture, usually within or for special performances devoted to 'drag queens' or 'drag kings.'

In the first section it will be necessary to discuss the theoretical underpinnings of this paper, focusing on drag as a form of gender parody that cross-cuts the univocal conception of gender identity. Second, it will be necessary to discuss the show itself, in particular the formal elements of the show, influences, directs, and proliferates meanings within a predictable structure. Third, this paper will discuss the ways in which the discursive practice of the show creates a form of linguistic drag. This paper will highlight the ways in which presence and identity can be manipulated through the use of coded, inflected, and manipulated language, in order to destabilize and decouple univocal conceptions of biology, gender, sexuality, and alterity. Finally, this paper will discuss the relationship between performance and performativity in the context of *RDR*. Specifically, I will be asking how competence in the technologies of drag points to culturally intelligible forms of radical agency and identity. How does the habitus of performative gender become embodied in a set of comprehensive physical movements? And further, how do the *RDR* drag racers make this process visible and comprehensible as a media product intended for a broad audience?

2. Drag Definitions, Drag Meanings

There is a fundamental contradiction in defining drag. While drag is a concept that has a number of agreed upon features both for practitioners and academics, it seems also to be a practice that seeks to transgress barriers. While not the only such subversive or transgressive practice, drag is also a highly mobile concept capable of being recognizably itself even as it is shifting out from under the feet of scholars and queens alike. As Dorian Corey, one of the queens interviewed in the seminal drag documentary film *Paris is Burning* (Livingston et al. 2005), observes that within the drag 'balls' of Harlem, the generational shifting of drag occurs at high speed, the transition from idolization of Marilyn Monroe to the idolization of designer-label-drenched 'Dynasty' television diva occurs in a fast-forward rush (Conlon 1995: 7–8). Even as Corey's drag practice is being succeeded by novel forms of drag, there is some genealogical link between them that allows all of these overlapping practices to be firmly recognizable as drag.

A number of scholars of drag, transvestism, and cross-dressing seem to take the nature of drag as a cultural given, and elide specific definitions of what it means to be 'in drag.' Charlotte Suthrell, in her book *Unzipping Gender* (2004), enfolds drag into her discussion of cross-dressing. Suthrell never commits to a singular definition of either transvestism or drag, taking the concept of dressing across accepted gender norms as a self-evident truth. Similarly, Esther Newton's seminal *Mother Camp: Female Impersonators in America* (1979) focuses on the rigidly gendered definitions of drag that serve to rigidly naturalize drag as merely the wearing of women's clothing by homosexual men. Newton's primary assertion is that drag is defined within and by the gay male community, and that within this community "the homosexual term for a transvestite is 'drag queen'" (Newton 1979: 3). In both of these definitions we can see that there is a conflation of transvestism and drag, which without critical examination obfuscates our understanding of either set of related practices.

Similarly, Claudine Griggs' *S/he: Changing Sex and Changing Clothes* (1998) uses John Money's definition of drag which, almost obstinately, solidifies the linkages between homosexuality, desire, and gendered performances. Money, as quoted in Griggs, states that a drag queen is the "vernacular name for a male homosexual dressed in women's attire and impersonating a woman, often in an exaggerated way" (1998: 45). Although Griggs problematizes Money's simplistic definition by referencing the emotional affect that accompanies certain forms of dress for a number of transsexual individuals, at the same time, the underlying assumption is that this definition is good enough, but merely needs complexification to apply to all cases. Many of these definitions are simultaneously too broad and too vague.

The primary focus of many of these definitions is the linking of desire, dress, and the 'reality' of either the body OR the mind. In either instance there is a form of biological determinism that functions as a screen for the cultural play at work in the creation of pre-discursive gender realities. Judith Butler's writing to liberate the practice of queer, drag, gender parody, and gender transgression may be useful in liberating drag practice from reinforcing and reifying the exact discursive formations that it purports to transgress. While it is important to note that drag is not a magical antidote to discourses that inextricably link the body, desire, and gender, at the same time we might look to drag as a parodic practice which has the potential to be liberatory (Butler 2008: 200–201).

In spite of the potential problems of unfairly and incompletely fixing drag identities, I will attempt to present a workable definition of drag. There are some key elements of drag which must be included. First, we must consider the role of clothing and gendered clothing discourse. As Suthrell notes, "in

most parts of the world we acquire" some form of gender appropriate clothing "soon after birth, and, in public at least, are seldom without them again" (2004: 14). Transvestism and cross-dressing are consistently linked to drag (see Suthrell 2004, Garber 1992, Newton 1979). However, there is a much more problematic relation between bodies and clothing than the perceived discrepancy between that body and its appropriately coded dress (Suthrell 2004: 15). I would argue that drag is more complex than the crossing of a single boundary between male and female by the "conscious wearing of clothes which, in that particular society, are perceived as the domain of the opposite sex" (Suthrell 2004: 17).

This particularly limited definition makes problematic a number of drag practices, particularly those in which the performer is a self-identified biological female, or cisfemale, and yet performs dressed in female drag.[2] Who is mimicking whom in this scenario? How does the performativity of clothed bodies function in the drag context which marks it as separate from associated practices such as FTM/MTF transexuals or transvestites? In order to speak to the specificity/multiplicity of drag practices I will define drag as a performative act which attempts to re-inscribe new, altered, transgressive, or, most importantly, parodic gender identities within the context of performance. This definition, while imperfect, attempts to take into account Judith Butler's contention that "gender is performative" and is "manufactured through a sustained set of acts, posited through the gendered stylization of the body" (2008: xv). Pierre Bourdieu's theory of the habitus is a useful addition to Butler's theoretical discussion. Bourdieu describes the habitus as "principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends" (1977: 72). Using this concept, we might consider drag a gendered habitus of the performative, one which relies on intensification to act as a parody of the naturalized limitations on desire, on bodies, and on the dressing of those bodies that occur within society.

3. RuPaul's Drag Race

RuPaul's Drag Race is a reality television show which first premiered on February 2, 2009 on the Logo network, although it also 'airs' via the Logo website, as well as on the popular video media service Netflix. Technological advances and changes in the distribution of television shows has created an instance where cross-platform viewing (either via a network's website, popular video site Hulu, or any number of other means) is becoming the norm, adding to both complexities in estimating viewership in addition to other concerns. At the time of this writing, the show is in its

fourth season, and according to the Logo website has been greenlit for a fifth season. The show itself is organized as a 'talent search' which seeks to find "America's Next Top Drag Superstar."

In the show's run-time of approximately 45 minutes an episode a number of structural elements organize each episode into three distinct sections. The first section of the show is centered around the completion of a 'mini-challenge' which takes place in the dressing/work room. These challenges vary from episode to episode in terms of their specific time limits and requirements, although some mini-challenges recur across seasons, such as a challenge to 'read'[3] their competitors for comedic effect. The outcome of the mini-challenge frequently results in a winner who has some advantage in the main challenge portion of the show.

The second portion of the show revolves around a larger scale 'Main Challenge,' which always involves some form of performance, either in front of a live audience or in front of a camera, which is then reviewed by the show's judging panel. These challenges often require the mastery of some aspect of the technologies of drag performance, either in constructing specific outfits, as in the episode considered below where the 'racers' must construct a wedding dress and male drag for a photo shoot, or in coordinating a series of performances into a cohesive whole for various group challenges. The final structuring element is the runway show which dominates the show's close, and always culminates in the lowest performing contestants being forced to "lipsync for their lives," a dual lipsyncing performance to a musical number which results in one contestant being allowed to remain on the show and one contestant being asked to "sashay away," which is a reference to RuPaul's musical single of the same name (*RDR* 2010).

There are other structuring elements which need to be mentioned here. The first of these is the intercutting of commentary interviews with the 'drag racers.' These interviews are conducted with the 'racers' out of drag, occasionally sporting beards, and usually included in short clips. These interviews are often intended to reveal internal motivations, *post facto* criticisms, and/or humorous reads of various competitors or situations. In a very real sense this cross-cutting is the eruption of narrative voices into the 'reality' of the camera's view. This narrative eruption serves as a way for the thoughts of the 'racers' to be heard. While it is obvious that 'reality' television is as carefully crafted by its production staff as any fictional narrative program, these eruptions serve to direct the construction of each show's 'story,' as well as to confound, confirm, or complicate viewer expectations.

The second structuring principle is the repetition of various catch-phrases, mottoes, and trademark linguistic constructions at specific points in the show. At the beginning of each episode, RuPaul[4] enters and repeats the phrase, "gentlemen start your engines, and may the best . . . *woman* win," so integral to

the show is this phrase that it is repeated a number of times in the show's opening theme song (*RDR* 2010). Another phrase that recurs throughout each season is the exhortation, "and *don't* fuck it up" (*RDR* 2010). These repetitive phrases provide a form of structural punctuation, a frame of expected ideas which serves as a matrix for the specific 'plot' of each episode. In the next section we will turn to the ways that these repetitive phrases also serve another function, one in which language is made to perform and comment on both bodies and identities.

4. Linguistic Drag: Performing Inflections

As mentioned above one of the show's key phrases is "gentlemen start your engines, and may the best . . . *woman* win" (*RDR* 2010). Within this phrase is a microcosm of the show itself, making visible both the biological 'reality' of the performer, a transformation into a 'woman,' and yet at the same time there is an inflected slippage that occurs at the site of womanhood. The slight pause and altered inflection that accompanies the word woman clues in even the least attentive viewer that there is something *different* about these women. The show, and maybe drag performance itself, makes it clear that drag queens are not about a purely *femme realness*.[5] At the same time, these women are the point of intersection between drag, gay, ethnic, regional, and other identities that somehow produce the ontological effect of coherent identities (Mouffe 1992). As Tatiana, one of the 'racers,' notes "being a drag queen on top of being gay . . . that's a burden" and yet it's one that, in spite of the various social and cultural pressures, is an affirmation of her identity (*RDR* 2010).

This phrase itself illustrates what I am calling linguistic drag. Linguistic drag, as illustrated by the juxtaposition of gentlemen/women, is the use of language to perform the central sleight-of-hand of the drag performer, enfolding transformation and transgression in the gendered restrictive confines of grammar (see Butler 2008). This grammatical cross-dressing uses the performative moment, a place where inflection shifts meanings and calls to question the easy relationship between signifier and signified. As authoritative meanings slip out of grasp, one is reminded of Jacques Derrida's seminal "Signature Event Context" (1995 [1972]). Derrida's discussion of the ways that the supposed absence of the 'author' is fundamental to the manufacture of meanings might direct us to the myriad ways that linguistic drag creates a play between the presence of multiple interleaved meanings and the absence of a single authoritative bedrock of meaning.

Linguistic drag calls into question fixed identities by playing with the presence, or absence, of the signified. The putting on and taking off of clothes is mimicked by the language used. One key aspect to this linguistic

drag is that it offers a possible method of countering the kinds of hegemonic gender, sex, and desire discourses that Butler identifies. At the same time, these drag constructions still use the terms of gender binary that they parody, mock, and shake to their core. This linguistic quantum state of hegemony and counter-hegemony forces each term to take on some aspects of fundamental destabilization of the binary opposition. While not un-mooring language completely from meaning, gentlemen are women; somehow each side of the hegemonic and hierarchical gender construction begins to take on aspects of its opposite. This goes beyond a mere seeming, at least on a linguistic level, to a deeper level which critiques the 'reality' of an inmost core of pure being. For human bodies this core would be its biological sex, which is posited to exist in a pre-discursive truth of the body (Butler 2008). For language, this core is the naturalized linkages between signifier and signified which serve to obscure the ways that these linkages are somehow arbitrary and yet social facts (Derrida 1966). Moving back to Bourdieu, linguistic drag decenters the linguistic and discursive habitus that defines gender and sex in culture. At the same time the points of articulation for these overlapping habituses and subjectivities is a place that has the force of an ontological truth.

Another key to linguistic drag is the portion of the show where the two lowest performing 'racers' must "lip sync for their lives" (*RDR* 2010). In terms of the show's dramatic arc, this is the climax, the point at which the two performers must be judged on their competence. The presence of the speaker here becomes shifted. Who is speaking the words, and with whose voice is the Drag Queen speaking? How does this *différance* between voice/body/gender/identity/meaning/performance cross-cut univocal conceptions of identity? In cross-cutting these identities we can see the functioning of a counter-discourse that disrupts the hegemonic discourses of gender that swirl around the performance.

While the academic discourse necessary to discuss these issues posits yawning chasms that open up and threaten to engulf us in a horror of absence, *RDR*'s 'drag racers,' the show's producers, and the avid viewing audience who have contributed to the show's continued presence on cable, all highlight the productive nature of these gaps and slippages. As the drag queens perform and the viewing audience watches, the drama stems from the narrative of the show and not the existential dread of postmodernism's unraveling identities.

5. Technologies of Drag

One of the most obvious aspects of the show, as mentioned above, is the transposing of the 'drag racers' in their normal attire, and in their female drag. While this transposition is the most stark, there is also a clearly directed

aspect of the show where the camera is allowed to linger on partially dressed bodies. This focus on the methods of transformation, the tucking of male external genitals, the padding of the body to resemble 'feminine' curves, the tricks of make-up, and the arrangement of clothing (including the occasional blurred shot where the body transgresses the limits of taste), all serve to indicate a preoccupation with the technologies of drag. While these technologies may be corsets and make-up, they are also reflected in the bodily poetics[6] that mark the performative aspects of being a woman.

In identifying these technologies of drag, I must also highlight how these transformations, based on a mimesis of the performative, are also roughly contiguous in effect with Butler's conception of gender parody. What the *RDR*'s 'drag racers' highlight is the ways that the mimesis of the performatives of 'woman' need not "further a politics of despair . . . which affirms the seemingly inevitable exclusion of marginal genders from the territory of the natural and the real" (Butler 2008: 200). We might look to *RDR* as an inversion of that politics, one of bodily eumorphia that can naturalize the un-naturalizable marginal. The search for realness occurs in spite of the way that the 'drag racers' point out the "fundamentally inhabitable" nature of the "ontological locales," which in bodily practice becomes a joyful and positive aspect of identity (Butler 2008: 200).

In the episode of *RDR* under consideration, the main challenge is one in which the 'racers' must dress in drag as a bride AND as their own groom. Using the mimetic magic of photo compositing, each performer holds his own hand. One key aspect, as indicated by the above discussion of the nature of drag practice, is that for these performers the approach to being the man in a heterosexual union (leaving aside for the moment the actuality of bodies or the sexual orientations of the 'racers') is one that involves just as much 'technology' as the female drag to which they are accustomed.[7] None of the 'racers' elects to 'be himself' by wearing his street clothes. Each of the 'racers' uses make-up to mimic the facial hair that they must remove to be convincing women. Contestant Tyra Sanchez describes the experience of wearing male drag as one of discomfort. In an intercut interview segment she states that she feels far less comfortable with male drag because female drag is fun, playful, and freeing in authorizing performance (*RDR* 2010). And another 'racer,' Pandora Boxx in an intercut interview during her photo session, says that she "feels more like a drag king than a man" in her male drag (*RDR* 2010). Both of these statements point to the affect that performative technologies take on when they become overtly tied to aspects of lived identity.

These superimposed images, intercut with the queens in their 'street' clothes, all linked in the "optical unconscious" of the viewers, are a revelation and a proof of the ways that technologies can transform bodies (Taussig

1993: 23). Yet somehow in spite of this mutability there is some possibility for the type of radical agency which Butler discusses in the final pages of *Gender Trouble* (2008). Without blinking a false eyelash these drag performers highlight the lived experience of identities that can transgress without being forced to invert hierarchies, or worse, to pretend that gender hierarchies do not exist. Three bodies and one person, this overlapping of multiple aspects of identity can be played in any number of directions by the performer. Technologies of drag make it possible to "reveal the performative status of the natural" (Butler 2008: 200). While it must be admitted that unlimited mimetic doubling may be a danger to conceptions of fixed identities and social orders, the 'drag racers' and show producers point to a fierce joy and liberating power in this "riot of mergers and copies posing as originals" that pass among the photographic images (Taussig 1993: 42).

At the same time there is a necessary aspect of competence which is attendant on drag performance, which translates well to the genre of 'reality' television. *RDR*'s 'drag racers' are assessed by a panel of judges, which frequently include well-known celebrities, as well as RuPaul herself. Each of the performers is judged on any number of specific levels of competency, from skill with make-up, to esthetic decisions regarding outfits, to the ineffable, such as being 'fierce' or looking 'busted.'[8] These competencies are judged not only on the quality of their performance, but also on the performative aspects of their drag.

These technologies, and their related competencies, highlight the ways in which *RDR*, both performers and structure, de-naturalizes the performatives of the body. At the same time, the show makes clear the importance of performance and performatives in the construction of vital, meaningful, and coherent identities.

This paper has attempted to illustrate the ways in which drag culture, as exemplified by *RuPaul's Drag Race*, illustrates the positive possibilities of de-naturalized gender through performative parody. Through the technologies of drag, physical and ineffable, the 'drag racers' exhibit the possibilities of radical agencies that highlight flexibility, movement, transgression, and transformations. Through the mimetic doubling of television, the 'drag racers' naturalize and normalize the possibilities of difference in a form of body eumorphia. It is hoped that these formulations, while not entirely new, might serve to allow the interrogation of other forms of gender parody in ways that highlights the use of language to create successful disruptions of hegemonic gender discourse and praxis.

NOTES

1. Eleganza is a portmanteau that implies both elegance and the intensification of dress, style, make-up, and bodily poetics that is full of symbolic significance within drag communities.

2. See Jody Taylor's excellent discussion of faux or bio queens in "The music of kings and bio queens," *Kritikos*, 4 (2007), interthory.org/jtaylor.htm (accessed October 21, 2012).

3. 'Reading,' or 'throwing shade,' is a fixture of drag culture where cutting witticisms are leveled at fellow drag queens. As described in the 2005 film *Paris is burning*, is a highly developed form of insult that is both personalized and used between drag queens as a form of social performance that confers social prestige based on accuracy and competency in performance. Dorien Corey describes shade as, "I don't tell you you're ugly, but I don't have to tell you because you KNOW you're ugly and that's . . . Shade" (Livingstone et al., 2007).

4. Appropriately beginning each episode dressed in men's clothing, often a suit, but sometimes dressed in coordination with some overarching theme of the episode. In the first episode of the second season where both challenges referenced the film *Gone With the Wind*, RuPaul carried a pink parasol as an accessory to her suit.

5. Realness is a key concept in drag performance.

6. Unfortunately a full discussion of the poetics of drag bodies will have to be deferred to future research.

7. We might speak of a drag queen's body as being the site of a self-discipline of femininity, in the Foucauldian sense.

8. *Fierce* and *busted* are key markers of competence in the drag community. With *fierceness* being a positive descriptor of a mixture of skill in physical mimicry, the technologies of femininity (including make-up and dress), and projected confidence that resides in more subtle performative markers. *Busted*, while not a direct antonym of *fierce*, is often used as a contrast to it. A *busted* queen is one whose competence is being called into question, in any dimension of her drag or performance.

REFERENCES

Bourdieu, Pierre (1977), *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Butler, Judith (2008), *Gender Trouble*. New York: Routledge.

Conlon, Edward (1995), "The Drag Queen and the Mummy," *Transition* (65): 4–24.

Derrida, Jacques (1995), "Signature Event Context," *Limited Inc*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

_____ (1978), *Writing and Difference*. Alan Bass (trans.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Garber, Marjorie (1992), *Vested Interests: Cross-dressing and Cultural Anxiety*. New York: Routledge.

Griggs, Claudine (1998), *S/he: Changing Sex and Changing Clothes*. New York: Berg.

Livingston, Jennie, Paul Gibson, and Jonathan Oppenheim (2005), *Paris is Burning*. Burbank, CA: Miramax Home Entertainment.
Mouffe, Chantal (1992), "Feminism, Citizenship and Radical Democratic Politics," in Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott (eds.), *Feminists Theorize the Political*. New York: Routledge, 369–384.
Newton, Esther (1979), *Mother Camp: Female Impersonators in America*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
RuPaul's Drag Race. "Here Comes the Bride." RuPaul's Drag Race>Season 2, 43:00. 3 March 2010.
Suthrell, Charlotte (2004), *Unzipping Gender: Sex, Cross-Dressing and Culture*. New York: Berg.
Taussig, Michael (1993), *Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses*. New York: Routledge.
Taylor, Jodie (2007) "The Music of Kings and Bio Queens," *Kritikos* 4, intertheory.org/jtaylor.htm (accessed October 21, 2012).

Ramey Moore is a Ph.D. student, teaching assistant, and Doctoral Academy Fellow in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Arkansas-Fayetteville with a Master's degree in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Texas at Austin. His research focuses on gender, media, advocacy groups and interactions with the natural world.

Addleton Academic Publishers

Journal of Research in Gender Studies
Volume 3(2), 2013, pp. 27–47, ISSN: 2164-0262

POSTPATRIARCHY

DZUNG KIEU NGUYEN
dnguyen@albany.edu
State University of New York at Albany

ABSTRACT. This article points out: *"The combination of men and women in families is irrational."* Men and women are two different "species." They only require sexual activities from each other, which are considered the less time-consuming activities during their lives. Sex must be treated as an enemy of marriage, due to its inferior and treacherous nature, and should not be included in marriage. Men and women should not live together in a family, since this institution must be understood as a permanent place for all family members and is expected to have a solid structure. The traditional family model is the result of men's enslavement of women and the exaggeration of the role of sex. This model creates an overwhelming advantage for men in selecting partners, proposing marriage, and other family activities. This article indicates: (i) The prominent family models existing between the group-marriage period and now are sex-based family models. (ii) Technical and social conditions nowadays require a new and sustainable base for a family. The selected targets in this study are the consanguineous and sworn relationships among same-sex people in case they choose to be heterosexual, (and in turn, among opposite-sex persons when they engage in homosexuality). For example, a family can consist of two blood brothers (or sworn brothers or cousins) with their children, in case they are heterosexual. This family model is named the *non-sex based family (NSBF) model*, since the sexual needs will be met outside the family. The article also outlines a post-patriarchal society with the presence of NSBFs, and argues that the new model should be seen as an essential development trend of society.

Keywords: same sex marriage; sexuality; patriarchy; gender inequality; family

1. Introduction

Many studies point out that marriage is associated with better health, for both males and females, compared to living alone. Children born into families with both parents present are shown to develop more preferably than those living with single parents. Humans need to belong to a family for material

and moral support and in order to share feelings, views, rights, and duties. The traditional marriage – one wife, one husband – however, has shown its backward and obsolete aspects. Many other forms of marriage, such as polygamy and group marriage have been practiced but the results have not been very significant.

This article indicates the need to separate men and women, and at the same time, separate sex out of the family. It proposes a new family model called the non-sex based family (NSBF). Since the new family form will help to eliminate the patriarchy within a family and to improve human's society structure, the study is therefore entitled "Postpatriarchy."

The article is structured as follows: The second section claims that the traditional family model is an irrational and corrupt institution. In more detail, it points out that including a sexual function in marriage is wrongful, and both sexes can fulfill all other three family functions: sharing, support, and lineage. It particularly emphasizes the fundamental differences between the sexes and the disadvantages of women in typical families. By opposing this form of family, it concurrently criticizes all other cohabiting forms, where men and women live together and sexual activities exist in their union. The third section proposes a new alternative model of family and describes the evolution of marriage and family according to sexual contexts. It also outlines a post-patriarchal society where the new family form presents. The last section shows the prominence of the new model in comparison with other existent family structures, providing answers for foreseen critics and suggesting ideas for future research.

2. Irrationality of Traditional Families

A traditional family in this study is described as the cohabitation of a man and a woman engaging in sexual activities, which may or may not involve children. It is also called a monogamous family. This inquiry is not trying to delve into any legal aspect, so the concept of "marriage" here also includes non-marital cohabitation. This study focuses on this kind of family, as it is among the most popular kinds of families in the world at present. The functions of the family are classified into four main groups: **(i) Sex**: the family is the realm where sexual activities take place; (ii) **Sharing**: life partners share their views, feelings, rights and duties in the family with each other; (ii) **Support**: the life partner is the physical and mental source of support and takes care of the other in times of illness or old age; (iv) **Lineage**: family is the place to rear children, extend life, and give inheritance to offspring. (It is noted that reproduction is not linked with the lineage function but rather the sexual function, for it is a product of sexual activities).

An ideal family in this study is presupposed to be a permanent and solid structure in order to protect its members from life's difficulties, help them implement their long term plans, and rear offspring. Some people may argue that serial marriage is quite stimulating, as living with different partners throughout one's life may entertain you with fresh and new feelings. As to my opinion, an unanticipated separation will create psychological trauma for those engaging in cohabitation, especially women. Even marriage ending like a short or medium-term contract (e.g., from one to five years) can have serious impacts on long-term investment plans for material and immaterial capital, as well as being a detriment to children. Therefore, this article considers the notion: the longer-term and better-structured the family is, the better.

2.1 Irrationality of Sex in Family

In this part I will point out the relatively unimportant role that sex plays in marriage. Moreover, with its dangerous and inferior nature, the existence of sex in marriage can be destructive.

The sexual morality of a traditional family specifies that sexual activities are not to appear outside of the family. However, such morality has not gained support from many schools of philosophy. A conventional argument of non-monogamous advocates is that persons who are monogamous usually "either have low 'sex drive' or are exerting superhuman control over their sexual desires" (Overall 1998, 14). Liberals generally promote a "non-interference to individuals as long as their actions are based on freedom of choice and don't harm others directly and significantly, unless consent to be harmed is given" (Holbrook 2007, 8). Romantics claim, nevertheless, that sexual consent is not enough as sex should be tied to love. It is easily seen that sex based on mutual consent or love is not limited to within the family and it is not necessary to be faithful to one single partner. Yet, those who most strongly oppose sex in the family are likely the radical feminists. Catharine MacKinnon states that "sexuality is a social construct of male power: defined by men, forced on women, and constitutive in the meaning of gender" (MacKinnon 1989, 316). Some others like Charlene Muehlenhard and Jennifer Schrag are not as radical as McKinnon, however, they regard sexual intercourse in a traditional American family as coercion, from which they, without restraint, deny the positive role of sex in the marriage (Primoratz 2001, 211).

As for me, consent is necessary but not sufficient. Let's take an example of a woman who grows up in a special family or is a supporter of a particular religion or comes from a particular culture. In her childhood, she was taught to pleasingly submit herself to any requirements of men. When she grows up, she is easily involved with sex that is not worth participating in, according to viewpoint of most Western women. This case should not

be considered "ignorance" as per the definition of David Archard, author of the book *Sexual consent*, because we have known that many people do not change their points of view throughout their lives, including those on sex, whether or not they are re-educated in a non-native country (Archard 1997, 2). (For example, many female immigrants do not change their views on outfits despite having lived in America for years, though not to imply that the American view on outfits is more appropriate). In this case, I will opine that the woman is "perceptually handicapped" because of her prior education and there is no chance for recovery. Similar to mental disability, her consent is worthless. Furthermore, I find myself giving the nod for the views of radical feminists – men's dominance in every social area (economy, politic, culture, military, science, etc) causes most sexual acts, including traditional sex in marriage, to be coerced. More or less, the perception disability of women is a popular phenomenon across this world, making the majority of sexual consent among people with heterosexual orientation meaningless.

Traditional marriage, like almost all prevalent forms of family from the group-marriage time until now, is based on the one hypothesis that sex is indispensable. That is why I refer to such a form of family as a sex-based family. The goal I set out to achieve here is to assess the role of sex in marriage. Is sex so important that it must exist in the family?

Sex in marriage, according to Hegel, is an expression of not only physical but also spiritual bond between the spouses. These relationships create the most important product of marriage – children (Halper 2001, 832). Alan Goldman suggests that sexual activities create a physical connection between two individuals involved and hence a pleasure which this contact generates. He also admits sex as a means to present love and tenderness, two important factors of a sustainable marriage, which causes benefits to their children. Nevertheless, Goldman insists on a distinction between sex and love in order to avoid a confusion that sexual desire is mistaken for love. He refutes Thomas Nagel's and Robert Solomon's views that sex is a means of "interpersonal communication" because "that one can communicate various feelings during sex acts does not make these acts merely or primarily a means of communicating" (Nagel 1969; Solomon 1974; Goldman 1977, 268, 273).

Both Nagel and Solomon do not include sex in the context of marriage. And Goldman, who seeks to separate sex from love, must imply sex does not necessarily appear only in family. I could be of the same mind as Hegel, Goldman, Nagel, Solomon and many others that sexual activities take place for the purpose of physical and spiritual bonds, interpersonal communication, pleasure, love, reproduction and so on. This means under a qualitative perspective, the value of sex diverges in marriage. But such a view makes it difficult to assess the importance of sex in the family. In this article I suggest examining the importance of sex under quantitative perspectives.

A measure that has become popular in the press as well as in the literature on social sciences is the number of sexual participations in a year (or week) and the duration of each. Statistics show that the average number of occasions of sexual intercourse in the world is 106 times per year – equivalent to twice a week. Total time spent on foreplay and intercourse is nearly 40 minutes per encounter, both in Canada and the US (Link and Copeland 2000, 1). Suppose the average time one spends for family life is 13 hours daily, namely 5460 minutes per week. Compared to the time used for sex, 80 minutes per week, it is found that sex plays no significant role, contrary to conventional belief that sex is an important feature of marriage. One may argue that physical intimacy between a man and a woman requires not only sexual intercourse, but also touching, hugging, kissing, holding hands etc. However, the latter activities happen also among same-sex people, and bring them some similar feelings. In this study, sexual activities imply sexual intercourse and thus the time consumed by these kinds of activities are relatively small compared to the total time one lives in the traditional family. Assessing value of a kind of human behavior or performance simply by its time consumption has been mentioned in philosophical literature. In her book *Justice, Gender, and the Family* Susan Okin indicates that a lack of justice in family is reflected in the difference in time spent on housework between husband and wife (Okin 1991, Chap. 7). Some people may debate that the evaluation of sex's role in the family should consider both qualitative and quantitative aspects. This article is not aimed to eliminate sex from personal life or to force everybody to abstain from sex, but to propose a new form of family, in which sex is taken out. Some other people may question that sex within the family is completely different from that outside family, and that eliminating sex from the family is like losing the bond with your spouse (including physical and spiritual bonds), as well as a source of interpersonal communication, pleasure, love, reproduction, harmony and so on. Let's take an example: in many Asian countries before the 20th century, three-generation families used to be a social norm. Nowadays, elderly parents living separately from newly-married young couple has become popular. Compared to previous generations, married couples nowadays no longer benefit from such close family bonds, material and immaterial support, and childcare from their parents. But in return, they benefit from privacy and independence in decision making. Thus, losing some forms of family connection is not necessarily a bad thing. Still, sex is simply a way, but not the only way, to achieve the goals of the marriage. Some people may argue that a family is not a "family" without sex. These people should review cases in which, for example, one of the spouses is innately morbid or sick from an accident, making them unable to perform real sexually activities from the beginning of or during marriage; homosexuals who get married to partners

of the opposite sex; those who are blood-related living together without sexual relations. Such cases are still considered family. An institution is called a "family" whenever a group of people are living together sharing material and spiritual values and significantly sacrifice themselves for the benefit of the others. In short, I want to confirm that considering its quantitative aspects, sex accounts for a relatively small role in marriage, and does not necessarily stay within the family.

I would like to add more reasons for which sex in traditional marriage is irrational and even destructive. Since the average sexual demand of men is more frequent than that of women, to have proper consent, in most cases, men are required to restrain their sexual needs or women are required to overserve. This causes oppressiveness. In my opinion, fidelity (in the sense of ability to control, having sex with only one person in a certain period) is not innate to human instinct. Those who are subjected to similar education can have different levels of fidelity, as fidelity depends partially on education but mostly on the chemical and physical structure of each person. The traditional family typically requires fidelity toward only one single partner during marriage, which is strict and unreasonable since such a request demands the highest level of fidelity in people. In addition, the expectation of sexual harmony in a long marriage is merely an illusion. The common characteristics of a woman that men are attracted to are physical attractiveness and youth, which fade away over time. This makes it easy for men to gradually lose their love, and as a result, their sexual arousal starts straying toward other people rather than the spouse. Once the fidelity and love cannot be maintained, sex becomes destructive. In addition, sexual activities in a family can cause bouts of domestic violence, in which the culprits are usually said to men. All of these arguments are designed to show that sex is a factor that ruins marriage.

Next I will discuss the moral stature of sex. Sex is praised, poeticized, and exaggerated in order to seduce marital partners to serve each other's demand. However, regardless of many efforts to speak for the nature of sexual intercourse, to discuss its details it is still not considered of refined activities. Sexual hospitality is not considered an official action rite in modern societies. Prostitution, though already accepted to be an official job in many countries, is not recognized as a respectable job. Let's see Mathew Altman interpreting Kant's views: "When someone has sex, then, he succumbs to an animal impulse, allows himself to be used as things or beasts are used, and uses his partner merely as a means to his own pleasure" (Altman 2010: 312). Although sex is defined as a basic instinct, a man paying his court to a woman by portraying desperate sexual need is perceived to have more "beast" than "man", and can even be fined for that behavior. During conversation, sexual activity is closely connected to unseemly ex-

pressions. MacKinnon treats “feminine sexuality” as a “fuckee” which drives the very “sexual shame” among women (Cornell 1991: 2248). Still, sexual intercourse is discouraged to show to small children because of its low standard of decency. It has been posited that showing intercourse among people (including homosexual or heterosexual activities) is unhygienic and therefore will disappear in the future.

In short, this section supports the views of radical feminists, considering most sexual activities in traditional families as coercion, and suggests an evaluation of the role of sex in the family by time spent consuming sexual activities. It particularly highlights the necessity to separate sex out of the family due to its less important, inferior, and treacherous nature.

2.2 Three Functions of Family and Gender Stereotype

In this part, I will discuss gender roles in the implementation of family functions: sharing, support and lineage.

I temporarily admit here that men and woman can share views, feelings, and rights, but people of the same sex can as well, and at times in a better way. I will come back for the discussion in the subsection of “the fundamental difference between men and women.” The matter to be discussed here is sharing of family duties and child rearing. Can both men and women take charge of such duties?

Conventional arguments for gender differential roles usually appeal in Christian and natural bases. The traditional stance argues that sex-based stereotypes and gender differentiated labor are not “oppression but the fulfillment of women’s nature, and necessary for family and social cohesion.” Thus, women’s freedom and gender equality should be framed under these restrictions (Blackstone 1975: 243). Margaret Somerville claims that marriage has a history of a thousand years of “institutionalized, natural parenthood and its corresponding rights and duties” (Woodcock 2009: 869, 870). John Finnis judges the one wife, one husband marriage structure as a base for procreation without the support of a third person, and thus, it is a necessary structure to form a sustainable family for children (Finnis 1997: 10).

However, there are many successful objections to these arguments. The first to be mentioned is the comments in support of same sex family, although they only indirectly criticize gender stereotype. Jim Vernon interprets Hegel’s views to protect same sex marriage, which generally overshadows different roles between men and women: “there is no ethical requirement that these couples represent both sexes” and “since sexual division plays no role in determining the marital relationship, marriage cannot be divided rigidly into sex roles” (Vernon 2009: 83). That same-sex or heterosexual marriage is ethically equivalent implies that gender differentiated roles are not necessary.

These arguments for same-sex family promotion also refute Finnis's views. Altman believes that Kant's opinions on marriage provide us the tools to morally promote gender equality: Marital morality cannot be based on religious view or what is "natural" (Altman 2010: 310). Gender stereotypes in marriage are also opposed by libertarians and feminists. Scott Woodcock treats Somevill's appeal for tradition as irrational, because parenthood and procreative issues of prior conception of marriage may be a precise target for a modern amendment. Woodcock provides several deviations from standard marriage (e.g. marriage of people beyond their fertile ages and of infertile couples) in order to justify that procreation is not an inherent function of marriage (Woodcock 2009: 870, 871). Contemporary liberal feminists require minimizing or eliminating the difference in gender roles in order to promote gender equality and freedom in households. Both spouses share equally the family chores and childcare duties, sharing the role of "breadwinner," and having the same opportunities in developing their careers (Ferguson: 2007).

As to my observation, single adolescents, irrespective of male or female, could undertake almost all their tasks in the family. (A visual example could be found in the dormitory). The jobs requiring professional skills or strength, e.g. in-home furniture repair, could be outsourced. It is unreasonable to think that they will lose these skills after engaging in marriage. In addition, the difference between children raised in unisexual or multi-sexual environments is not as worrying as the difference between those subject to varied economic conditions, educational background, and capacities of one's parents. Even in traditional families, the difference between the number and sex of the children (family with all sons, family with all daughters, family with one child and family with many children, etc.) and the birth spacing among children can lead to large differences in child development. Hence, proponents of the division of labor by gender should become obsolete.

Now I will discuss material and moral supports. In one-income families, the wife usually takes up housework (unpaid work) along with child care duties, while her husband works for money. In case of illness and old age, the husband becomes the only financial support while the wife offers "services." However, as shown above, men can also be responsible for family duties and women can take part in the labor market if necessary. This means both of the two are in charge of providing material support. In two-income families, the average wage of the husband is often higher than that of the wife. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that material support is the husband's duty. Moral support can imply either sex offering such to the other. So, material and moral support in a family does not depend on gender.

In brief, both sexes can undertake all work in the household, child-rearing responsibility, and give support to each other with regard to physical

and mental materials in case of illness and old age. The sharing of views, feelings, and rights can also be done by anyone, no matter what gender they belong. (I will discuss this point in detail in the next subsection). The division of housework by gender would create inequality in the family and adversely affect the education of future generations, as many feminists previously stated.

2.3 Why Men and Women Should Not Live Together

2.3.1 The Fundamental Difference between Men and Women

The desire to emphasize the differences between sexes has long existed, maybe since the advent of philosophy. There are two prominent stances: (i) women are deformed versions of men (ii) women and men are fundamentally different.

History has seen many famous thinkers advocate views of the inferiority of women. Montesquieu and Rousseau emphasize women's physical weakness while Comte supposes that the "intrinsic weakness of her reason" leads to their subordination to men. Schopenhauer on the other hand concurs with Aristotle's opinion that women's inferiority is in both body and mind. Some others such as Jerome and St. Aquinas appealed to religious views to assert the superiority of men. Even recent philosophers such as Jose Ortega and William James presuppose a wife's subordination and husband's domination in most marriages, and a "representative American" considering a wife dependent (Bell 1989: 140–148).

The acknowledgment of weakness in women as mentioned above originates mainly from the disproportionate success of men in many social areas in their time, along with the law's favorable treatment of males. Many feminists and liberalists in history, as well as those contemporary, consider gender differences as basic but disagree with the view of women's subordination as their destiny. The liberals claim that any sexual difference preventing women from being responsible for certain tasks require special treatment and women should be equal to men in all social, economic, political, and legal aspects (Blackstone 1975: 244). Mill and Condorcet deny the superiority of men with the argument that except for a very small number of outstanding men, men and women are equal (Bell 1989: 142).

Some traditional and contemporary feminists insist, however, that sexual differences should be ignored in most social contexts with the exception of those involved in reproduction. The assumption here is that the physiological differences between the sexes do not drive any significant differences in nonphysical aspects (e.g. sensitivity, reasoning, moral deliberation). Since the sexual distinction is common in most social institutions and the disad-

vantages of women in many social domains are well known, the mainstream of feminist thought considers a non-sexist society to be the ultimate goal for women's freedom. In contrast, according to Alison Jaggar, there is a fact that sexual differences exist not only in reproductive organs but as well in nonphysical aspects. Instead, feminists can use women's physical weakness and their reproductive ability as grounds for requesting special treatment of females in order to counterbalance their gender inequality (Jaggar 1974: 276–288).

This article favors Hegel's opinion on "opposing natures" of the two sexes: "the difference between men and women is like that between animals and plants" (Okin 1996: 33). The women's physical weakness and the nonphysical distinctions between the sexes are obvious but cannot be grounds for the superiority of men. The current focus is more on the nonphysical disparities, as some people are convinced that the attraction of partners does not only include sexual need but also incorporates considering the harmony of souls, hobbies, and characteristics. The following paragraph indicates that these nonphysical differences between the sexes are fundamental and their harmony is fallacious or at least is not as good as that among same sex people.

A substantial body of philosophical literature acknowledges the sexual differences in mind, (e.g. Rousseau (Okin 1996: 34)). The psychological and cognitive differences between the sexes, according to Nancy Chodorow, are rooted in their contrasting infanthood development (Bordo 1988: 621). Graciela Hierro insists that "male-female inequality is not the product of a biological difference but of psychological, social and political differences" (Hierro 1994: 175). Neuroethics' studies also admit the sexual distinctions "in brain anatomy, chemistry, and function, and involving cognitive domains such as emotion, memory, and learning" (Chalfin et al. 2008: 1). The basis of the difference in characteristics between the sexes is also well documented.

As to my opinion, these distinctions in mind also lead to inevitable differences in many features of male and female communication (in word selection, topic, number of topics, ways to change topics, and purpose of conversation). The so-called harmony of nonphysical perspectives between men and women should be understood as partly sharing and suffering, different from similar sharing among same-sex people. This means those of the same sex can fulfill the sharing function of family better than those of opposite sex. Men and women are different species. That they live together under the same roof means that male and female species are put into the same proverbial cage. In this place, the huge difference is restrained by the power of men's physicality and made up by sexual intercourse. This dynamic can lead to domestic violence (physical, psychological, and sexual), in which the culprits are typically said to be the men.

2.3.2 Disadvantages of Women in Traditional Family

Currently, men still have an overwhelming advantage in the family and marriage. In the majority of countries in the world men have rights to propose marriage or ask for cohabitation with women. Radical feminists consider family a political institution where women are oppressed. Many of them are convinced, with Marx, that the only way to liberate women is to abolish the capitalist system at the same time as class system (Blackstone 1975: 244). As to Iris Young, a stable marriage contemporarily means a women's dependence on men and their suffering from inequality and various kinds of male supremacy, both in the domestic and public sphere (Young 1995, 545).

I concur with Okin's opinion that the traditional family is unjust and is a cause of women's vulnerability to "dependency, exploitation, and abuse". It is also a less preferable institution in term of the first school in which to educate future citizens about justice and fairness (Okin 1994; Kymlicka 1991: 82). As long as men and women live under a same roof, gender inequality and domestic violence cannot be eliminated because of men's physical strength and women's altruistic nature. Men get married because family life brings more profitable things to them. Although women are thought to be passive in marriage, people still think that women need a family more than men do. Men try to hide intention and console themselves that women also benefit from the marriage.

Thus, it could be said that the traditional family model creates an overwhelming advantage for men both pre and within marriage. The difference between the sexes is so fundamental, and the disadvantages of women are so severe, that it is better to separate them into different spaces.

2.4 Restriction of Traditional Families

Linking the subsections 1 and 2, one can recognize that only the sexual function strictly leads to the participation of both sexes. The activities driven from this function, however, consume relatively little time as previously shown. This is the reason this article states that "men and women require only sexual activities from each other, which are considered the less time-consuming activities during their lives." Traditional families require life partners to combine all of the four functions (sex, sharing, support and lineage), in which sex is the inferior and treacherous one as described.

Taking the analyses above into consideration, it is shown that the traditional family is an irrational and corrupt institution due to of the forced combination of two different species (men and women), the inclusion of sex (a small contributor but devastator of marriage), the large gender inequality, as well as the strict integration of many functions of the family. These facts

also explain the fragility of marriage in the western world today. Family should be a permanent and solid structure in order to protect its members from life's storms, helping them implement their long term plans and rear offspring. That's why I support the solution to separate men and women, and at the same time, separate sex out of the family.

There is a large body of literature exploring ways to satisfy sexual need within marriage, but very few mention how to separate sex out of the family, as to my knowledge. Sex is not a good base to keep the family stable. This study aims to find another base for the family. Details of this plan will be discussed in the next section.

3. A New Model of Family – Non Sex Based Family

In the book *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, Engel speculates that a monogamous family (one wife, one husband) stems from a pairing family, in which the husband has an official wife among many wives. Concurrently he is also her official husband among many other husbands. The reason for a transition of the pairing family to monogamy is that in order to be sure of the wife's fidelity, and thus the paternity of children, "she is delivered unconditionally into the power of the husband." Engel believes that the monogamous family model is created by a patrilineal inheritance rule. Matriarchy ended and made room for patriarchy because of the victory of male over female (Engel 1884, chap. 2 (III), 1, 10; chap. 2 (IV), 1).

This article proposes the idea that almost all prevalent family models which were formed between the group-marriage period and now are sex-based family models. In the previous sections, I have shown that men and women are two different species. They only require sexual activities from each other, which are considered to be the less time-consuming activities during their lives. They do not need to live together in a house. The traditional sex-based family model is no longer suitable to the contemporary technological social contexts. The need for gender equality, the need of sexual freedom, the development of techniques to support autoeroticism, of medical methods to support safe sex, birth control, as well as that of technologies of assisted reproduction (artificial insemination, cloning) all facilitate a new family model. Moreover, that the development of tools and supporting methods for sexual activity is increasing reflects the idea that reciprocal dependence between the two sexes is becoming gradually lessened. Therefore, it is possible to separate men and women, as well as family functions (sex, sharing, support, and lineage), so that individuals could satisfy them in a flexible way.

As argued previously, sex is not a good base for forming a family. This study aims to find another base for the family: the blood relationship or sworn relationship among same-sex people who have a compatibility of souls, hobbies, characteristics and interests, and have heterosexual orientation (and among different-sex people should they have homosexual orientation). An example of this kind of family could be blood brothers (or cousins, uncle and nephew, blood sisters, aunt and niece, grandfather and grandson, grandmother and granddaughter, etc.) or, among non-blood relationship people, i.e. individuals engaging in a sworn relationship (sworn brothers, sworn sisters, sworn uncle and sworn nephew, sworn aunt and sworn niece etc.) with or without their offspring. This kind of family is referred to as *non-sex based family (NSBF)*, since sexual activities will be take place outside the family. This model will consist of two adults in each family, though a larger number of adults could also be feasible. I believe that the number of families consisting of two adults will make up the majority of NSBFs because it is a reasonable number of family members for sharing feelings, rights and duties, benefits, and also getting through all family decisions. Same sex people (if they are heterosexual) are proposed to live together so that there will be no sexual activities in the family. This kind of physiological need will be offered by external channels. Blood relationships are chosen because of their sustainable nature. The children can be their biological children or adopted children.

Figure I illustrates the evolution of marriage and families over time. Sexual activities will happen outside the families. Society is required to develop institutions to offer different kinds of these activities and encourage private channels. For instance, at workplaces there could be love houses next to the facilities where staff's sexual activities could take place. Centers or love clubs will be more popular like restaurants and groceries. The sexual contract will also become widespread. Sexual technology, safe-sex products, and matching counseling will flourish. Recently, futurist Ian Pearson predicts that man will be able to make love with electric equipment and without a sexual partner by 2030 (also called electric autoeroticism, as to Pearson (2011)). His prediction does not conflict with the proposal of this article.

I agree with Firestone and some other researchers stating that natural reproduction will be barbarian in the future, gradually disappear, and will be replaced by artificial means of reproduction (Firestone 1970: 229). Non-natural reproduction will be made anonymous to avoid any inconvenience that might be caused. NSBFs will make up the majority in post-patriarchal society. Other kinds of families and cohabitations (traditional family, single parent family, polygamy, group marriage etc.) will still exist but make up the minority. However, NSBFs will not exist forever and will gradually disappear during the development of the human enhancement (also known

as trans-human) process, which will cause fundamental psychological and physiological changes, e.g. it will eliminate the mental and asset sharing needs and the need for support in times of illness. This coincides with Karl Marx's prediction regarding the disappearance of families in the communist regime. Another factor that might exert an influence on the existence of families is the prevalence transgender operations, changing males to female and vice versa, which could be very easy thanks to the human enhancement process.

Figure II describes the current and future state of families, and sexual and offspring development institutions. A traditional family includes four functions: sex, sharing, support and lineage. A single father or single mother with his or her children forms a family with only one function: lineage. In the future, a typical family may include only three functions: sharing, support and lineage. Some traditional channels providing additional sexual activities such as public love centers and clubs, brothels, sex groups, personal relationships will become main channels. In addition, the new channels such as love houses at workplaces will be established. Artificial reproduction centers and child rearing centers will also be developed in order to reduce the burden of the lineage function in the family.

3.1 How Will the Postpatriarchy Happen?

Once the theory on post-patriarchy is disseminated, its foremost supporters will be women who are struggling with difficulties in finding ideal life partners, liberals, and concupiscent men. Single parents will find one another to share happiness and sadness. People over 50 encounter more challenges in finding a good opposite-sex partner because they, especially women, face declining physical attractiveness, among other age-related disadvantages. NSBF will more likely be their choice as their sexual needs are reduced significantly in comparison to that in their youth. Gay communities will also promote this theory because it helps reduce discrimination against same-sex families. Consequently, there will be a strong support from female adolescents influenced by gender equality development. Then will come the foundation and popularity of love centers. The women's movement will exert an impact on men so that they will feel ashamed of the one man, one woman marriage model. At last, this model will be accepted by the majority of men in society. Since the model requires consent from only a few individuals in order to form a family, its feasibility seems to be higher than the utopian female society model developed by Gilman (1915). I quite believe that in the future people will define the monogamous family as a dirty and barbarous institution, where two different animals are bound and suffer torment in a life full of ethical contradictions.

4. Discussion

4.1 Non Sex Based Family in Comparison with Other Family Forms

The NSBF is formed based on the blood relationship or sworn relationship (on the compatibility of hobbies, views, interests, and characteristics etc.) which are naturally sustainable bases or bases with high levels of sustainability. That the sexual activities are moved out of the NSBF will keep family life safe from the sabotage caused by sex. The NSBF model also helps to set up gender equality and strengthen women's role in society as well as reduce domestic violence. Feminist literature still has controversial views on the connection between gender equality and sexual assault. With NSBFs, existing and new types of sexual channels will be fostered toward widespread develop, and hence, such assaults will be reduced in the long run. As the average sexual need of men is higher than that of women, and since women are better protected by societal law, men must behave more gently toward female partners if they want to propose sexual relations. Separating sexual activities out of the family also helps religious people such as Buddhists practice at home more easily. Buddhism teaches that sex is not "evil," but the temptation and sexual need will disturb the peace and contentment of the soul and prevent spiritual development. On the other hand, concupiscent people, especially concupiscent men, will have the chance to enjoy a diversified and abundant sex life without any ethical barriers. NSBF indirectly assists to effectively reallocate "sexual resources" of the society. Benefactors and concupiscent persons could participate in sexually charitable activities. The NSBF model brings benefit not only to developed countries but also to developing ones. In these places, gender inequality in traditional families is very prevalent, and men have much more of an advantage in seeking life partners and decide almost all matters in the marriage. NSBF therefore supports women to be independent from men.

A substantial body of literature proposes various alternative forms of family. One such document is Strauss' (2012: 534–544) essay on polygamy. Another creative idea toward legalization is suggested by Elizabeth Brake: Minimal marriage. With this marital form, Brake implies that individuals can have legal marriages with more than one person, symmetrically or asymmetrically, no matter the sex of partners, number of partners, type of relationship, or the way they share their rights and responsibilities (Brake 2010: 303). Polygamy, group marriage, and "minimal marriage" nevertheless have their inherent problems of complexity. The process of family decision-making becomes more complex and is more time costly when more adults to participate. Importantly, they are all sex based family forms. By indicating the irrationality of the traditional family, I had concurrently criticized sex

based families, where men and women live together and sexual activities exist in their union. The NSBF model has strong points of gender equality, supports the ability to seek outside-marriage sexual partners, and possesses a relatively simple structure. The structure of the NSBF model simplifies the decision making process among a family's members and thus makes suitable to become widespread in society. Some NSBFs based on blood relationship also have advantages in term of maintaining biological bonds among adult family members. On the other hand, I admit that the new model has its own problems – for example those concerning biological children. Clearly the comparison of the theoretical models is sometimes ineffective because no one may be entirely inferior to another. Each model has its strengths and weaknesses and can fit into a certain group of citizens. More importantly, as argued by one of my readers, the theory is essential but may have unintended consequences. Only when put into practice will these models reveal clearly their positive and negative impacts on society.

Until now, models of living alone or being a single parent have not been practiced by the majority in society, since people still have mental and asset sharing demands and require moral support when sick or in old age, as well as a partner to assist in rearing children. NSBF can also be preferable to social groups because of its common features such as sharing assets and duties in family, and support to rear children.

4.2 Criticism of the Non-Sex Based Family Model

Although the post-patriarchal society has not yet appeared, I have foreseen some critical arguments against its prominence.

The NSBF is closely associated with the gay and lesbian family model. Some common problems of the two models, such as biological children and gender stereotype, have been discussed in the subsection "Irrationality of traditional families". The difference is that, though NSBFs will not face criticism regarding homosexual activities, it may encounter other critics, for example on matters involving sexual freedom, i.e. having more than one sexual partner at a time. The mistake here is that NSBFs do not necessarily relate to sexual freedom. Those who prefer the traditional monogamous fidelity can still seek mates who have the same views while those in favor of unrestricted sex, or that promote polyamory, can also look for like-minded partners. Opponents of sexual liberation usually link it with the erosion of the traditional families. The development of free love, however, may not be a bad thing but rather reflective of a current demand of modern society, in my opinion. Marriage forms should be consistent with the social context. Monogamy was not the initial marital form of human history, it was instead group marriage. It appeared simply to meet the need of undisputed

fatherhood and patrilineal inheritance, as speculated by Engel. It may therefore no longer fit the contemporary technological and social conditions, and the decline of traditional families may therefore be unavoidable.

Distance between sexual partners will be another arguable point of the NSBF model. Comparing it to the existent sex based family, there is a trade-off between sexual freedom and the availability of one long-term partner. Fortunately, the time consumed for sex is rather small in comparison to total time one lives in one's family as prior shown. Combining that with the future widespread appearance of out-of-family sex-provision channels and the development of assisted autoerotic techniques, many people will find themselves biased toward the new model.

Sanitary and sexual health is also of high interest. People who are against sexual freedom may argue that extramarital relations create conditions for spreading sexually transmitted diseases. That kind of relation, however, has become a widely developed phenomena now in western and some other parts of the world. It is necessary to encourage people to practice safe sex and facilitate innovations in technology supporting safe sex instead of prohibiting NSBFs. As to my opinion, fidelity is a forced concept and so is not suitable to people's basic instincts. People should sooner or later eliminate it. The current state of medical techniques is advanced enough to put this concept aside.

Another important argument is that the family consisting of one man and one woman will promote better health. This applies especially to men, who will benefit from the family life that keeps them in moderation and thus allow them to live longer. As discussed in previous sections, men prefer the traditional family since they can abuse women's kindness. It is hard to sympathize with ideas stating that men will become aggressive when separated from women, and more easily involved in crimes. In view of human rights, women are not responsible for men's depraved behaviors. There will surely be some comments stating that the separation of sexual activities out of families will lead to sexual hunger, especially for men who are poor, undereducated, and unattractive. However, similar to inequalities in income, education and physical attractiveness, which still exist worldwide today, society must deal with inequality in sexual resource, and find lasting solutions for sex allocation on a voluntary basis and develop respective institutions, instead of maintaining the unfavorable position of women in the family as is done today.

Importantly, the article does not intend to speculate on the legislative aspects of implementation, though those NSBFs associated with same-sex couples can benefit from the current movements in favor of same-sex marriage. Other arguments such as religious barriers may need to be considered. Religious representatives will surely criticize the family form since it is

against their present philosophy. However, religions could not hamper its progress as they have failed to prevent out-of-wedlock births and same-sex sexual activities. Society should admit these new institutions instead of trying to eliminate them, as they could bring benefits to a certain portion of the population.

5. Conclusions

At last, this research does not aim to eliminate existing family models but tries to add a new model for citizens to choose. Giving more options is necessary to meet the diversified demand of society. NSBFs, in fact, have existed in some forms in the world, but comprised a minority part in comparison to the number of sex based families. Moreover, there has been very little foundation for developing this kind of family to become a movement, or even a social trend, as to my knowledge. This study would like to lay out a philosophical foundation to start these movements and trends. As discussed previously, once this proposal is widely circulated, I believe that NSBFs will be an essential development of society.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank Elizabeth Anderson, Gerald Marschke, Lisa Fuller, Rachel Cohon, Nguyen Tien Zung, Ngo Quang Hung, Do Quoc Anh, Ha Duong Tuong, Tran Huu Dung, Tran Vinh Du, Zachary Klein, Phan Thu Trang, Le Dong Tam, Nguyen Xuan Oanh, Nguyen Hoang Linh, Pham Tuan Anh, Nguyen Bich Ngoc and Truong Anh Huy for their valuable advices, comments and supports.

REFERENCES

Altman, Mathew (2010), "Kant on Sex and Marriage: The Implications for the Same-Sex Marriage Debate," *Kant-Studien* 101. Jahrg., S: 309–330.

Archard, David (1997), *Sexual Consent*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Bell, Linda (1989), "Does Marriage Require a Head? Some Historical Arguments," *Hypatia* 4(1): 139–154.

Blackstone, William (1975), "Freedom and Women," *Ethics* 85(3): 243–248.

Bordo, Susan (1988), "Feminist Skepticism and the 'Maleness' of Philosophy," *The Journal of Philosophy* 85(11): 619–629.

Brake, Elizabeth (2010), "Minimal Marriage: What Political Liberalism Implies for Marriage Law," *Ethics* 120(2): 302–337.

Chalfin, Molly, Emily Murphy, and Katrina Karkazis (2008), "Women's Neuroethics? Why Sex Matters for Neuroethics," *The American Journal of Bioethics* 8(1): 1–2.

Cornell, Drucilla (1991), "Sexual Difference, the Feminine, and Equivalency: A Critique of Catharine MacKinnon's Toward a Feminist Theory of the State," *The Yale Law Journal* 100(7): 2247–2275.

Engel, Frederick (1884), *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State.* Zurich: Hottingen.
Ferguson, Ann (2007), "Gay Marriage: An American and Feminist Dilemma," *Hypatia* 22(1): 39–57.
Finnis, John (1997), "Law, Morality, and Sexual Orientation," in John Corvino (ed.), *Same Sex: Debating the Ethics, Science, and Culture of Homosexuality.* Lanham-New York-London: Rowman and Littlefield.
Firestone, Shulamith (1970), *The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution*. William Morrow.
Gilman, Charlotte (1915), *Herland: A Lost Feminist Utopian Novel*. The Forerunner.
Goldman, Alan (1977), "Plain Sex," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 6(3): 267–287.
Halper, Edward (2001), "Hegel's Family Values," *The Review of Metaphysics* 54: 815–858.
Hierro, Graciela (1994), "Gender and Power," *Hypatia* 9(1): 173–183.
Holbrook, Daniel (2007), "Fidelity to the Marriage Bed, an Inquiry into the Foundations of Sexual Ethics," *Electronic Journal of Human Sexuality* 10(1).
Jaggar, Alison (1974), "On Sexual Equality," *Ethics* 84(4): 275–291.
Kymlicka, Will (1991), "Rethinking the Family," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 20(1): 77–97.
Link, Al, and Pala Copeland (2000), "Sex Statistics," *Urban Male Magazine* (fall).
MacKinnon, Catherine (1989), "Sexuality, Pornography, and Method: 'Pleasure under Patriarchy,'" *Ethics* 99 (2): 314–346.
Nagel, Thomas (1969), "Sexual Perversion," *The Journal of Philosophy* 66(1): 5–17.
Okin, Susan (1991), *Justice, Gender, and the Family*. Basic Books.
Okin, Susan (1994), "Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender," *Ethics* 105(1): 23–43.
Okin, Susan (1996), "Sexual Orientation, Gender, and Families, Dichotomizing Differences," *Hypatia* 11(1): 30–48.
Overall, Christine (1998), "Monogamy, Non-monogamy, and Identity," *Hypatia* 13(4): 1–17.
Pearson, Ian (2011), "The Future of Sex: Ctrl-Shift-O for Orgasm," *Wired*. Last updated 27 Nov.
Primoratz, Igor (2001), "Sexual Morality: Is Consent Enough?" *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 4: 201–218.
Solomon, Robert (1974), "Sexual Paradigms," *The Journal of Philosophy* 71(11): 336–345.
Strauss, Gregg (2012), "Is Polygamy Inherently Unequal," *Ethics* 122(3): 516–544.
Vernon, Jim (2009), "Free Love: A Hegelian Defense of Same-Sex Marriage Rights," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* XLVII: 69–89.
Woodcock, Scott (2009), "Five Reasons Why Margaret Somerville Is Wrong about Same-Sex Marriage and the Rights of Children," *Dialogue* 48: 867–887.
Young, Iris (1995), "Mothers, Citizenship, and Independence: A Critique of Pure Family Values," *Ethics* 105(April): 535–566.

Dzung Kieu Nguyen is a Researcher in Economics and Philosophy at the State University of New York at Albany and the Center for Analysis and Forecasting, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences. Her research interests include Economics of Gender and Family, Feminist Philosophy, Ethics, Political Philosophy, Political Sociology and Human Enhancement. She has published several papers on Gender Equality, Moral Equality, Freedom of Speech, E-commerce and IT policies.

Figure I: The evolution of marriage and family according to sexual contexts





Figure II: Family, sexual and offspring development institutions



Addleton Academic Publishers
Journal of Research in Gender Studies
Volume 3(2), 2013, pp. 48–66, ISSN: 2164-0262

THE SERVANTS OF THE DEVIL. THE DEMONIZATION OF FEMALE SEXUALITY IN THE MEDIEVAL PATRISTIC DISCOURSE

YOLANDA BETETA MARTÍN
yolandabeteta@hotmail.com
Complutense University of Madrid

ABSTRACT. The sexuality of women has been much theorizing about the nature, characteristics and alleged deficiencies. Such theories are based on an androcentric view of sexuality in the Middle Ages revolves around two core beliefs. First, the imaginary medieval sexuality perceived as an activity linked exclusively to reproduction and sexual pleasure. Second, female sexuality is projected symbolically as a phenomenon endowed with negative connotations and even destructive defined in terms of greed, insatiability and animalism. The article analyzes the perceptions of female sexuality in the late Middle Ages through the medical treatises, hygienists and theology, its relation to the Complaint of Women and its association with anthropological concepts of transgression and monstrosity

Keywords: sexuality; demonology; patristic; transgression; monstrosity

"Thou shalt not suffer a witch"
(*Exodus* 22, 18)

1. Building Monsters. The Demonization of Female Sexuality

The sexuality of women has been much theorizing about the nature, characteristics and alleged deficiencies. Such theories are based on an androcentric view of sexuality in the Middle Ages revolves around two core beliefs. First, the sexuality is perceived as an activity linked exclusively to reproduction and no to sexual pleasure. Second, female sexuality is projected symbolically as a phenomenon endowed with negative connotations and even destructive defined in terms of greed, insatiability and animality.

Both beliefs are based more immediate ideological patristic discourse, i.e., in a Discourse of biblical inspiration that projects an image of women deeply misogynist based on the biblical figure of Eve and her role in the Edenic fall. The medieval mentality shapes the feminine nature in terms of alterity and otherness so that women make up the back of masculinity. The

women project all that is not men who are projected as a mirror image of the Christian deity. The Discourse gives patristic principles of rationality, morality and intellectuality to men so that women are defined, following the principle of otherness, as irrational, immoral and visceral. This view of feminine nature, supported ideologically on the supposed natural inferiority of women under the Edenic fall, is radicalized throughout the Middle Ages and especially from the thirteenth century.

Late Medieval patristic radicalized the discourse about women's nature due to religious factors, social and political among which the social and ideological significance of the movement known as the Women's Complaint. The Complaint is a social, philosophical and political, launched after the publication of the Book of the City of Ladies (1405) by Christine de Pizan, highlights the discrimination faced by women in all public areas especially in relation to their alleged innate inability to acquire scientific and theological knowledge. Public events and claims that arise related to the Complaint authors of Women, such as Isabel de Villena, Teresa de Cartagena, Beatriz Galindo, Juana Maria Mendoza or Cazalla among others, arouses the suspicions of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the sociopolitical system together with the ability of women to occupy spaces traditionally banned sex.

In this context of two overlapping female claim addresses to delegitimize women: the patristic discourse inherited from the Fathers of the Church, and the dogma demonological establishing an association between innate female sexuality and evil issues. Demonological beliefs play a role in late medieval discourse because it intensifies the classic linking women with diabolical matters and the Edenic fall.

The medieval demonology reaches a remarkable impact in the Middle Ages thanks to the proliferation of demonological treatises since the thirteenth century was published in Western Europe. The great medieval demonological treatise is *The Malleus Maleficarum* published between 1485 and 1486. It is the paradigm of demonological works because, despite not being the first treaty of its kind, comes under the approval of Pope Innocent VIII through the bull *Summis desiderantes affectibus* that encouraged the investigation and prosecution of crimes of witchcraft. *The Malleus Maleficarum* knew thirty-four editions between 1486 and 1699 the number reached 50,000 in just over two centuries. These data show the interest in demonology in the Middle Ages not only among theologians and inquisitors but also among a secular audience mediated by the eschatological beliefs of millenarianism, the Antichrist, the end of the world and the Last Judgment.

The medieval demonology is a very complex phenomenon which can be analyzed from different perspectives and theoretical positions. The article discusses the misogynistic load of demonological beliefs and its overlapping with the biblical thesis, doctors and hygienists in relation to female sexuality

that the medieval imagination emerges as a phenomenon animal, voracious, insatiable. The question that begins the study of medieval perception of female sexuality is what the purpose of demonizing women is.

The demonization of sexuality of women reflects a strategy of delegitimization. The patriarchal system projects a distorted image of women in order to punish all those attitudes which androcentric discourse considered transgressive. To address the study of the delegitimation of female transgressions through its demonization in the symbolic order is necessary to analyze the concepts of transgression, monstrosity and social control.

The imposition of a normative culture that legitimizes relations of domination between the sexes must necessarily make use of various social control mechanisms to ensure compliance with the standard. Physical violence is an effective control strategy but viable in the long term because it undermines the legitimacy of the dominant group and may trigger a violent action-reaction process that erode the structures of the system. A more subtle strategy and effective regulation is that which determines and shapes the perceptual and behavioral structures of social subjects to give them an identity that does not question the cultural framework on which stands the patriarchal discourse.

Symbolic violence, understood as a process of socialization aimed to naturalize a system of hierarchical relations of cultural origin through symbols, images and representations, stands as the control mechanism more subtle and effective long term. Its value lies in the difficulty of reversing the process of socialization as it would require mental structures forged question unconsciously. The individual should reflect on what Pierre Bourdieu called "habitus," i.e. the system of categories of perception, thought and action (Bourdieu 2005).

The construction of identities is part of the process of production and reproduction of symbolic capital. The process of identity construction, far from being a natural phenomenon of biological origin, is a cultural construction built on ideological and policy statements that articulate, backbone, coding and outline our perceptions, experiences, behaviors and sexuality. Human beings while social subjects forge their identity in society from images and cultural representations that are imposed from childhood and whose margins should shape it.

The absence of an innate biological substrate force the construction of a collective imagination in which the symbols, myths and fantasies acquire a normative meaning that the differences should naturalize patriarchal culture established among both sexes. The symbolic universe acquires a key role in the somatization domain relations imposed by legitimizing identities and from culture. The internalization of these relations is feasible only through a symbolic coding of reality that impedes any hint of individual response to

annul the individual against the community and place critical thinking beyond the limits of socially and morally acceptable.

The internalization of the symbolic coding of reality requires a dual process of acculturation that operates in two clearly defined areas of action: the social and symbolic order. The first level of acculturation is at the policy level by regulating the rights and obligations of individuals according to a pyramidal social structure in nature. Discrimination against women is regulated and articulated policy frameworks that impede the free development of women's autonomy by virtue of an alleged lack of natural attitudes.

The second level of acculturation acts in the symbolic order through the internalization of a discourse that imposes a model of femininity based on androcentric principles. The patriarchal system isolates and stigmatizes all those events, attitudes and behaviors that are beyond the norm because all that is different is a threat to social stability. In this sense, the concept of monstrosity and transgression are closely linked and their study to analyze in greater depth the process of demonization of women in the medieval imagination.

The monster is the symbolic and aesthetic category that violates the moral order socially institutionalized. Monsters are complex manifestations of those behaviors, attitudes and culturally repressed drives under a social pact that subordinates individual freedom from the maintenance of social order and morality. It is all that is repressed by the patterns of the dominant culture, the annulment of the difference while others violate the universality of moral laws and question the survival of the system. In this sense, the category of the monstrous has meaning only in relation to what the sociopolitical structure has been established as not monstrous establishing a symbiotic relationship between the offender and society as a whole that ultimately legitimizes the authority of the system.

Freud, in his study *The sinister*, underscores the familiarity as the main feature that makes an object or social subject into something sinister, an acceptance that fits neatly into the category of the monstrous. Freud defines the uncanny as "that sort of horrible things involving known and familiar from long ago (...) all that should have been hidden, secret, but has appeared" (2001, 12). The sinister, and by extension the monstrous, would not constitute a violation in itself because it would be nothing new, but, in psychoanalytic terms, was always present in the psyche until successive waves of repression they hid in the field of unconsciousness. The assimilation of cultural models moved to the unconscious drives through the cultural prohibition and punitive nature of the standard. Therefore, Freud suggests, the uncanny is the absolute realization of a desire that, in essence, remains hidden, forbidden and censored. It is the realization of the struggle between desire and

fear, the dilemma between nature (drives and desires) and culture (regulatory prohibitions). It is the realization of a fantasy hidden.

Monsters embody all that is feared and desired at the same time. This struggle between reality and fantasy synthesizes one of the phenomena that Freud analyzed as one of the primary fears androcentric symbolic universe: the fear of castration. The symbolism of women as castrating of masculinity and femininity perceived as a denial and mutilation of manhood awoke simultaneously desire and fear of women's sexuality. The desire to be possessed sexually active women and the fear of seeing diminished his masculinity (myth of the vagina dentata) is promoting a redefinition of female sexuality that toggles between the two primary instincts, the desire of the feminine and the fear of castrating sexuality. The feeling of castration is closely linked to sexual desire in the same way that the monster is scary for embodying everything that is socially undesirable (violation of the norm) but individually desired (fulfillment of desires and impulses). The attraction of the monster can be understood as a return to the state of nature, the recovery of the repressed and sublimated desires projection.

The fear of castration and mutilation makes monsters devouring beings and in the case of female monsters, sexual predators transform their reproductive organs into instruments of domination able to maul and destroy the other. The vulva and uterus embody the androcentric imaginary, the essence of a castrating, destructive female sexuality manipulated and biased by the mechanisms of acculturation imposed by the patriarchal system. This is an essentialist view of womanhood that also hosts a body symbolism underlining the impurity and dangerousness of the limits of the body, the holes that channel human pollution through exogenous factors at the same physical subject (Douglas 1991, 33). The vulva, such as reproductive organ, and therefore castrating patriarchal perspective, female sexuality, lies at the boundaries of culture to the extent that the body of women is categorized as a source of impurity. The existence of female monsters is, in short, a symbolic representation of male fears and desires regarding sexuality of women.

Somatization of a hierarchical view of gender relations is a slow process of acculturation based on cultural naturalization biological differences, a process determined by the powerful symbolism of sociocultural models shipped to the social subjects in a hierarchical perception the world and themselves. Under this logic, it would be impossible to conceive of the History of Women without a history of its representations, myths and decode their images, they are aspects that express the construction and evolution of female social imaginary and the structure that accepts forms and plays.

2. The Servants of the Devil.
The Character Animal, Voracious, Insatiable Sexuality of Women

The delegitimation of women derived from treaties and patristic demonological the Middle Ages is primarily focused on the association of women with witchcraft and demonic issues. This relationship establishes a symbolic link that identifies women with the biblical image of the witch or evil witch who made pacts. The article analyzes one of the premises on which sits the union and that will determine the social perception of women in late medieval imagery: the insatiable nature of female sexuality that drives women to engage in evil. The theoretical premises on which support these beliefs are based on some of the medical and theological treatises outlining women's sexuality as a phenomenon of demonic nature and their sexual organs as an imperfect and impure.

The projection of the female genitalia as a foul, dark and impure is based on the identification of menstrual blood as a fluid that defiles women under a tradition of biblical origin which is fully documented in *Leviticus*.

> When a woman has a discharge of blood, the impurity of her menstrual period lasts seven days. Anyone who touches her is unclean until evening. Everything on which she lies or sits during her period is unclean. Anyone who touches her bed or anything on which she sits must wash his clothes and bathe in water; he remains unclean until evening." "If a man sleeps with her and her menstrual blood gets on him, he is unclean for seven days and every bed on which he lies becomes unclean." "If a woman has a discharge of blood for many days, but not at the time of her monthly period, or has a discharge that continues beyond the time of her period, she is unclean the same as during the time of her period. Every bed on which she lies during the time of the discharge and everything on which she sits becomes unclean the same as in her monthly period. Anyone who touches these things becomes unclean and must wash his clothes and bathe in water; he remains unclean until evening." "When she is cleansed from her discharge, she is to count off seven days; then she is clean. On the eighth day she is to take two doves and two pigeons and bring them to the priest at the entrance to the Tent of Meeting. The priest will offer one for an Absolution-Offering and the other for a Whole-Burnt-Offering. The priest will make atonement for her in the presence of God because of the discharge that made her unclean. "You are responsible for keeping the People of Israel separate from that which makes them ritually unclean, lest they die in their unclean condition by defiling my Dwelling which is among them." "These are the procedures to follow for a man with a discharge or an emission of semen that makes him unclean, and for a woman in her menstrual period – any man or

> woman with a discharge and also for a man who sleeps with a woman who is unclean. (*Leviticus* 15, 19–33).

Menstrual blood makes women impure and they are subject during the five days of menstruation and the eight following, that is, for thirteen days. The Hebrew Talmud and emphasizes the origin of this impurity in finding that the array is like a sewer that collects all the filth of the female body so that blood from this organ is necessarily infected. Its impure nature triggers a long list of superstitions associated with menstruation that were backed by erroneous medical theories and religious dogmas. The same Talmud says that if a menstruating woman walking between two men one of them will be sentenced to death. Classical authors such as Pliny the Elder in *Naturalis Historia* lists some of the curses that can trigger women during the day such as impure cloud the sky, barren fields back, abort the cattle and even "if a man had relations with a woman who menstruation, during an eclipse or new moon, could be killed." Also, it was thought that children born during the period would tend to suffer from diseases such as leprosy, measles, smallpox and born with red hair color in the Middle Ages had a negative connotation and sexual.

> This disease [smallpox] is generated from the menstrual blood retained in the porous member and the fetus, nature strives to throw it and throw it out, cleaning the baby's skin, the young man or young, few sometimes in the brothel, let alone in old age. This form of purging is common to all, but accidentally comes from other causes, for example, if one is generated at the time of menstruation, this class is very bad, because so rarely escape engendered leprosy or disease (*Lilius of Medicine* I, XII)

The rejection of the period, understood as a feature of female sexuality and fertility, is one of the first symptoms of demonization of female sexuality. In fact, one of the features inherent in most female monsters is their attraction to blood. The association between women and the blood is a constant in the symbolic imagery from antiquity. However, despite this rejection, the presence of menstrual blood in ritual magic of the Middle Ages, especially in the rites of fertility and love potions, it becomes an element that arouses fear and attraction. The same feelings that causes female: fear of castration and sexual attraction.

Sexual attraction becomes desire in one of the most important features of women. In addition to thirteen times impure, the phallocentric imaginary projects an image of women characterized by an insatiable sexuality. One of the oldest biblical references that highlight this feminine trait is due to Paul of Tarsus mentions women as "laden with sins, led away with all kinds of desires" (Second Letter to Timothy 3, 6). In the Middle Ages female sexuality becomes an issue that deeply troubled society organized around the hegemony of the phallus. Aristotelianism had perpetuated the old idea

that the excess moisture from the female body gave women an unlimited sexual capacity and Juvenal prevailing thesis of "lassata uiris necdum satiate" ("tired of men but unsatisfied"). He had also accepted the idea that the female sexual organs possessive attraction exerted on the male body that refers to the Hippocratic theory of uterine displacements and the *Timaeus* of Plato (Thomasset 1992, 66). This overwhelming desire is expressed symbolically in the vagina dentata myth. But female desire has other connotations that reinforce the image of women as impure.

The medieval mind establishing an association between sexual desire and semen originating the idea that women needed to produce large amount of semen because of exorbitant desire. Since it was believed that semen is corrupted if not used in procreation, it could be the cause of putrefaction. If the semen accumulated menstrual blood is added, considered as a fluid infected, women are turned into a "poison factory" (Martos 2008, 234). The association between female sexuality and the concept of impurity creates the medieval myth of the "Poison Maiden." The women loaded the poison generated by nature sinful and imperfect, they develop the terrible power to poison men, castrate his manhood and even end his life through his eyes poisoned. However, it is paradoxical that this poison cannot harm women. In a patriarchal mentality that cultivates the rejection of women, the explanation could be that no poisonous snake or animal poisons its own poison (Martos 2008, 239).

The monstrous character of women is also linked historically with the impure nature of menstrual blood. There are many literary references to underscore the association between menstrual blood and women's capacity to generate monsters. One of the most clarifiers is the passage contained in *The admirable secrets of Albert the Great* in which the incident again in the presence of the snake as a bearer of evil women. "Take, say, a woman's hair, do them well seasoned underground, where there has been a hotbed during the winter and early spring or summer, when the hair is heated by the sun's heat will breed snakes, which then give birth to others of the same species" (Albert the Great 1982, 25).

The medieval androcentrism indivisible draws a line between the concept of impurity and feminine nature that reinforces the vision of women as being second order and close to the state of animality. The descriptions of female sexual desire and its symbolic link with the serpent weaves a web of symbolism that legitimizes the subordination of women to the extent that they are closer to the state of nature that the state of culture following the dialectic disorder / order nature / culture. The Middle Ages not only defines women extolling its wild state but who spreads the belief that a living animal lives inside. A hungry animal and not get angry when he asks is furious and goes inside the body, squeezes the lungs, the heart stirs and ascends to the

throat where threaded hard to breathe, causing dizziness, hot flushes and loosing, that is, the mythical female hysteria and nymphomania. This wild animal is the uterus.

The identification of the uterus with an animal that food does not claim arises in the Middle Ages. Already present in the Egyptian medical writings (Ebers Papyrus) and is taken up by Greek philosophy. The *Timaeus* of Plato explains that the uterus is actually an animal that lives inside the female body and whose desire is procreation. This is the argument that arouses the interest of the Fathers of the Church. In front of the Egyptian texts that emphasize the purely sexual uterus, Plato emphasizes its procreative purpose. The animal that contains the woman does not rebel by sexual desire but by the need to conceive a child. In this sense, the patristic discourse is delegitimizing women emphasizing their animal nature, but is not being lewd and wild but their animal instinct drives him to be a mother. This is called maternal instinct and, from the Christian perspective, allows women to redeem sinful and malicious nature.

The medieval imagery reinforces the animal nature of women through the menstrual blood contamination and the ancient belief that women can spread poison through his eyes. This belief is the germ of establishing a symbolic union between the female nature and one of the most famous creatures of medieval bestiary: the basilisk. In the same way that the basilisk was petrifying the enemy only with his eyes, menstruating women were able to poison the men watching them in the eye. This image of women has its most immediate symbolic projection of the myth of Medusa. After the beheading of Medusa at the hands of Perseus, the Greek hero uses the head of the goddess to defeat the enemies and the gaze of Medusa was capable of causing death by terror. Throughout the Middle Ages are numerous allusions to the association between the basilisk and women while the two "could damage the mirror to stare at him" (Cabanes 2003, 15).

The theory that women could lead to death through the eyes can be the basis on which to build the popular belief of the evil eye, a curse attributed to witches during the Inquisition trials of the late Middle Ages. Albert the Great had already warned of the possible action of the eye evil female super animalibus Quaestiones (IX, Q9) explaining that the poisonous vapors of women ascend to the brain from which permeate the eyes. The spell is done through the air, following the process of vision defined by Aristotle and Galen, with the air necessary intermediate object between the eye and the object. The eye is not the polluter, but the vapor that is expelled through them is what permeates all that is within your reach. Issues remain virtually unchanged until well into the Renaissance (Barona 1995, 15–27).

The delegitimization of women's sexuality would not be effective if there were previously social condemnation of sex. Unlike normalization with

Greco-Latin societies lived sexuality, medieval displays a repression of sexuality and eroticism as a result of the taboos imposed by Christianity, a taboo that even away from the Jewish tradition that had given a remarkable the erotic Song of Songs. The Christian tradition adopted certain beliefs about the Platonic opposition between soul and matter according to which the passions are seen as an obstacle to the free development of the spirit. In fact, a considerable part of patristic theology is directly inspired by the Socratic philosophy and it can be said that Platonism was a foreshadowing of Christianity. Platonic rejection of perception, belief in the immortality of the soul and the affirmation of the existence of a celestial plane, show the legacy bequeathed to the Greek world to Christianity. However, in regard to sexuality, classical thought was more liberating to the extent that even the eroticism and sexuality was part of some religious ceremonies and rituals.

The strong rejection of sexuality arises, therefore, under the weight of a Christianity that does not see sexuality as a source of pleasure but as a sinful act necessary for procreation. The patristic discourse perceives sexuality as the quintessential Sin and not surprising that in this climate of sex phobia, even the marriage was considered by the Fathers of the Church as a "remedium concupiscentiae" or "lesser evil." In this line is positioned San Jerómino by stating that "marriage is a sin, all I can do is to excuse it and keep it holy" (Mayayo, 2003, 143). The patristic discourse only recognizes sexuality within marriage, a less than desirable state celibacy, to the extent that regulates sexuality between men and women. The need to regulate the heterosexuality is the reason that marriage is raised to sacramental institution as St. Paul points out. "It's good that man should not touch a woman. However, to prevent fornication, let every man have his own wife and each woman her own husband" (*Letter of Paul to the Corinthians* I, 7)

This disdain for sexuality needs a scapegoat who embodies the impurity of sexuality and against whom the guilt of sin. Eva becomes the driver of the medieval sex phobia to the inability of the blame on Adam who has been "created in the likeness of God." Eva stands on "the other" in the back of Adam which exhibits the consequences of sin and that sin is the same. Eva, identified with a snake-headed woman (auton) is the primal female monster which will look at all the Christian women to admire and fear the dangers of their evil nature and animals. All this despite the fact that in the Old Testament Yahweh recognizes Adam and Eve as equal to say that "not good that man should be alone, I will make him a helpmate" (*Genesis* 2, 18).

Extrapolation of these negative theses on female sexuality demonological discourse is driven after the promulgation of the bull *Summis desiderantus affectibus* promulgated by Innocent VIII on December 5, 1484. This bull starts the process of institutionalization of witchcraft as an evil source feminine art that must be fought by all means available to the Church, and

among which the most instrument control and repression, the Inquisition. The bull points directly to women as the architects of the covenants that would perform evil through witchcraft and commit crimes in the name of the devil. Thus, Innocent VIII Church doctrine positions on an interpretation credulous and demonological beliefs stickler for delegitimizing the thesis held in the *Canon Episcopi* (909) did not recognize the existence of witches as physical realities but as a product of imagination and the deception.

> They are infected with the heresy of witches more women than men. Hence, logically, can not speak of heresy of witches, but witches, if we want to name, and praised be the Most High has preserved until today male abomination (Bull *Summis desiderantus affectibus*).

Under the auspices of the bull *Summis desiderantus affectibus*, published the *Malleus Maleficarum* in 1486 designed as a reference book of inquisitorial judges in the witch trials. The defining feature of the *Malleus Maleficarum* is the deep misogyny that runs through all the arguments about the origin, characteristics and purpose of the witch-activities. From the thirteenth century there is a reworking of patristic discourse that against the exaltation of the figure of Mary, restores the image of Eve as the embodiment of sin and the Edenic fall. This patristic misogyny seasoned with the perception of women as being inclined to evil issues due to its nature imperfect and sinful. The theses of St. Thomas Aquinas on the diabolical pacts among women and the devil and the theories of St. Augustine on the ability of the devil to have sex with women offer a body of theory underlying the symbolic projection of women as witches, that is, as accomplices of the devil and concubines. A related evil must be prosecuted and convicted in the death of the witch.

The projection of female transgression as a monstrosity is emphasized repeatedly in the *Malleus Maleficarum*. The character and monster devouring the feminine nature is not only channeled through the archetype of the witch but also explicitly detailed triple monstrosity that characterizes women under its chimeric nature and animals.

> Taking the carnal desires of his body, where do so many evils to human life? (...) If the world be without women could not live without gods ever. Well really, if there were no evil of women, saying nothing, even of women, the world would then be free to harm many (...) You do not know that woman is a dream but you know. This monster has a threefold form: comes in the form of a lion radiant, stained with a goat's stomach, and is armed with the venomous tail of a scorpion. Which means, it looks beautiful, or contact foul, threatening his company (...) seeing them and hearing them with his face that is a wind that burns and her voice is a hissing snake, but also attract them through Hexes

> countless men and animals. Your heart is a network, because it's inscrutable malice which reigns in your heart, your hands are devils because where they put the curse, as there trying to do with the complicity of the devil (Kramer & Sprenger 2004: 105).

The animal nature is wrapped women, however, a halo of beauty and pleasure that hides sinful and imperfect nature of the descendants of Eve. One feature that emphasizes patriarchal imaginary as an evil that attracts the attention of men and fools to fall into the snares of the devil is the female voice. The Discourse marks the quackery patristic as one of the main flaws of women and Greek mythology and delegitimize the female voice in attributing a monstrous, trickster and hypnotic in the myth of the sirens. Homer tells the dangers issued by the songs of the Sirens (Odyssey, XII) reinterprets the ecclesiastical discourse in the Middle Ages to undermine the voices of Women Complaint as stated in the following passage from the *Malleus Maleficarum.*

> Let's hear something about yet another of his peculiarities: the voice. Liar by nature it is in their language, because pica singing. Where the voice of women is compared to the Sirens, who by his sweet melody passing attract and kill them. They kill you, effectively, because empty the bag, removed the force, and force losing God (...) when he speaks is a delight, but sin is painful. Venus flower is the rose because under his purple has many thorns. Compare with Proverbs: more oily or oil is the worst word out is bitter as wormwood. And also on his walk, his being and his attire and maintenance: there is the vanity of vanities (Kramer & Sprenger 2004: 106).

The biblical tradition underscores the need to eliminate any act contrary to divine law as witchcraft, divination or interpretation of the stars. Isaiah is silent in this regard when he states that "Thou art wearied in the multitude of thy counsels. Let now the astrologers, the stargazers, the monthly prognosticators, stand up, and save thee from these things that shall come upon thee" (*Isaiah* 47, 13). But the witch receives greater punishment is not only doomed to hell it is also ordered to life as emphasized by the phrase "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live" (*Exodus* 22, 18). This delegitimization of the witches in the biblical tradition responds to the rejection of the activities related to witchcraft but especially the female condition of witches. Numerous scriptures and ecclesiastical writings that highlight the natural inferiority of women and the need to be subjected to male authority to control their lustful inclinations, evil and adulterous. These passages form the theoretical basis for its demonization in the *Malleus Maleficarum.*

The divine act of creation of women limits their independence to be created directly from a rib of Adam. While humans and other living things arise from the absence of matter or of the land, women have their origin in

the male body. “Then the Lord God made a woman from the rib he had taken out of the man, and he brought her to the man.” (*Genesis* 2, 22). A dependency and subjection are constantly stressed and determines the relationship of women with divinity.

> The man should not cover his head because he is the image and glory of God, while woman is the glory of man (...) in fact, man from woman but woman from man (...) nor was man created for woman, but woman for man (*Corinthians* 11: 7–9).

Genesis says that sexual difference is central in God’s creation to the extent that the woman is created as a companion and complement to Adam to respond to the needs of man alone and when we say “covet thy husband, and he rule over you” (*Genesis* 3:16). In the same vein sets forth the First Letter to Timothy, stating that “not consent to the woman to teach or to have authority over man, but be silent because Adam was created first and then Eve and Adam not deceived but the woman was deceived and fell into sin” (*First Letter to Timothy*, 3). Thus, the concept of dependence is associated with the feminine nature and the ability to control the men even though the first story of Genesis is symmetric, “and God created man in his image he created in the image of God. Male and female he created them” (*Genesis* 1: 27). The characterization of women as emotional relationship to the greater ability to think of men stigmatizes the projection of women in the symbolic order and places the attribution of female sexual desire as the trigger for the Edenic fall and the basis on which stands the covenant of sexual women and the devil. The passages of Genesis are of great importance for the later Christian apologists because they justify based on the ideas that the Greek philosophers kept on the “natural weakness” of women. Thus, the *Malleus Maleficarum* legitimate misogyny classical patristic doctrines.

> From the malice of women talk a lot Ben Sira: no poison worse than the poison of the snake, there is no greater hatred than the hatred of an enemy (of women). I’d rather live with a lion or a dragon with a bad woman ... She concludes, with all malice is nothing compared to the malice of women. Hence Chrysostom, speaking on the text of Matthew, should not the marriage, says: what else is woman but the enemy of friendship, grief unavoidable, a necessary evil, the natural temptation, desirable calamity, domestic danger, the delectable detriment, the evil of nature painted with good color. Where repudiate as a sin, and we must preserve it, then our torment is fatal: either commit adultery or repudiating live among everyday disputes. Cicero also says in his rhetoric: the many passions of man will lead each one to his vice, but one passion leads women to all vices on the basis of all the vices of women is envy. Seneca says in his Tragedies: A woman either loves or hates, there is no third way. A woman weeping deceives. There are two kinds of tears in the eyes of

> women: some for pain, some for the snare. A single woman, who thinks, thinks evil (Kramer & Sprenger 2004: 100–101).

Along with the dependency and inferiority of women, the patristic discourse affects the impure nature of women. Hebrew and Christian traditions encourage the projection of women as imperfect and impure nature able to "contaminate" the virility and sexual capabilities and reduce life of men. Since the tenth century the ecclesiastical discourse shows great concern about the effects of female sexuality on men as evidenced in the *Decretorum* (1007), writing of Bishop Burchard of Worms in which is a reflection on the sexual behavior of women illustrated by a model of interrogation can be used to extract confessions from suspected witches.

> Have you done what some women tend to do? Have you made a sexual machine Did you used to fornicate with yourself? Did you like those women who wish to turn off the racks, come together as if they could join? Have you committed adultery with your son? Have you given to an animal? Have you led to intercourse by some artifice? Have you tried your man's semen to be consumed with love for you? Have you mixed drink or eat what diabolical aphrodisiacs (bread baked on your buttocks or blood of your menses, or testicular ashes toasting)? Have you done what some women have a habit of doing when he committed adultery and want to kill her litter? To eject the fetus of the matrix do so by using Hex or herbs. Thus kill and expel the fetus and if you still have not conceived, they do not need to conceive. Have you done what some women adulterous lover just discovered that his wife take off legitimate desire of man with evil foot an art that is powerless against his wife and can not join it? (*Decretorum*).

Allegations of Worms about the dangers of female sexuality are collected and amplified in the *Malleus Maleficarum* to categorize the vices of women in three defects common feature its relationship to sexuality: infidelity, greed and lust.

> There are three main kinds of services that seem to prevail especially among poor women: infidelity, greed and lust. Then they mostly delivered to the evils, those indulging in these vices. And because of the three, the latter is dominant because it is insatiable (…) because they are burning to satisfy their depraved passions, such as adultery, the fornicating, the concubines of the great (...) to From here, we say what we know from experience: for the blunders of this kind, both about themselves and about the powerful of the century, regardless of the status and condition of these women, they perform many curses" (Kramer & Sprenger 2004, 107–108). "I would rather live with a lion or a dragon with a bad woman. All malice is nothing compared to the malice of

> women. And you could add: inconsistent in being, so are for action (Kramer & Sprenger 2004: 101).

Along with the concept of impurity, the phallocentric imaginary projects an image of women determined by an insatiable sexuality. The *Malleus Maleficarum* reflects this belief of female sexuality as an uncontrollable desire to facilitate the intervention of the devil.

> All these things come from witchcraft carnal passion that is insatiable in these women. As the book of Proverbs: There are three and four insatiable things never quite say: hell, the barren womb, land that water can not quench the fire that never says enough. For us here: the mouth of the vulva. Hence, to satisfy their passions, are delivered to the demons. They could say more, but who is intelligent, it seems enough to understand that there is nothing surprising in that women have more witches than men. Consequently, calls this heresy of witches, but witches (Kramer & Sprenger 2004, 106–107).

Taking as starting point the female delegitimization of biblical origin, the Malleus Maleficarum, the legacy of medieval doctors of the Church about the imperfection of women and their diabolical nature. The *Malleus Maleficarum* noted that the natural inferiority of women is even reflected in the etymology of the concept woman because "faith comes from feminine minus, weak to maintain and keep the faith. And in regard to faith all part of his nature, but by grace and nature faith never failed in the Blessed Virgin, even in the passion of Christ, when they failed in all men" (Kramer & Sprenger 2004, 119). Therefore, the reason for his natural inclination demonic issues comes from its own nature and his insatiable sexual appetite.

> For though it was the devil who led Eve into sin, it was Eve who seduced Adam. And the sin of Eve would have led us to the death of soul and body, had it not been followed by lack of Adam and Eve which dragged him and not the devil, then it can truly more bitter than death. More bitter than death even, because if this is natural, only kill the body, but sin that begins with the woman kills the soul, depriving it of grace, and also drag the body in punishment for sin. More bitter than death also, because bodily death is a formidable enemy but clear, the woman, by contrast, is a charming and sneaky enemy. (...) The natural reason explains that it is more carnal than men, as evidenced by its many blunders flesh. It might be noted also that there is a defect in the formation of the first woman was formed because of a bent rib, that is, a rib of the chest that is twisted and is as opposed to men. This defect is also necessary that as imperfect animal, she always deceives (...) All these things come from witchcraft carnal passion, that is insatiable in these women. As the book of Proverbs: There are three and four insatiable things never quite say: hell, the barren

> womb, land that water can not quench the fire that never says enough. For us here: the mouth of the vulva. Hence, to satisfy their passions, are delivered to the demons. They could say more, but who is intelligent, it seems enough to understand that there is nothing surprising in that women have more witches than men. Consequently, calls this heresy of witches, but witches" (Kramer & Sprenger 2004, 106–107).

Finally, it is necessary to emphasize that with the delegitimization of the female body, male-centered discourse begins a process of disavowal of feminine knowledge that focuses on accusations of witchcraft against midwives, midwives and healers and in which sexuality plays a role determinant. Witches wielded a power that was inadmissible to androcentric structure whose hegemony began to be questioned by the Women's Complaint and heretical movements that threatened to fragment the unity of the Church, the power of knowledge. Midwives, healers and midwives were the only people who provided medical assistance to the most disadvantaged social classes, especially women without economic resources. Her knowledge of herbal enabled them to heal or alleviate disease, relieve pain linked to childbirth, accelerate uterine contractions and cause abortions in a context in which the Church still believed in labor as a divine punishment for original sin motivated Eve: "To the woman he said, "I will surely multiply your pain in childbearing; in pain you shall bring forth children. Your desire shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over you" (*Genesis* 3, 16)

Feminine knowledge posed a serious threat to the hierarchy and the new scientific knowledge that had become institutionalized in universities and aspired to monopolize the female body. Faced with scientific knowledge, witches wielded an empirical wisdom passed down from mother to daughter and based on experimentation and the cause-effect relationship. On the contrary, the Church was deeply anti-empirical, distrustful of the senses, undervalued the natural world and thus delegitimized any action designed to investigate the natural laws governing physical phenomena. The *Malleus Maleficarum* agustianas echoes the words on the deception of the senses.

> However, the cause of desire is perceived through the senses or the intellect, both within the power of the devil. Indeed, as Augustine says in Book 83, this evil, which is part of the devil, creeps through all the contacts of the senses is hidden under figures and shapes, blends with the color adheres to the sounds lurking beneath the angry words and injurious lies in the smell, perfume pervades and fills all channels of the intellect with certain scents (Kramer & Sprenger 2004, 42).

Empirical knowledge, contrary to scientific knowledge, is discredited in a continuous process of demonization that emphasizes the evil of the senses. These become the demon door in the mechanisms by which draw men fur-

ther away from the faith and drag them to the sin of the flesh. Empiricism patristic discourse represented to surrender to the senses and a betrayal of faith. But the key question is whether empirical knowledge would have been had he not been discredited in female hands. If we analyze the factors involved in the impairment of empirical knowledge is a strong influence of ecclesiastical misogyny and sex phobia indicate that the delegitimization not directed both empirical knowledge and the feminine knowledge. Midwives, midwives and healers embody a quadruple threat: were women, enjoyed a knowledge reviled by church rules, had specific knowledge of the body and sexuality of women and wisdom could rival the scientific knowledge that was taught in the universities. This last factor deserves special attention because it is at the core of the struggle for control of the female body that begins with the demonization of midwives and healers. From the thirteenth century begins the professionalization of medicine as a scientific knowledge taught in universities. They stand as knowledge centers and exclusively male socialization has no place where the women know or own physical presence of women. The exclusion of women in universities is being away from the new scientific knowledge and the delegitimization of empirical knowledge of midwives and midwives as stressed by the *Malleus Maleficarum.*

> The midwives are witches whose fetuses die within their mothers in various ways, offering children to devils (...) No one is more detrimental to the Catholic faith than midwives. Indeed, if not kill the child, then, obeying another plan as taken out of the room, up in the air and given to the devil (...) A woman who has the audacity to cure without having studied witchery must die (Kramer & Sprenger 2004, 251).

The aim of the delegitimizing of empirical knowledge and the female body was, therefore, obscure the visibility of women in a historical moment in which the patriarchal system is faced with various threats that challenge their ideological foundations, political, social and religious: The Women's Complaint, the rivalry of empiricism versus female university medical knowledge, the emergence of heretical movements that threaten the unity of the Church, new forms of female spirituality and the crisis of the feudal system. Women become the scapegoat on which to pour fears the breakdown of the feudal system. To eliminate the influence of progressive women in public, patriarchy uses not only the pursuit of feminine knowledge but also distorts their social identity and sexuality through a complex symbolic process that makes them "female monsters." Thus, the body and empirical knowledge are stigmatized as monstrous and diabolical elements capable of disrupting social order and destabilize the system.

REFERENCES

Alfonso, Pedro (1980), *Disciplina clericalis*. Zaragoza: Guara Editorial.

Caro Baroja, Julio (2003), *Las brujas y su mundo*. Madrid: Alianza, D.L.

Beteta, Yolanda (2010), *Súcubos, hechiceras y monstruos femeninos. Estrategias de desautorización femenina en la ficción medieval*. Madrid: Almudayna.

Beteta, Yolanda (2009), "Las heroínas regresan a Ítaca. La configuración de las identidades femeninas a través de la subversión de los mitos," *Revista de Investigaciones Feministas* nº0. Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

Blázquez, Juan (1989), *Eros y Tánatos. Brujería, hechicería y superstición en España*. Toledo: Arcano.

Boourdieu, Pierre (2005), *La dominación masculina*. Barcelona: Anagrama.

Brown, Peter (1993), *El cuerpo y la sociedad. Los hombres, las mujeres y la renuncia sexual en el cristianismo primitivo*. Barcelona: Muchnik editores, S.A.

Cabré, Monserrat and Ortíz, Teresa (2001). *Sanadoras, matronas y médicas en Europa, siglos XII-XX*. Barcelona: Icaria.

Casanova, Eudaldo y Larumbe, Mª Ángeles (2005), *La serpiente vencida. Sobre los orígenes de la misoginia en lo sobrenatural*. Zaragoza: Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza.

Cirlot, Victoria (2005), *Figuras del destino. Mitos y símbolos de la Europa medieval*. Madrid: Siruela.

Ciruelo, Pedro (2003), *Reprobación de las supersticiones y supercherías*. Diputación de Salamanca.

De Castañega, Fray Martín (1997), *Tratado de supersticiones y hechicerías*. Universidad de Buenos Aires: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras.

Delameau, Jean (1989), *El miedo en Occidente*. Madrid: Taurus.

Dijkstra, B. (1994), *Ídolos de perversidad (la imagen de la mujer en la cultura de fin de siglo)*. Barcelona: Debate.

Douglas, Mary (1991), *Pureza y peligro. Un análisis de los conceptos de contaminación y tabú*. Madrid: Siglo XXI.

Durand, G. (1981), *Las estructuras antropológicas de lo imaginario*. Madrid: Taurus.

Eimerich, Nicolau (1974), *Manual de inquisidores para uso de las inquisiciones de España y Portugal*. Barcelona: Fontamara.

Eliade, Mircea (2005), *Tratado de historia de las religiones*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.

Girard, René (2002), *El chivo expiatorio*. Barcelona: Anagrama.

Federici, Silvia (2010), *Calibán y la bruja: mujeres, cuerpo y acumulación primitiva*. Madrid: Traficantes de sueños.

Freud, Sigmund (2001), *Lo siniestro*. Palma de Mallorca: Olañeta.

Freud, Sigmund (1979), "La cabeza de Medusa" in *Más allá del principio del placer, Psicología de las masas y Análisis del yo*. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu.

Foucault, Michael (1998), *Vigilar y castigar*. Madrid: Siglo XXI.

Homero (1980), *La Odisea*. Barcelona: Planeta.

Izzi, Massimo (1996), *Diccionario ilustrado de los monstruos*. Palma de Mallorca: Alejandría.

Kraner, Heinrich, and Jacobus Sprenger (2004), *Malleus Maleficarum*. Valladolid: Maxtor.

Lactancio (1990), *Instituciones divinas, Libros I-III.* Madrid: Gredos.
Le Goff, Jacques (1986), *Lo maravilloso y lo cotidiano en el Occidente medieval*. Barcelona: Gedisa.
Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1998), *Las estructuras elementales del parentesco.* Barcelona: Ediciones Paidós Ibérica.
Martín de Castañega, Fray (1946), *Tratado de las supersticiones y hechicerías.* Madrid: Sociedad de Bibliófilos Españoles.
Martos, Ana (2008), *Historia del sexo y del erotismo.* Madrid: Nowtilus.
Messadié, Gerald (1994), *El diablo. Su presencia en la mitología, la cultura y la religión.* Barcelona: Martínez Roca.
Paré, Ambroise (1987), *Monstruos y prodigios.* Madrid: Siruela.
Patai, Raphael y Graves, Robert (1988), *Los mitos hebreos*. Madrid: Alianza.
Pizan, Christine de (2000), *La Ciudad de las Damas*. Madrid: Siruela.
Robbins, R. (1988), *Enciclopedia de brujería y demonología*. Madrid: Círculo.
Russel, Jeffrey (1998), *Historia de la brujería*. Barcelona: Paidós.
Russel, Jeffrey (1995), *El diablo: Percepciones del mal. De la Antigüedad al Cristianismo primitivo*. Barcelona: Laertes.
Russel, Jeffrey (1995), *Lucifer, el diablo en la Edad Media*. Barcelona: Laertes.
Salisbury, John (1909), *Policraticus*. Oxford: C. C. I. Webb.
San Agustín (1984), *La ciudad de Dios*. Méjico: Porrúa.
Santo Tomás (1951), *Suma Teológica.* Salamanca: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos.
Santos, Aurelio (2000) (ed.), *Los evangelios apócrifos*. Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores cristianos.
Schüssler, Elizabeth (1996), *Pero ella dijo. Prácticas feministas de interpretación bíblica*. Madrid: Editorial Trotta.
Segura, Cristina (2008), *El pecado y los pecados de las mujeres*. Madrid: Silex Ediciones.
Stern, David and Mark Mirsky (1990), *Rabbinic Fantasies: Imaginative Narratives from Classical Hebrew Literature*. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society.
Tertuliano (2001), *De Cultu Feminarum o El adorno de las mujeres*. Málaga: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Málaga.
Thomasset, C. (1992), *La naturaleza de la mujer*. Madrid: Taurus.
Trías, Eugenio (1988), *Lo bello y lo siniestro.* Barcelona. Ariel.

Yolanda Beteta is a Ph.D. Student at the Feminist Research Institute of the Complutense University of Madrid. She is a graduate in History and Social Anthropology. Her main researching lines are: the construction of the social identities, the demonization of women in the Middle Ages and the influence of the art in the female subjectivity. She has got the National Research Prize awarded by the National Association of Researchers on Women's Studies in 2012. She carried out a three-month research in Sant Denis University of Paris in 2013. She has published more than thirty papers in scientific journal and books including *Brujas, súcubos y monstruos femeninos. Estragias de desautorización femenina en la ficción bajomedieval*, Madrid, Almudayna, 2011. Moreover, she has participated as speaker in several international meetings and she also serves for the editorial board of the *Journal of Feminist Researches* edited by the Complutense University of Madrid.

Journal of Research in Gender Studies
Volume 3(2), 2013, pp. 67–75, ISSN: 2164-0262

L'ÉCRITURE *NEE EN FRANCE* POUR TRAVERSER LES FRONTIERES

ANNE MARIE MIRAGLIA
ammiragl@uwaterloo.ca
University of Waterloo

ABSTRACT. This study of *Née en France* will focus on the role of writing in the life of a young beur woman sequestered in Algeria by her father, a frustrated immigrant unable to deal with the cultural and generational conflicts with which his daughter struggles in France. Aïcha Benaïssa's testimony contributes to a program targeting the psychological wellbeing of young French women of Maghrebi origin raised in France. This is evident not only in the book's dedication but also in Sophie Ponchelet's post face which follows the testimony. This sociologist's support is crucial to the publication of Aïcha's story. Aïcha recounts her experience under a pseudonym in order to 'reveal the magnitude of the threat faced by hundreds of young women'.

Keywords: writing; testimony; beur; sequestration; forced marriage

« Savoir, c'est pouvoir » dit un vieil adage suggérant que l'éducation et l'apprentissage sont indispensables pour surmonter un défi, éviter un danger, réaliser des rêves, bref réussir sa vie. Apprendre à parler et à écrire la langue de l'autre, savoir s'exprimer et communiquer dans cette langue, c'est pouvoir solliciter de l'aide, une protection, voire un soutien vital. Or c'est exactement ce que demande une lycéenne dans le texte *Née en France. Histoire d'une jeune beur*. Sa requête prend tout d'abord la forme d'une lettre adressée au proviseur de son lycée en 1985. Mais elle rejoint la sphère publique et acquiert une valeur sociétale lorsqu'elle se transforme en témoignage grâce à l'intervention de Sophie Ponchelet, sociologue spécialiste dans l'intégration des Françaises d'origine étrangère. Dans le post-scriptum de ce récit auto-biographique d'Aïcha Benaïssa, publié chez Les Editions Payot en 1990, Sophie Ponchelet révèle que c'est seulement sous un pseudonyme que la jeune Française d'origine maghrébine a accepté de relater son expérience

personnelle. La rencontre a eu lieu lorsque Ponchelet préparait une enquête sur les « beurettes » et les mariages forcés (136). Si Aïcha arrive à surmonter sa honte et sa peur des représailles pour relater son histoire, c'est afin d'aider d'autres jeunes femmes vivant la même situation.

En fait, le « je » que l'on peut attribuer à Aïcha Benaïssa et peut-être aussi à Sophie Ponchelet affirme dans la dédicace : « je dédie ce livre à toutes celles qui se battent pour leur liberté et je remercie toutes les personnes qui ont participé au dénouement de cette histoire. » Si Ponchelet a transcrit et fait publier ce témoignage, il est indéniable que l'histoire relatée et une grande partie de sa narration reviennent à Aïcha dont la parole se libère grâce au soutien et à l'intervention de Sophie Ponchelet.

En 2006, cependant, 16 ans après la publication du témoignage d'Aïcha Benaïssa, et cinq ans après la crise terroriste du 11 septembre 2001, Alec Hargreaves publie un article intitulé « Testimony, Co-Authorship, and Dispossession among women of Maghrebi Origin in France. » Dans cette étude, il fait référence à cinq témoignages publiés depuis 1990 par cinq femmes issues de ce qu'il appelle « la deuxième génération de l'immigration maghrébine ». Il affirme que ces cinq Françaises d'origine maghrébine ont été dépossédées de leur histoire et reléguées à l'ombre par leur co-auteur dont le nom figure aussi sur la couverture des textes. Hargreaves suggère aussi que les témoignages de ces cinq femmes ont été manipulés et instrumentalisés par des éditeurs voulant bénéficier du voyeurisme du lectorat quant aux musulmans en France. En plus de *Née en France. Histoire d'une jeune beur* (1990), cette étude de Hargreaves évoque *Dans l'enfer des tournantes* de Samira Bellil (2002), *Ni putes ni soumises* de Fadela Amara (2003), *Vivre libre* de Loubna Méliane (2003), et *Mariée de force* de Leïla (2004) (Hargreaves 2006, 46).

Quoique nous ne puissions nous pencher ici sur les 4 autres témoignages auxquels fait référence Hargreaves, nous espérons que cette étude de *Née en France* révélera non seulement l'importance accordée à l'écriture en français dans l'amélioration de la condition féminine, mais nous souhaitons mitiger les observations portant sur la soi-disant dépossession des Françaises d'origine maghrébine par leur co-auteur.

Il est vrai, en général, que les descendants des immigrés maghrébins en France bénéficient de l'école française et que, contrairement à leurs parents, ils savent lire et écrire en français. Certains, comme Azouz Begag, sociologue, chercheur au CNRS et ancien ministre délégué de la promotion de l'égalité des chances, ont même écrit des essais et des romans autobiographiques relatant leur histoire et celle de leurs parents. Mais cela ne signifie pas pour autant que tous les Français d'origine maghrébine aient la maîtrise linguistique et communicationnelle nécessaires pour écrire leur histoire et qu'ils possèdent les connaissances techniques et les contacts personnels pour

la faire publier. Cette préoccupation touche encore davantage les femmes et surtout les enfants issus de l'immigration et dont la parole ne se ferait jamais entendre sans le soutien d'autrui. Donc, loin de déposséder Aïcha de son histoire, nous croyons que Ponchelet la soutient: elle explique le pourquoi du pseudonyme et les mobiles altruistes de l'adolescente en plus d'attribuer la paternité du témoignage clairement et exclusivement à la lycéenne: « Aïcha n'attend de ce témoignage ni gloire, ni compassion. Elle souhaite simplement épargner à d'autres ce qui l'a marquée à jamais, et révéler l'ampleur de la menace qui pèse sur des centaines de jeunes filles. Mariages forcés, séquestrations, fugues, enlèvements, suicides… » (137).

La transcription par Sophie Ponchelet du témoignage oral d'Aïcha Benaïssa accorde de la crédibilité, de la légitimité, de la reconnaissance, un poids et une durée, à une parole hésitante, pudique, éphémère, normalement interdite sinon ignorée ou vite étouffée. L'écriture et la publication de la parole d'Aïcha Benaïssa attirent l'attention sur un problème social important qui affecte à des degrés différents la vie de toute jeune Française d'origine maghrébine. Loin de déposséder l'auteure, de la reléguer à l'ombre, l'intervention de Sophie Ponchelet est doublement valable et justifiable. Primo, elle met en lumière l'existence et l'expérience d'une jeune personne dont la parole est généralement craintive et exclue; et secundo, elle attire l'attention du public sur une réalité brutale exigeant la mobilisation de services sociaux et la création de lois susceptibles d'améliorer les conditions de vie des femmes et, en particulier, des adolescentes vulnérables en France.

L'impact et l'importance de l'histoire d'Aïcha sont évidents dans l'adaptation faite pour la télévision en 1993 par le réalisateur Miguel Courtois qui a réalisé un film de 80 minutes intitulé « Leïla née en France ». Une quinzaine d'années après la publication de *Née en France* des mesures ont été prises pour lutter contre le mariage forcé. L'article 144 du code civil a été modifié. L'âge légal pour le mariage a été fixé à dix-huit ans pour les filles. Aussi, les futurs époux doivent consentir au mariage en personne; et les parents perdent le droit d'autoriser le mariage de leurs enfants mineurs. Plus dissuasive, la loi du 24 juillet 2006 relative à l'immigration et à l'intégration prévoit que « quiconque contracte un mariage dit de complaisance, forcé ou abusé, organise ou tente d'organiser un tel mariage, est puni de 5 ans d'emprisonnement et de 15 000 euros d'amende. »

Dans une étude récente sur *Née en France,* publiée dans *Qu'en est-il de la littérature « beur » au féminin ?,* Olga Oprea-Gancevici affirme « il est nécessaire de mettre l'accent sur la valeur documentaire du texte et sur certains paliers thématiques dont le socioculturel et la problématique de *l'entre-deux* ». (Oprea-Gancevici, 2012: 70). Cependant, nous ne saurons accepter l'idée qu'une « étude de ce livre, dans une perspective littéraire, est une démarche inappropriée parce que le texte n'a pas Aïcha Benaïssa

pour seule auteure» (*Ibid*, p.69). Au contraire, il nous semble que tout en étant la transcription d'un « témoignage », *Née en France* comprend des éléments littéraires (une certaine « littérarité ») caractéristiques des romans autoréférentiels où les thématiques de l'écriture et de la représentation de soi sont prédominantes. Par exemple, en plus de relater sa séquestration en Algérie pour un mariage forcé arrangé par sa grand-mère à l'insu même de ses parents, Aïcha insiste tout autant sur le rôle important joué par l'écriture en français pour s'affirmer et pour ne pas sombrer dans la déprime. Son témoignage revient à plusieurs reprises non seulement sur la nécessité de maîtriser la langue française mais aussi sur l'importance du masque (la maîtrise de soi) et de l'écriture pour mettre fin à sa captivité et à son isolement.

Or l'acquisition de la langue française exige un « double effort » de la part des enfants d'immigrés dont la langue parlée à la maison est autre que le français. C'est le cas pour Aïcha qui constate :

> À la maison, on parlait à la fois le français et arabe. On mélangeait plus ou moins les deux dans une espèce de charabia maison… Avec mon frère et mes sœurs, on se parlait en général en français, mais des mots arabes se glissaient dans la conversation. Parfois, on avait des trous, on n'arrivait plus à retrouver un mot. Une fois, il nous a fallu trois jours pour traduire *majada*, oreiller… (33–34)

Quoiqu'elle reconnaisse avoir de la facilité à apprendre l'anglais et l'allemand, comme d'autres élèves d'origine maghrébine, Aïcha souffre d'un « complexe d'infériorité à cause de [s]es difficultés en français » (33), à l'écrit et à l'oral. Elle semble intimidée par le pouvoir des mots: « J'avais l'impression de parler mal. À une époque, je n'ouvrais presque plus la bouche. Je suis devenue timide, complexée. Aujourd'hui encore, je cherche soigneusement mes mots, je fais attention » (33).

La jeune fille ne peut demander de l'aide à ses parents car ceux-ci ne savent ni lire ni écrire le français. Ce sont eux qui ont besoin d'elle. Ses compétences en français font d'elle « une adulte très jeune » accaparée par des responsabilités qui incombent normalement aux parents comme remplir des formulaires pour les impôts, pour la Sécurité sociale, et signer les carnets de ses frères et sœurs (31). L'enfant d'immigrés sert ainsi de charnière, de lien entre ses parents et la société française. Par ses connaissances linguistiques et culturelles, elle habite simultanément deux mondes, deux espaces distincts et conflictuels, et cette double appartenance est souvent difficile à gérer. Tout comme les protagonistes des romans dits « beurs », Aïcha est consciente d'être assise 'entre deux chaises' et du fait que cette dualité culturelle provoque un schisme identitaire chez elle, aggravant les conflits générationnels:

> Mais mes parents ne pouvaient pas tout comprendre. Ils n'imaginaient même pas les difficultés que nous rencontrions en dehors de la maison à cause de cette éducation, mélange de deux cultures distinctes et souvent incompatibles. En recevant ainsi des bribes de chacune, on n'en assimile aucune [sic] complètement. Seuls les enfants s'en rendent compte, plus tard, quand ils atteignent un certain âge. Vue de l'extérieur, j'ai reçu une éducation 'à la française': j'allais à l'école comme les autres, je portais les mêmes vêtements. Mais une fois rentrée à la maison, je devais respecter des règles qui n'étaient d'ailleurs jamais énoncées clairement; tout restait sous-entendu, suggéré.
> Si je restais, je savais que je ne pourrais jamais réaliser ce que je voulais, jamais m'affirmer telle que j'étais. (21)

Il est intéressant de remarquer que l'école française semble tolérer sa différence culturelle plus que ses parents ne le font. Cela semble évident dans un commentaire d'Aïcha sur son apprentissage de l'arabe littéraire en classe de seconde. C'est dans ce contexte qu'elle se sert pour la première fois des mots donnant son titre au texte: « Aujourd'hui, je parle encore arabe couramment. Je ne l'oublie pas, je n'ai aucun problème pour le reparler. Au contraire, c'est un plaisir. C'est ma langue maternelle, même si je suis née en France » (34).

Or, il importe de noter que malgré les événements traumatisants qui la poussent à privilégier sa citoyenneté française et à rejeter l'Algérie sans ambiguïté (« ce pays n'était pas le mien et ne le serait jamais » 50), la jeune femme exprime parfois un attachement quasi viscéral à ses racines: « Moi aussi, finalement, quelque chose de très fort me liait à ces gens. Mes racines ressurgissaient » (42).

Si elle se réfère très tôt dans son récit au traitement de son grand-père et de ses oncles, arrêtés et torturés par les Français pendant la Résistance (15), ce n'est pas sans exprimer clairement un peu plus tard son « scepticisme » croissant à l'égard de l'Islam et sa difficulté à se retrouver dans cette religion (35). Son objection porte essentiellement sur la déplorable condition de la femme en Algérie : « la femme n'a aucun droit » (11). Et le culte de la virginité est tel qu'Aïcha « se sent comme dépossédée de son propre corps dans ce qu'il a de plus intime » (39). Cette condition de la femme en Algérie et dans les familles traditionnelles immigrées en France l'oblige à choisir entre deux attitudes également inacceptables et nocives: d'une part la résignation – « se laisser enfermer à la maison » – et de l'autre, la duplicité « s'en sortir en mentant et en jouant la comédie » (29). Le penchant naturel de toute jeunesse étant la liberté, le choix s'arrête le plus souvent sur la pratique de la dualité, d'une certaine « hypocrisie » compromettant l'intégrité identitaire d'une jeune femme. Aïcha comprend, par exemple, la nécessité de son adaptation à la culture dominante mais, comme d'autres enfants

issus de l'immigration, elle ne peut se défaire d'un sentiment de trahison et d'abandon à l'égard des siens. Elle constate: « J'ai réussi à dissocier ma personnalité, à faire cohabiter en moi deux personnages opposés : la Française que je suis, l'Algérienne que mes parents auraient voulu que je sois » (15). Si plusieurs passages dans le témoignage d'Aïcha reviennent sur la nécessité de ce dédoublement, d'autres mettent en lumière son désir de fuir car elle se sent étouffer chez ses parents depuis l'âge de 12 ans – l'âge où « les portes se ferment » (26). L'univers familial exige que la jeune femme s'ampute de l'essentiel d'elle-même :

> J'avais l'impression de ne pas exister vraiment. Qu'une moitié de moi était provisoirement morte. Une moitié que j'essayais de mieux connaître.
> Je ne cessais de me voir comme un personnage double. Celui de la maison, celui que mes parents voulaient que je sois : le personnage provisoire. Et l'autre, celui [sic] était vraiment moi, que je dévoilerais un jour, mais ailleurs. (27)

Aïcha comprend dès une première fugue à 17 ans que le masque, la création d'une image de soi conforme aux exigences de ses parents, est le seul moyen de survivre. Elle constate aussi qu'elle se sent mieux dans sa peau au lycée, dans l'univers culturel français, car il lui permet de s'exprimer :

> C'est à cette époque que j'ai compris que les choses étaient immuables et que c'était à moi de choisir. Choisir de rompre avec eux, ou me résigner totalement et respecter les traditions pour leur faire plaisir. Mais une telle résignation, pour moi, c'était le suicide au bout. Alors, j'ai continué à feindre, à faire comme si, en sachant que j'allais les quitter, pour toujours sans doute, en attendant le moment propice.
> Les seuls moments où je me supportais, où je me sentais à peu près bien, c'était au lycée. Là, je pouvais m'exprimer, parler, raconter. (46)

Aïcha ne comprend que trop tard, cependant, qu'elle n'est pas la seule à porter un masque. D'autres sont tout aussi capables de jouer la comédie pour gagner sa confiance et éventuellement lui tendre un piège. Son père, par exemple, fait semblant d'accepter et ses relations avec Antonio et leur cohabitation. Cette réaction désarme la jeune femme de 19 ans qui, pour lui faire plaisir, accepte d'assister au mariage d'un cousin en Algérie. Mais, une fois rendue dans ce pays, elle est privée de son passeport et enfermée dans une chambre. Aïcha est aussi trahie par un cousin algérien à qui elle confie une lettre à poster pour Antonio, implorant son aide pour sortir de l'Algérie. La surveillance augmente; et après trois mois passés à crier en vain, Aïcha finit par comprendre qu'il faut feindre la résignation et la soumission pour quitter de temps en temps la chambre et la maison :

> Pour trouver un équilibre et survivre, il me fallait dépasser la souffrance mêlée d'humiliation que me causait cette trahison. Je devais jouer la comédie, cacher cette mutilation intérieure pour faire croire que je changeais, que je m'adaptais. C'était le seul moyen d'obtenir un peu de liberté. Je voulais inspirer une certaine confiance pour qu'on me laisse enfin aller et venir. (73)

Aïcha se rend compte que la duplicité et la méfiance sont primordiales en Algérie dont le gouvernement dissimule régulièrement certaines réalités à son peuple et poursuit ses opposants en affichant leurs photos et en prétendant qu'ils sont recherchés par leurs proches. (96). Après huit mois passés en Algérie contre son gré, Aïcha constate que le gouvernement fait régner « un climat de méfiance terrible » : « On en arrive même à soupçonner les membres de sa propre famille. […] Il existe toujours un climat de suspicion, comme si chacun craignait en permanence pour sa propre peau » (97).

C'est l'espoir de pouvoir retourner en France qui soutient Aïcha. Et cet espoir réside principalement dans sa capacité de se dire, de s'écrire et de solliciter en français un soutien lui permettant de traverser la frontière pour rejoindre son pays natal.

Le rôle vital joué par l'écriture en français dans la vie d'Aïcha, dans sa fuite comme dans son épanouissement est évident dès l'incipit de ce récit. Il est clair que l'écriture en français lui est interdite à cause de son potentiel subversif. Elle prépare l'évasion, la traversée des frontières, l'éclatement de l'espace tout contraint et restreint réservé aux filles et aux femmes. Elle est rédigée en toute clandestinité parce qu'elle est dangereuse non seulement pour celle qui écrit mais aussi pour l'ensemble du système en place. Des descriptions semblables évoquant la dangerosité et la nature subversive de l'écriture en français se retrouvent également dans *L'Amour, la fantasia* de la romancière algérienne Assia Djebar et dans le roman *Georgette !* de la romancière française d'origine maghrébine Farida Belghoul.

Chez elle, en France, à l'âge de treize ans, Aïcha avait envie d'écrire un journal intime mais elle avait trop peur que ses parents le découvrent (32): « Ils auraient comme violé mon âme, en découvrant qui j'étais vraiment » (32).

Ainsi, c'est enfermée dans les toilettes avec les moyens du bord qu'Aïcha écrit des lettres demandant de l'aide pour rentrer en France. Elle cache ces lettres dans son soutien-gorge en attendant l'occasion de les envoyer en France. Ainsi, dans la lettre du 15 janvier 1985 qui ouvre le récit, la jeune femme de 19 ans, « au bord du suicide » implore l'intervention du proviseur de son lycée à Paris (10) pour la faire sortir de l'Algérie. Séquestrée et surveillée pendant huit mois, Aïcha trouve la force de résister surtout grâce à sa correspondance clandestine avec Antonio. La lettre de Rachid, le frère d'Aïcha et le premier à lui écrire après son départ pour l'Algérie porte la

date du 2 février 1985. Aïcha remarque que « les parties de la lettre qui [la] concernaient avaient [été] gommées et réécrites » (110). Les sœurs d'Aïcha, quant à elles, trouvent des astuces pour faire passer des messages. Elles se servent d'un langage codé pour communiquer car elles savent que leurs lettres sont « lues et relues par tout le monde » (118). Ainsi la lettre de Malika datée du 9 février 1985 lui apprend que, de l'autre côté de la Méditerranée, « Téfolle » (Antonio) tient toujours à elle. Le 21 avril 1985, Antonio lui écrit une longue lettre et la lui remet en personne, s'assurant ainsi qu'Aïcha soit la seule à la lire. Il prie Aïcha de garder de l'espoir, d'écrire à son père, d'écrire au consulat français et de ne pas arrêter de lui écrire à lui, Antonio, tant qu'elle ne serait pas sortie d'Algérie. L'écriture dans le récit d'Aïcha est synonyme du désir de vivre et de l'affirmation de soi dans un milieu hostile qui ne cherche que la soumission et l'effacement d'une jeune femme souhaitant vivre librement.

Malheureusement, la captivité d'Aïcha en Algérie est si traumatisante qu'elle a peur de sortir même lorsqu'elle se retrouve en France :

> La foule, les gens dans la rue me faisaient peur. Je n'osais pas mettre le nez dehors, je restais enfermée toute la journée, j'étais terrorisée par cette soudaine liberté. Ma hantise, c'était de me retrouver seule dehors. J'étais restée enfermée si longtemps que me retrouver à la fois en France et dehors, c'était trop d'un coup. J'ai mis du temps à réaliser que c'était fini, que j'étais enfin revenue. (125)

Elle se découvre incapable de téléphoner à Antonio pour lui annoncer son retour. C'est ce dernier qui vient la chercher pour l'emmener car Aïcha ne se sent pas « assez forte pour décider toute seule » (127) ce qu'elle doit faire. Craignant que son père ne « les trouve et les tue », elle n'emporte avec elle que sa carte d'identité française (128). Quelques années plus tard, elle rend visite à ses parents mais, toujours sous le choc de sa captivité algérienne, elle prend la précaution de laisser sa carte d'identité française chez elle, avec Antonio.

Comme l'ensemble du témoignage d'Aïcha, cette précaution sert de leçon et permettra à d'autres jeunes femmes d'origines maghrébines d'éviter les pièges de l'amour familial qui compromet leur épanouissement, leur quête d'une harmonie identitaire et leur désir de vivre leur vie pleinement. Le nom de Sophie Ponchelet sur la couverture du texte, tout juste au-dessous du nom d'Aïcha Benaïssa, n'enlève rien à la jeune Française d'origine maghrébine qui met son courage et son altruisme au service de ses sœurs. La solidarité féminine, comme l'écriture de soi, est nécessaire mais cela n'empêche pas certains de les considérer, l'une et l'autre, suspectes.

REFERENCES

Benaïssa, Aïcha (1990), *Née en France. Histoire d'une jeune beur*. Paris : Éditions Payot.

Hargreaves, Alec (2006), "Testimony, Co-Authorship, and Dispossession among Women of Maghrebi Origin in France," *Research in African Literatures* 37(1): 42–54.

Oprea-Gancevici, Olga (2012), "L'entre-deux de nouveau en question : Aïcha Benaïssa : la Française algérienne," *Qu'en est-il de la littérature "beur" au féminin?* Najib Redouane et Yvette Bénayoun-Szmidt (eds.), Paris: L'Harmattan: 69–78.

« Mariages forcés, mariages arrangés, dites non. » http://www.ldh-france.org/IMG /pdf/mariages-forces-dites-non.pdf consulté le 29 nov. 2012.

Anne Marie Miraglia, Professor, is a specialist of francophone novelists from Black and Arab Africa, Québec and the French Caribbean. Her research includes literary theory, semiotics, narratology and feminist criticism. She also works on questions of cultural hybridity and cultural identity. Her present research focuses on writers from Africa who have immigrated to France or to Quebec and who write about the immigrant and clandestine experience. Professor Miraglia has published two books. The first, *L'Écriture de l'Autre chez Jacques Poulin* (Québec, 1993) applies the concepts of "dialogisme" (Mikhaïl Bakhtine) and of "intertextualité" (Kristeva, Todorov, Riffaterre) to the study of novels by Jacques Poulin in their relation to American fiction. The second, *Des Voix contre le silence* (Durham University, UK, 2005) examines the narrative techniques used in nine novels written in French by women writers from the Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco) to comment on the condition of women in traditional Muslim societies. Professor Miraglia has published articles on a variety of francophone novelists. These include well known writers such as Assia Djebar (Algeria), Maryse Condé (Guadeloupe) and Andrée Chedid (Egypt) and on less familiar writers living in the Maghreb such as Emna Bel Haj Yahia (Tunisia). Her publications also include texts on Canadian born novelist Nino Ricci, on Haitian born novelist Dany Laferrière, and on French "second-generation immigrant" ("Beurs") novelists Azouz Begag, Tassadit Imache and Farida Belghoul. Her earliest research includes articles on the representation of Québec's "américanité" in contemporary Québécois novels.

Addleton Academic Publishers
Journal of Research in Gender Studies
Volume 3(2), 2013, pp. 76–84, ISSN: 2164-0262

GENRE INTIME ET GENRE SEXUEL DANS L'ŒUVRE GIDIENNE

JUSTINE LEGRAND
justinelegrandjuan@yahoo.fr
Université Paris-Sorbonne

ABSTRACT. In 1911 Gide dare a bet of a treaty – *Corydon* – which aims at fighting over a lie, in which he reassesses Pascal famous phrase: "All tastes are in nature." A key quote within a period of time, and while Gide risks to put literary genre at service over a reflection on the sexual kind, when Oscar Wilde faces trial involving his homosexual inclination. Having discovered from his infancy he was "not like the others" Gide took the opportunity to use his artistic talent to give voice to that difference. The gender theory that developed a few decades after the death of Gide traces some of its roots in the aesthetic work of Gide where the homosexual has a very important place. Today, more than ever, Gide writing in all its richness, and in all its forms, appears as an ode to the difference, a place where to say is to mean. The author calls for openness of the reader, who must be over an ideology working on respect and the right to difference. The author's work is far from being vain, when we look at the evolution of thought on the issue of homosexuality. Therefore one should look at the past works to understand the gender discourse and measure the extent of social and cultural progress in our Western society advances for which we can thank the author and his bet to achieve a true literature of ideas.

Keywords: gender; homosexuality; André Gide; society; difference

1. Introduction

En 1911, Gide ose le pari d'un traité, *Corydon*, qui ne vise pas moins que *combattre le mensonge*,[1] et dans lequel il reprend cette célèbre phrase de Pascal : « Tous les goûts sont dans la nature ». Une citation essentielle quand on sait qu'à cette même époque, et tandis que Gide se risque à mettre le genre littéraire au service d'une réflexion sur le genre sexuel, Oscar Wilde doit faire face à un procès mettant en cause son penchant homosexuel. En découvrant dès sa prime enfance qu'il n'est « pas pareil aux autres »,[2] Gide saisit l'occasion d'utiliser son talent artistique pour que sa

différence ait voix. La théorie du genre développée quelques décennies après le décès de Gide trouve bien ses racines dans ce travail esthétique gidien où l'homosexuel a sa place. Si Gide craignait que l'on dresse de lui le portrait d'un « monstre »,[3] il convient d'affirmer qu'il n'en est plus rien. Au contraire, aujourd'hui, plus que jamais, l'écriture gidienne dans toute sa richesse, et sous toutes ses formes, apparaît bien comme une ode à la différence, un lieu où dire c'est prendre position. Pour l'auteur, on ne peut réduire l'homosexuel à un être déviant : l'homme n'est pas homme selon sa seule orientation sexuelle. Pour Gide, l'œuvre est le lieu permettant au littéraire de rencontrer l'intime, et de discourir ouvertement de la question du genre sexuel, lieu où l'écriture possède toutes les caractéristiques d'une écriture genrée, puisqu'elle dépasse le clivage homme/femme. Le discours particulier gidien n'incite pas au communautarisme mais appelle à une ouverture d'esprit de la part du lecteur, qui doit être le relais d'une idéologie travaillant sur le respect et le droit à la différence. Un travail loin d'être vain quand on regarde l'évolution de la pensée sur la question de l'homosexualité. Il s'agit donc de regarder l'œuvre du passé pour comprendre le discours sur le genre, et de mesurer l'étendue des avancées sociales et culturelles réalisées dans notre société occidentale ; des avancées pour lesquelles nous pouvons remercier l'auteur et son pari de réaliser une vraie littérature d'idées.

2. La prise de conscience de la différence : le genre autobiographique

Pour André Gide, la pratique homosexuelle ne fonctionne pas en opposition avec la norme pensée comme le point de référence dans la distinction entre ce qui est normal et ce qui est pervers. La prise de conscience de son désir homosexuel est l'occasion de mettre son talent littéraire au service d'une réflexion sur l'homosexualité, et plus largement sur ce que l'on nomme le genre sexuel, sur cette distinction établie entre sexe et sexualité, entre mâle et femelle et masculin et féminin. *Corydon* est considérée, à ce titre, comme l'œuvre la plus « serviceable », c'est-à-dire, « de plus grande utilité, de plus grand service pour le progrès de l'humanité ».[4] Car ce traité est l'un des lieux ayant permis à Gide d'opérer un glissement entre deux genres, nous invitant à nous demander comment le genre littéraire a su profiter de ses diversités pour que le genre sexuel soit développé. Les liens constants entre le littéraire et le sexuel dans l'œuvre de Gide nous ouvrent la porte sur le monde de la différence : différence de la convoitise et du besoin sexuel ainsi que différence entre les sexes.

De ces différences sont nées des attaques ayant provoqué chez Gide un autre besoin, celui de dire. Cette *défense*, mot qu'il emploie lui-même, a à certains égards pleinement participé à l'émergence d'une nouvelle idéologie socioculturelle : l'idéologie genrée. Chez Gide, la prise de conscience de la

différence est précoce, et est rattachée à des souvenirs de différence clairement énoncés dans le récit autobiographique *Si le grain ne meurt*. Ce qu'il y a de plus particulier ici, c'est le décalage qui se situe dès cette période de la découverte sexuelle, où les jeux sont exclusivement homosexuels :

> Je revois aussi une assez grande table, celle de la salle à manger sans doute, recouverte d'un tapis bas tombant ; au-dessous de quoi je me glissais avec le fils de la concierge, un bambin de mon âge qui venait parfois me retrouver. […] l'un près de l'autre […] nous avions ce que j'ai su plus tard qu'on appelait « de mauvaises habitudes ». Qui de nous deux en avait instruit l'autre ? et de qui le premier les tenait-t-il ? Je ne sais. Il faut bien admettre qu'un enfant parfois à nouveau les invente. Pour moi je ne puis dire si quelqu'un m'enseigna ou comment je découvris le plaisir ; mais, aussi loin que ma mémoire remonte en arrière, il est là.[5]

Dans son ouvrage *Hommes, femmes*, ouvrage faisant suite à un « séminaire organisé par le Collège de la Cité des sciences et de l'industrie dans le cadre des carrefours du savoir », Françoise Héritier évoque la construction de la différence. Dans le chapitre intitulé « A quoi jouent les petits garçons et les petites filles ? », [6] la question des origines de cette distinction des sexes est ouvertement posée et nous permet de comprendre que le récit gidien n'a rien de sexuellement exceptionnel puisque si « la connaissance fine de ces traits et rôles masculins et féminins n'est guère achevée avant la préadolescence, un premier niveau semblant néanmoins être atteint entre deux et trois ans : à cet âge, les enfants sont capables d'identifier verbalement ou de classer les personnes – eux-mêmes y compris –, ou encore de distinguer les attributs et les activités selon le sexe ».[7] Gide semble confirmer cette acquisition quasi innée, en évoquant le récit de ses premières découvertes sexuelles et l'échec de son effort de normalisation dans *Si le grain ne meurt*, c'est-à-dire son incapacité à vivre une sexualité hétérosexuelle.

> Mais qu'ai-je besoin d'évoquer ces lugubres jours ? Leur souvenir explique-t-il mon délire de cette nuit ? La tentative auprès de Mériem, cet effort de « normalisation » était resté sans lendemain, car il n'allait point dans mon sens ; à présent je trouvais enfin ma normale.[8]

Gide comprend que sa *normale* n'est pas la normale, et sa différence s'inscrit jusqu'au cœur de son désir, un désir qu'il tente de nier en vain. Cette tentative de l'effort de normalisation est née de l'idée selon laquelle il y a une « domination masculine »,[9] postulat définit ainsi par Bourdieu : « La division entre les sexes paraît être *dans l'ordre des choses*, comme on dit parfois pour parler de ce qui est normal, naturel, au point d'en être inévitable : elle est présente à la fois, à l'état objectivé, dans les choses, dans

tout le monde social et, à l'état incorporé, dans les corps, dans les habitus des agents, fonctionnant comme systèmes de schèmes de perception, de pensée et d'action ».[10] Ajoutons que « la structure de la domination masculine est le principe ultime de ces innombrables relations de domination/ soumission singulières qui, différentes dans leur forme selon la position dans l'espace social des agents concernés – parfois immenses et visibles, parfois infinitésimales et quasi invisibles, mais homologues et unies, de ce fait, par un air de famille –, séparent et unissent, dans chacun des univers sociaux, les hommes et les femmes, maintenant ainsi entre eux la « ligne de démarcation mystique » dont parlait Virginia Woolf ». [11]

3. Le droit à la différence et le besoin de dire

Cette domination masculine ne s'entend toutefois pas chez Gide comme une négation de la femme, ni de sa place dans la société. Il n'y a pas de caste strictement masculine, et la communauté littéraire, par exemple, ne refuse pas sa place à la femme. Cependant, certaines activités se réalisent dans un monde exclusivement masculin, où la femme n'est qu'une expérience comme Mériem, une expérience permettant à l'homme de confirmer son désir homosexuel.

La femme devient le catalyseur de la réflexion homosexuelle masculine. Incapable de vivre sereinement son besoin sexuel, André Gide se retrouve victime de *Schaudern*, c'est-à-dire de crises d'angoisse dont il fait le récit dans *Si le grain ne meurt.*

> Je n'avais vu que deux ou trois fois le petit Emile Widmer et n'avais point ressenti pour lui de sympathie bien particulière ; […] ce n'était pas précisément la mort de mon petit cousin qui me faisait pleurer, mais je ne sais quoi, mais une angoisse indéfinissable […] encore aujourd'hui, je ne la puis expliquer mieux. […] C'est le souvenir de mon premier *Schaudern* à l'annonce de cette mort que, malgré moi, et tout irrésistiblement, j'évoquai.
>
> Le second tressaillement est plus bizarre encore : c'était quelques années plus tard, peu après la mort de mon père ; […] je devais avoir onze ans. […]
>
> On eût dit que brusquement s'ouvrait l'écluse particulière de je ne sais quelle commune mer intérieure inconnue dont le flot s'engouffrait démesurément dans mon cœur ; j'étais moins triste qu'épouvanté […] ces confuses paroles que je répétais avec désespoir :
>
> « Je ne suis pas pareil aux autres ! Je ne suis pas pareil aux autres ! »[12]

Nous remarquons que, par leurs symptômes, ces *Schaudern* sont proches de la suffocation, et qu'ils sont liés à la mort. Freud explique d'ailleurs l'origine et la cause de ces crises d'angoisse en soulignant que « l'angoisse des enfants n'est rien d'autre à l'origine que l'expression du fait que la personne aimée leur manque ; de ce fait, ils abordent chaque étranger avec angoisse […] et seuls les enfants dont la pulsion sexuelle est excessive ou prématurément développée, ou encore rendue exigeante par les cajoleries, ont un penchant à l'anxiété. L'enfant se comporte à cet égard comme l'adulte en transformant sa libido en angoisse dès lors qu'il est incapable de la mener à la satisfaction ». [13]

Afin de parler de son intime, Gide ne peut occulter ses problèmes liés à l'angoisse. Toutefois, l'autobiographie n'est pas seule au service des genres sexuels et de *Si le grain ne meurt* à *Corydon*, il n'y a qu'un pas : « Il faut en effet considérer *Si le grain ne meurt* comme le livre jumeau de *Corydon*, Gide étant désireux d'y montrer comment cette pulsion homosexuelle a structuré son identité et son histoire, à côté du traité visant à démontrer et à établir le droit de l'homosexualité à exister comme un fait de nature et de culture, le tout culminant dans l'établissement d'une morale ».[14] Or, rappelons-le, *Corydon* est un traité sur l'homosexualité dont la fonction principale est de « combattre le mensonge ». L'écriture gidienne se veut alors une écriture genrée, qui s'affranchit du clivage homme/femme, et poursuit sans cesse sa quête de liberté.

Bien qu'écrit antérieurement à *Si le grain ne meurt*, *Corydon* s'inscrit dans cette dynamique de légitimation, au même titre que *L'Immoraliste*. Et à travers l'œuvre de Gide, on peut parler de différents genres littéraires qui s'unissent pour témoigner du droit à la différence. La diversité des genres littéraires mise au service du droit à la différence assoit la performativité des jeux rhétoriques qui œuvrent par leur existence à la légitimation de l'homosexualité, et par extension à une nouvelle approche de la distinction masculin/féminin.

Certes, il n'y a pas que le traité qui contribue à une réflexion genrée même si « le genre du dialogue auquel recourt Gide appartient à la tradition antique et philosophique, et se trouve illustré par de grands devanciers traitant de l'homosexualité ».[15] Ainsi, d'autres récits comme *Le Ramier* ou *L'Immoraliste* ont pleinement participé à la résolution du problème homosexuel. Nous parlons essentiellement de l'homosexualité masculine, non que la question du genre puisse être réduite à ce « problème », comme l'appelle Gide, mais parce que c'est ce problème gidien qui a conduit l'auteur à penser sa révision de la sexualité.

L'écriture gidienne est performative ; elle a pour fonction de dire, de dénoncer, mais aussi de résoudre le *problème* de la sexualité. Or, « en art, il n'y a pas de problèmes – dont l'œuvre d'art ne soit la suffisante solution ».[16]

Il y a donc une concordance entre genre littéraire et genre sexuel, puisque le genre littéraire doit venir répondre aux questions posées notamment dans le cadre de la sexualité. Et outre le genre littéraire, c'est le style qui concorde à son tour à ce que le littéraire et le sexuel parlent à l'unisson. Gide choisit de garder ses élans classiques car il n'y a pas de négation du modernisme intellectuel et de la rhétorique classique.

A certains égards, si le vécu gidien s'approche du romantisme, c'est pourtant bien au classicisme que l'auteur se réfère. Cela permet à ce dernier de montrer que le droit à la différence n'existe pas dans un but provocateur. La différence structurelle est indéniable, l'homme et la femme sont deux identités non égales, en ce sens que nous sommes biologiquement inégalitaires. Cette inégalité ne doit toutefois pas être entendue négativement, même si « ce sont bien les critères discriminants, élaborés dans le cadre d'une politique de normalisation des corps sexués, qui minent la définition même du normal en matière de processus de sexuation biologique ».[17] Et Gide aspire à montrer que la différence peut aussi être constitutive d'une image positive dans le vécu, car c'est dans la différence que lui-même trouve certains plaisirs, appelant de ses vœux à la multiplication des possibles. L'œuvre gidienne incarne le lieu permettant au littéraire de rencontrer l'intime, et de discourir ouvertement de la question du genre sexuel.

4. L'idéologie socioculturelle genrée

Nous employons l'adjectif « genrée », en référence à la traduction de Cynthia Kraus du livre *Trouble dans le genre* de Judith Butler. Dans cette partie, il s'agit de regarder la littérature de la fin du XIX^{e} siècle et du début du XX^{e} siècle pour comprendre ce que nous appelons *le discours genré*, et de mesurer l'étendue des avancées sociales et culturelles réalisées dans notre société occidentale ; avancées pour lesquelles nous pouvons remercier l'auteur et son pari de réaliser une vraie littérature d'idées.

La *French Theory*, à l'origine des études de genre, Gide y a participé avant l'heure en ouvrant le discours littéraire au discours sexuel. Il a ainsi contribué à l'émergence d'une réflexion socioculturelle dont on ne mesure peut-être pas encore toujours toutes les avancées aujourd'hui en France. Pourtant à travers ses prises de position audacieuses, Gide affronte un risque nécessaire. « Comme l'écrit Hélène Rouch, il faut donc se prémunir d'une "confusion systématiquement pratiquée entre attributs de sexe, comportement sexuel et rôle dans la reproduction" laquelle "conduit à bien des amalgames : entre l'individu et l'espère (la reproduction considérée comme nécessaire pour l'individu alors qu'elle ne l'est qu'à la survie de l'espèce) ; entre sexuation et sexualité (l'hétérosexualité comme norme, l'homosexualité comme marginalité, voire anormalité) ; entre sexualité et reproduction (la

sexualité reproductive comme seule forme de sexualité : amalgame particulièrement étonnant si l'on songe à la perte de l'*oestrus* dans l'espèce humaine)[18]" ».[19]

En effet, il y a une distinction impérative à établir entre le sexe et la sexualité, et cette confusion soulignée précédemment, André Gide l'avait mise au jour notamment par l'intermédiaire de personnages fictionnels, comme Michel dans *L'Immoraliste* ou Olivier dans *Les Faux-monnayeurs.* Des personnages de fiction dont nous sentons que les traits de caractère essentiels passent par l'expression d'une sexualité torturée, torturée en ce sens qu'elle se situe en décalage par rapport à la norme. Dans ce cadre, l'auteur choisit de placer la rhétorique et l'esthétique classiques au service de la dénonciation d'une normale d'apparat.

Dans les *Billets à Angèle*, Gide théorise la littérature, explique les questions de fond et de forme qui font l'œuvre ; et ce qui s'apparente à du paratexte, (nous nous situons par rapport à l'œuvre de fiction quand nous parlons ici de paratexte à propos des *Billets*) permet de justifier de la place de la littérature dans la réflexion sociale contemporaine à Gide. Ainsi, ce qu'il écrit en 1940, au lendemain de la fin de la drôle de guerre pourrait trouver écho dans la réflexion sur la sexualité :

> Il me paraît aussi absurde d'incriminer notre littérature au sujet de notre défaite, qu'il l'eût été de la féliciter en 1918, lorsque nous avions la victoire. La littérature est elle-même un produit et ne peut être tenue pour responsable du vieillissement de l'arbre dont elle est la fleur ou le fruit.[20]

En 1941, Gide montre la supériorité de l'art littéraire, un art dont le littérateur n'a guère à justifier les élans :

> Je n'aime pas les interviewers. Bons pour ceux, de quelque profession que ce soit, qui peuvent avoir de grandes et fécondes idées, mais dont le métier n'est pas précisément de les dire. Nous, littérateurs, nous n'avons nul besoin, pour atteindre le public, d'un truchement qui, le plus souvent, travestit fâcheusement notre pensée, fût-ce avec la meilleure volonté du monde.[21]

Mais chez Gide, tout se combat et se contredit.[22] Son besoin de témoigner est en partie motivé pas la peur éprouvée à l'idée que son nom soit associé à une pratique sexuelle jugée déviante, et que son œuvre soit à jamais liée à une monstruosité que certains pourraient prêter à l'auteur : *Je crains d'avoir à lutter bientôt contre une fausse image de moi qu'on est en train de tracer, un monstre auquel on donne mon nom, et qu'à ma place on dresse et qui est laid et bête à faire peur.*[23]

Si Gide ne mesure que trop bien les limites de l'homosexualité, écrivant par exemple en 1918 dans son *Journal* : « il m'a toujours paru qu'eux seuls (les invertis, ndlr) méritaient ce reproche de déformation morale ou intel-

lectuelle et tombaient sous le coup de certaines accusations que l'on adresse communément à tous les homosexuels. », il sait aussi que la dénonciation est vitale pour que l'homosexuel ait le droit d'être.

5. Conclusion

Au cœur de l'œuvre gidienne, il est un problème qui se décline à l'envi et transparaît derrière chaque genre littéraire : le problème de la distinction entre sexe et sexualité. La précocité de la découverte de sa différence a conduit Gide à mettre son talent littéraire au service d'une réflexion autour du Moi. Ce que l'auteur a entrepris, avec un certain courage, car l'homosexualité était considérée comme une maladie mentale à cette époque, c'est de montrer au plus grand nombre qu'il nous fallait faire de la différence le siège d'une réflexion progressiste au nom de la liberté d'être, liberté que Gide place au-dessus de tout puisque : « savoir se libérer n'est rien ; l'ardu, c'est savoir être libre ».[24] Et qu'être libre, c'est s'affranchir des jugements moraux pour que la question esthétique retrouve de sa superbe car, selon Gide, même lorsqu'il s'agit de repenser la sexualité et le genre, « le point de vue esthétique est le seul où il faille se placer pour parler de [s]on œuvre sainement ».[25]

NOTES

1. Gide, André (2009), *Corydon*, in *Romans et récits*, vol. II, Paris : Gallimard, « La Pléiade », 61.

2. Gide, André (2009), *Si le grain ne meurt*, in *Romans et récits*, vol. II, Paris : Gallimard, « La Pléiade », 165–166.

3. Gide, André (1996), *Journal 1887–1925* : « Je crains d'avoir à lutter bientôt contre une fausse image de moi qu'on est en train de tracer, un monstre auquel on donne mon nom, et qu'à ma place on dresse et qui est laid et bête à faire peur », 17 octobre 1910, Paris : Gallimard, « La Pléiade », 662.

4. Goulet, Alain (2009), « Notice à *Corydon* » in *Romans et récits*, vol. II, Paris : Gallimard, « La Pléiade », 1162.

5. Gide, André, *Si le grain ne meurt*, *op. cit.*, 81.

6. Héritier, Françoise (2010), *Hommes, femmes*, chapitre « A quoi jouent les petits garçons et les petites filles ? » (Stéphanie Barbu et Gaïd Le Maner-Idrissi), Editions Le Pommier et Universcience Editions, 81–91.

7. *Ibid.*, 90–91.

8. Gide, André, *Si le grain ne meurt*, *op. cit.*, 309–310.

9. Bourdieu, Pierre (2002), *La Domination masculine*, Paris, Editions Points, coll. « Essais », 12.

10. Bourdieu, Pierre, *La Domination masculine*, *op. cit.*, 21.

11. *Ibid.*, 147.

12. Gide, André, *Si le grain ne meurt*, *op. cit.*, 165–166.

13. Freud, Sigmund (2002), *Trois essais sur la théorie sexuelle.* Paris : Folio, « Esssais », 167-168.

14. Goulet, Alain, « Notice à *Corydon* », *op. cit.*, 1164.

15. *Ibid.*, 1163.

16. Gide, André (2009), *L'Immoraliste*, in *Romans et récits*, vol. II, Paris : Gallimard, « La Pléiade », 592.

17. Dorlin, Elsa (2011), *Sexe, genre et sexualités*. PUF, coll. « Philosophies », 50.

18. Rouch, Hélène (1995), « Les nouvelles techniques de reproduction : vers l'indifférenciation sexuelle ? », in A. Ducros et M. Panoff (dir.), *La frontière des sexes*, Paris : PUF, 244.

19. Dorlin, Elsa, *op. cit.*, 51–52.

20. Gide, André (1999), *Billets à Angèle*, *Œuvres critiques*. Paris, Gallimard, « La Pléiade », 308.

21. Gide, André (1941), *Billets à Angèle*, 316.

22. Gide, André, *Si le grain ne meurt* : « Je suis un être de dialogue ; tout en moi combat et se contredit », *op. cit*., 267.

23. Gide, André, *Journal 1887–1925, op. cit.*, 662.

24. Gide, André, *L'Immoraliste, op. cit.*, 597.

25. Gide, André, *Journal 1887–1925, op. cit*., 1064.

Justine Legrand, Ph.D., is the author of a thesis defended in 2011, published with Orizons Publishing in 2012 under the title: *André Gide: de la perversion au genre sexuel* within the "Universities" collection. After defending her Ph.D., she has chosen to focus her research on the role of women in literature (*Pouvoir et sexualité dans* Les Infortunes de la vertu, décembre 2013, Éditions Orizons), as well as gender studies, and links between genre and sexual kind. She has worked in Iceland and France as a teacher of French. Now she is as a teacher of French language and literature courses in French Civilization at the University of Sorbonne, Paris. She is also the editor of the blog Catherine Gide Foundation.

Addleton Academic Publishers
Journal of Research in Gender Studies
Volume 3(2), 2013, pp. 85–100, ISSN: 2164-0262

GENDER TROUBLE IN *WHO'S AFRAID OF VIRGINIA WOOLF*

PARISA SHAMS
parisa.shams88@gmail.com
Shiraz University
FARIDEH POURGIV
fpourgiv@rose.shirazu.ac.ir
Shiraz University

ABSTRACT. During his lifelong career, Albee has created a world inhabited by people struggling to understand and assert their identity within a social sphere of change and crisis, as his plays, being critiques of humans and their society, bring to light psychosocial, sexual, philosophical, and political problems lying at the heart of human existence. In like manner, Butler, tracking changes in contemporary social and political arena, has drawn upon various traditions in psychoanalysis, philosophy, feminism, and queer criticism in order to develop a wide set of reflections on gender, sexuality, language, and identity. This study has tried to merge Albee's worldview expressed in *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf* into Butler's philosophy to illuminate Albeean world through a Butlerian perspective.

Keywords: Albee; Butler; gender; *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf*; sexuality; performativity

1. Introduction

Albee appeared as the exemplary playwright of the 1960s to voice a criticism of American values. He started his career as a dramatist by *The Zoo Story* (1959) and over the next four years wrote five international hits among which his first Broadway play *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf* (1962) was met with extraordinary critical success (Kittredge 35). "*The Zoo Story* proved a revelation in the context of the American theater of the time, embodying onstage the restless, youthful energy of the disenfranchised 'Beat' generation" (Bottoms 3).

In "Edward Albee: Don't Make Waves" (2005), Weales notes that in *The Zoo Story*, *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf*, and *A Delicate Balance*, the ambiguities of Albee's attitudes are tested through his dramatic actions (29). *The Zoo Story*, *The American Dream* and *Who's Afraid of Virginia*

Woolf present Albee as "the quintessential angry young man of the American theater" (Kittredge 36). Albee's early plays aim to present "the rage and the daily despair beneath the surface of American middle class life" (Green qtd in Kittredge 37). The origin of Albee's artistic preoccupation with self-deception is marked by his early plays, as in *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf* where Martha and George have created an illusory son to cope with their personal disappointments (Kittredge 37).

When discussing gender and identity, Butler argues that gender is a socially and culturally constructed phenomenon, which is "supported by a masculine heterosexual hierarchy within society;" therefore, oppressive cultural forces such as rigid gender norms, patriarchy, and subordination of women's psycho-social needs to men impact the way subjects perform their genders as they submit to the dominant discourse about what constitutes an intelligible gender. In the process of performing the socially approved identity, individuals might repress, reject, or subvert themselves in order to avoid social banishment (Hough 37–8), or to resist the discrimination or violence exercised upon them. Power, subversion, and gender related issues are not only amongst the concepts with which Butler's work is endowed, but also they inhere in the structure of Albee's world.

Allowing a comprehensive examination of Albee's early play *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf*, this study will try to gain an understanding of how the play brings up the themes of gender, language, and power in its representation of human relationships, why gender roles are subverted and to what extent femininity and masculinity merge or oppose each other, and comply with or deviate from the culturally defined gender roles. In addition to the psychological ground to the characters' struggles and behaviors, in the context of the dominant cultural and social discourses of the time, the characters of Albee struggle to gain the upper hand through acts, language, subversion, violence and even submission—all this information will be gathered and analyzed through a Butlerian lens.

2. Literature Review

Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf opens with George and Martha's verbal attacking, which, as it continues to the end of the play, gradually gets more violent and, at some points, even physical. The couple, being back from the party given by Martha's father who is the president of the college wherein George is a history professor, expects a younger couple, Nick and Honey, whom Martha has met and invited to her place at her father's request. George and Martha's troubled relationship goes through a couple of ups and downs during the play, and their relationship with Nick and Honey reveals more of their troublesome marriage, and of their personal problems which, at

times, could be traced to their childhood and, in other cases, to the position the society has ascribed to them with respect to their genders.

One striking characteristic of the play is the game in which characters seemingly mimic the opposite gender roles. Martha's obsessions with her father and her imaginary son, Honey's fear of pregnancy, George's story of the boy who had accidentally killed his parents, and Martha's relationship with Nick are all of great significance. From one point of view, the characters' internal and external struggles revolve around the issue of gender and their formation as gendered subjects in a heteronormative patriarch society.

Casting a glance at what critics have already said about the play in regards with gender issues, it could be noted that in "Barren Ground: Female Strength and Male Impotence in *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf* and *Cat on a Hot Tin Roof*," Kundert-Gibbs considers Martha as one of the strongest female characters in American theater, noting that her strength is mitigated and undermined in the course of the play as she is "effectively punished for overstepping the bounds of what is considered appropriate behavior for women," so, although she is "granted a typically masculine strength and attitude," she is "betrayed by these strengths, trapped in society's eye between proper male and female behavior" (230). Kundert-Gibbs refers to Martha's childlessness, and notes that in the time of the play's production, motherhood was the only area in this world through which women were allowed to create a life of their own, so the fact that Martha has no children is not only central to the play, but also a sign of Martha's being a failure "of society's gender expectations" (232).

Zwagerman offers a reading of *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf* "as a performance of the terminal unhappiness, the dead end, of the verbal gender conflicts [...] the failure of performative acts and the failure of gender equality as it relates to linguistic agency" (105). He asserts that Albee "deconstructs humorous talk to expose its ultimate infelicity, and that of communication in general, right down to its locutionary roots" (105). In *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf*, it is portrayed that although humor is on the surface playful and potent, it is "ultimately a failed, unhappy speech act, representative of the generalized failure of performative speech to conceive significant social or interpersonal change" (105). As it is seen through the play, Martha is George's equal in talk; she possesses an equal authority over words and "a full appropriation of aggressive, sexual, masculine humor" (105), but they are both equal in failure. There's no one who wins and no one is the only victim. They express an "ultimate failure to constitute a child out of words," so "*Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf* is also a play about the impotence of equality; Martha can do with words everything which George can—which is to say nothing productive" (123). The fact that they are equal in being impotent also implies "collective intentionality," "the very

force that invents, destroys, and reinvents social constructs" (123–4). "The exposure/erasure of the son [...] culminates a play that relentlessly exposes the failed and impotent assertion of language and the fragility of all that we construct through rules, roles, words, and contexts" (124).

In *Edward Albee: the Poet of Loss*, Stenz asserts that Martha is the depiction of a potentially powerful human being who is "discouraged by family, education and society from having personal goals," so she "dissipates" her great energy in vain, "vicarious living" (40). She is the victim of her lack of self-esteem and also "her own thwarted aggressiveness" (40). She is an example of an unfulfilled person (43). She is more interested in the idea of what she could become through a man rather than the man himself (42). In fact, she "seeks identity in the life of the man she married" (40).

As regards the other female character of the play, Honey, Phyllis Dircks, in *Edward Albee: A Literary Companion*, notes that Martha and Honey are different in their attitude to having a child. Honey, at some point in the play, reveals that her illness is due to the fact that she is taking a substance to prevent pregnancy. So, she reveals her fear of pregnancy and that her immaturity has impeded her natural desire for motherhood. Alcohol is "the attractive and readily available anodyne" to soothe her inner conflicts (70).

At first sight, Nick seems to represent success, as he is a source of strength for his fragile wife, a promising young academic, and "the desirable object of Martha's advances"; however, as the play goes on these qualities are one by one devalued. Their marriage is revealed as an act of necessity due to Honey's pregnancy, his academic position is undermined by George, and finally, Martha announces him as being sexually impotent. Thus, Nick is another example of "the failure that comes between potential and performance" (Zwagerman 117).

3. Gender, Subverted Gender Roles, and Gender Performativity

In the non-stop game of power in which George and Martha collaborate, Martha shouts, orders, humiliates her husband, pokes fun at him and constantly accuses him of knowing nothing. Is she imitating the socially recognized role of a man? Is she parodying a certain gender? Or she is just performing her gender reality as constituted by the discourses of her time? The same questions can be asked about other characters of the play. Is George actually the meek man he appears to be? Is he involved in a game of gender mimicry? Is his acted-out femininity an act of subversive performance? Are Nick and Honey the ideal man and woman?

At first sight, what shocks Martha's audience is her vulgarity and aggressiveness. At times, she tells George, "you don't know anything," or "you don't do anything." She exhibits a tendency to take control. There are times

when she mimics the children's way of talking as when she says, "I'm firsty", maybe to poke fun at the idea that women should be nice and cute in order to be listened to, and that they should just exhibit a need in order to be heard. She refuses to appear as the nice sweet wife and mother. At times she acts like a "monster" as George calls her, and at times she really becomes calm and sweet; she just tries to make George laugh.

George appears to be submissive at the beginning; he looks helpless as Martha humiliates him, throws insults on him, orders him to do things and refuses to listen to him. Later in the play, he becomes defiant; he makes objections and acts aggressively. Once, tries to kill Martha although it is just a practical joke. But later he becomes physically aggressive, as he pushes Martha and beats her down in the bar, and later hits her head against the car door. At the end, he becomes a man totally in control of everything as he takes the game in his hand and ends it as he wishes.

Butler's concept of performativity is rooted in a philosophy of language, and "is concerned with the 'performed' character of (gender) identity and the implications this has for agency, resistance and subjectivity," so the notion of language games is evoked in such an understanding of performativity (Dent and Whitehead 7). George and Martha's constant involvement in verbal games and their seeming role playing is, on the one hand, suggestive of the fact that as they play masculinity or femininity, they are also poking fun at the established male and female roles. What they do is the implication of Butler's claim that human beings are involved in a constant game of playing gender; thus, gender is not an attribute; rather, it is a practice. In fact, they show that there is no fixed gender role; each man and woman portrays masculine and feminine traits and, in fact, *performs* gender, rather than *being* a certain gender. As such, the characters of the play are all performing gender.

Albee ruins the lines between fixed categories of gender and, by showing that each person is a blend of different genders, exhibits a denouncement of gender binaries. The way the characters behave shows the fluidity of gender, as each one of them seems to shift between genders at different times and in different contexts, rather than holding onto a fixed stereotypical gender role. Thus, they represent the Butlerian idea that gender is a continuum, for which there exists no original and natural form, except for the socially constructed ones. Each character of the play portrays dynamicity in their assertion of their gendered identity. Rather than seeing a patriarch masculine figure of a husband, one sees a seemingly meek man who can nicely manipulate the situation to get the upper hand and rule over. The harsh and aggressive housewife can shift towards emotionality and sentimental behavior, while Honey, the other apparently sweet and lovely wife, reveals her dissatisfaction through misuse of alcohol, a fear of motherhood

and her commitment with abortion. The seemingly perfect athletic-built man of the play proves to be sexually impotent and incapable at times.

On the other hand, by paying careful attention to the characters of the play, one could be convinced that rather than suggesting that Martha deliberately mimics masculinity and George intentionally mimics femininity, the play seems to portray the fact that gender comes into existence at the moment of its performance. Rather than suggesting that Martha is a typical woman and George a stereotyped man, the play conveys this idea that there is no predetermined gender; instead, individuals are constantly creating their own genders. Gender, as Butler suggests, comes into existence in the moment of its "performative constitution;" therefore, "gender is not something prior to its performative acts" (Stoller 99). Thus, Albee does not scold Martha as a woman who has stepped outside her female sphere; rather, he portrays a woman who creates and performs her own gender, makes use of these performances to protest and depict her dissatisfactions, and defies the socially prescribed gender roles. She can be cute, harsh, aggressive, or a kind and caring mother. However, she is living in a society where there is a tendency towards stereotyping women, and she is unconsciously under the influence of the socially and culturally accepted norms. She is influenced by the powerful figure of her father. She is consequently forced to seek identity through her father and to achieve her deferred dreams through her husband's career. Meanwhile, in the process of creating her own gender, at times, she moves beyond those social and cultural norms and expectations, and gets the figure of a "monster" that demands power and attention and seeks happiness.

Apart from the verbal games with which George and Martha involve themselves, Martha is not a woman who only aims to deny a certain gender or approve another through mimicking masculinity; she is exactly what she is expressing at the moment of expression, be it a tender woman or harsh man. As Butler notes, "There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very 'expressions' that are said to be its results" (Butler 1999: 33), and she quotes from Nietzsche, "there is no 'being' behind doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything" (33). As Stoller clarifies Butler's points "gender identities do not exist prior to their expressions" (100). It is not to say that one is performing a gender like an actor performs on the stage because no one here is expressing something that existed prior to its expression. One, thus, does not express or disguise their interior self through performing gender. Gender is, according to Butler, an act "which constructs the social fiction of its own psychological interiority" (qtd. in Stoller 100).

As such, Albee's Martha and George are displaying their reality even if they consciously involve themselves in a game of parodying gender. Even

when they give the impression that they are faking something which does not belong to them, the reason why this kind of perception takes place in the minds of the audience can also be traced to the audience's framed mentality and the fact that they are constantly and unconsciously affected by what the society and culture dictates to them as the appropriate behavior to expect from a man and a woman. The characters, in turn, are under the spell of socially accepted norms, namely gender roles. Martha finds no way other than defining herself through men – daddy, husband, and son. Having failed to have a son or husband who can run a department at college, she finds herself desperately sad and unsuccessful. She pokes fun at George and blames him for his inability to succeed and get a promotion at work, and attaches herself to an imaginary son who is beautiful and strong.

George and Martha are not the only characters of the play who seem to take on subversive performances. Honey is the one who seems to be the nice sweet housewife of the play. In the beginning, when she is asked how she is, she replies, "I'm perfectly fine;" she always tries to confirm Nick, ignores whatever annoys her, and makes an attempt to be nice, calm and satisfied. However, as the play moves on, she gets drunk, begins to protest, and declares her dissatisfaction. Thus, Honey and Nick, just like the other couple, are suffering from difficulties in their relationship and their interaction with the world outside. Honey, in spite of what appears at the surface, is faced with a lot of problems regarding the decision to become a parent, and finds herself in conflict with her role as a woman, wife and a mother. She appears to be a typical woman—a submissive one yearning for a child. However, when she gets drunk she stops performing the socially prescribed gender role. Once she even shouts "I don't want a child." It is then revealed that she fears being a parent, and has once committed an abortion.

Nick, in a similar way, looks like a man who does not behave that "manly" in spite of being an athlete who has also a well-formed body. Martha tells him, "you are a flop," "you are no man." Contrary to what Nick appears to be, it is implied that he is not so much of a masculine figure. He cannot make Martha sexually satisfied, and Martha, degrading him and his potency as a man, calls him a houseboy.

The characters in the play "are" not man or woman; they "play" man and woman. At the heart of the vulgar woman who smokes and shouts a lot and flirts in front of her husband lie rays of sensitivity and craving for a son who could bring meaning and happiness to her life. At her heart lie emotions such as love and appreciation for George, something which she not only refrains from admitting directly, but also insists on portraying the contrary. George is not a powerless submissive man as he appears to be, at times he is gentle, and at times he is harsh. Honey is not the sweet lamb-like blond woman she sometimes looks, she can demand and object.

Thus, their gender is a mélange. There are culturally assigned roles for them, but they resist them in some way or another; Martha by being harsh and vulgar, Honey by getting drunk, George by refusing to act like the controlling authoritative man. He even ignores it when he realizes that his wife is sleeping with Nick. He goes outside the house, instead of intruding upon them, and tries to end their game in a way that puts him in the upper hand position.

These examples from the play confirm Butler's view that gender is not a reality, and what constitute our gender are discourses and norms we conform to or reject. "Gender performativity is not a matter of choosing which gender one will be today [...] [It] is a matter of reiterating or repeating the norms by which one is constituted," and what shapes resistance, subversion and displacement is the same "subjectivating norms" whose repetition represent performativity (Butler 1997a: 17).

Therefore, the characters of the play have dynamic genders. Albee does not draw a line between man and woman, and between what is considered masculine and feminine. As Stenz asserts, "Albee brings into relief the problems of mature men and women" (3), and mature men and women of this play protest against the socially constructed gender roles ascribed to their bodies. They are involved in an unconscious and at times conscious attempt to take control of their bodies.

To explain the characters' way of gender performance and to figure out why they either are obliged to or choose to act the way they do, and why they do not take on a performance different from what we see in the play, it must be noted that Butler believes that "subversion must occur within existing discursive structures" (Salih 59). Gender is a particular type of process, it is "a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame" (Butler qtd in Salih 63). Therefore, the subject is not free to choose which gender to enact since the script is already determined within that regulatory frame within which the subject makes a choice of gender style (Salih 63). This is to say that the genders the characters perform in the play are taken from the definitive norms of their society regarding family, parenthood, occupation, femininity, and masculinity. In other words, even if Martha's aggressiveness, for instance, can be taken as a subversive strategy, her choice of how to present this subversion has been made within the norms that already existed in the discourse regarding masculinity, femininity, and power.

Although, authority or power in that patriarch society demands that Martha be submissive, Martha is creating her identity. Therefore, she is also in some way or another resisting the current discourses of her society. However, her subversion occurs within the existing discursive structure. Thus, the identity she creates is modeled upon men such as her authoritative father.

As Salih notes, “Butler insists that the law is generative and plural, and that subversion, parody and drag occur *within* a law that provides opportunities for the ‘staging’ of the subversive identities that it simultaneously suppresses and produces” (60).

4. Melancholia

As the story is unfolded, it becomes clear that both Martha and George have suffered from troubled childhood, and have confronted loss in some way or another. As George relates, Martha’s mother died when she was a child and her father married a rich woman whom George calls a witch, and Nick points out that “she never mentioned a stepmother.” George’s loss is one of greater significance. It appears that when he was a child he had shot his mother accidentally, and when he was a teenager he had caused his father to die in a car crash. It seems as if George has been unable to get over this loss and has incorporated it to his ego. He has once tried to communicate his life story as a novel where he could refer to himself in third person and stay anonymous. When he wants to relate his story to Nick, he talks about a boy in his bunch of friends who had killed his mother completely accidentally and the next year drove his father to death. It is clear that he has been unable to get over this loss since he is still unable to directly put into words what has happened and admit what he has done.

Butler defines identification as receiving identity from someone else (Lloyd 83), and asserts that masculinity and femininity result from identification. Melancholic identification is when a man mimes, cites and appropriates the status of a woman (Lloyd 87). Therefore, George and Martha’s identifications appear to be melancholic. Martha seems to have received identity through her father, and after marriage through her husband. In this process, she has been miming and citing the behavior which is usually associated with men; drinking, aggression, shouting, flirting, and vulgar language.

This is not only loss of a parent or two that could serve as a cause of melancholia. Performance itself, as Butler notes, could be intensively related to “the problem of unacknowledged loss,” meaning that gender performance “allegorizes a loss it cannot grieve, allegorizes the incorporative fantasy of melancholia whereby an object is phantasmatically taken in or on as a way of refusing to let it go” (Butler 1993: 234-35). A related concept here is foreclosure, which happens during melancholia, and is referred to as a desire that has been barred from consciousness and “that produces a subject through a certain kind of preemptive loss” (Lloyd 99). It is, as Lloyd clarifies, essential to the formation of the subject [...]. If the subject is produced in this way, it means that it is from the start separated and differentiated. It is

a dependent subject, one produced in subordination and whose continued subordination is essential to its continued existence (99).

It seems that Martha suffers from a foreclosure towards her father. Therefore, she is separated and differentiated, a dependant subject who is produced in subordination. She idealizes her father. He appears to be authoritative and has great influence on Martha. She believes that her father knows everything, and he is physically strong since he has beaten George in a boxing match. George always describes him with red eyes. Thus, Martha's formation of ego is a deficient one preventing her from establishing a relationship between her ego and the world outside, and between her social and psychic sphere. Moreover, her imaginary lost son is incorporated to her ego resulting in a melancholic internalization which leads her to form an obsessive attachment to him.

"Butler asserts that dispositions (whether one desires objects of the same or opposite sex) are the *effects* of identifications with the parent of the same/opposite sex" (Salih 54). She believes that all gender identities are melancholic, in fact "gender is a kind of melancholia or one of melancholia's effects" (Butler 1997: 132). As Butler proposes, loss of same sexed object of love leads to melancholic heterosexuality and melancholic homosexuals have barred heterosexual love from their consciousness. It could be that Martha's identification with her father is suggestive of her attempt at preventing herself from forming an incestuous attachment to him which has resulted in her appropriation of the status of her father. This can explain why she cites masculine behavior which is for the most part seemingly modeled upon her father. Martha, on the other hand, has lost her mother but she never speaks of her. It is to say symbolically that Martha suffers from the ungrieved loss of her mother as a same sex object of love. Butler (1997) explains that "in melancholia, the super ego can become a gathering place for the death instincts" (142) and "melancholia is both the refusal of grief and the incorporation of loss, a miming of the death it cannot mourn" (142). As a child, Martha could not have her mother's love and formed melancholia which was later followed by identification with her mother through incorporation, which, in turn, leads to her disavowed homosexual desire. This explains the points in her behavior where she tries to act feminine modeling upon her mother, reaching its height where she desperately yearns for being a mother. This entire illustrates why Martha's psyche seems to be a blend of heterosexual and homosexual desires as she fluctuates between extremes of masculinity (as in violence and vulgarity) and femininity (as in her yearning for being a mother). This is the same thing we see in George's case, as he has lost his both parents, which symbolically represents his complicated experience of loss leading to identification with parents of both sexes. It

explains George's complicated gender as he shifts to and from femininity to exaggerated masculinity.

Nick and Honey's physical ultra-femininity and ultra-masculinity also could denote "their relinquished desire for an object of the same sex" (Salih 58), meaning that they are what they have desired and the desires they have been prevented from expressing are evoked in their behavior. Therefore, they are melancholic heterosexual subjects. They portray "heterosexuality as a 'melancholy' structure of identity which is based upon a socially imposed primary 'loss' or rejection of homosexual desire" (Salih 9). Honey's femininity seems to be the result of sole identification with her mother through incorporation and consequently, her disavowal of homosexual desire which has led to her being a melancholic subject who tries to behave like a heterosexual. "Heightened or exaggerated 'straight' identity is symptomatic of repudiated homosexual desire in a culture of heterosexual melancholy, where repudiated desires 'return' as what Butler calls 'hyperbolic identifications'" (Salih 133). Honey and Nick seem to exhibit an exaggerated straight identity as they appear to be too feminine and too masculine. However, Honey fails in taking on the most significant feminine role which is motherhood, and Nick disappoints Martha in terms of virility and sexuality: another attestation to the claim that the characters of the play fluctuate within a wide continuum of sexual identity and gender performativity.

The significance of melancholia, as Salih explains, is that it "initiates psychic life and, by exceeding the power structures in which subjects are formed, it presents the possibility for subversion and agency" (134).

5. Parody and Drag

Drag, which is defined as a performance of gender which is intentional (Shapiro 252) and self-conscious (Bode 19), is considered by Butler as a strategy of subversion and agency (Salih 92). Parody and drag "subversively allegorize heterosexual melancholy, thereby revealing the allegorical nature of sexual identities" (Salih 96). In *Gender Trouble* (1999) Butler suggests that drag "fully subverts the distinction between inner and outer psychic space and effectively mocks both the expressive model of gender and the notion of a true gender identity" (174) and writes, "If the inner truth of gender is a fabrication and if a true gender is a fantasy instituted and inscribed on the surface of bodies, then it seems that genders can be neither true nor false, but are only produced as the truth effects of a discourse of primary and stable identity" (174).

Salih clarifies that it is possible to act gender in ways which emphasize the constructedness of heterosexual identities that have been considered natural; therefore, "all gender is a form of parody, but some gender perfor-

mances are more parodic than others" (65). Parodic performances such as drag highlight the fact that the body of the performer is distinct from the gender that is being performed, so all gender identities are imitative.

"Gender parody reveals that the original identity after which gender fashions itself is an imitation without an origin" (Butler 1999: 175). Salih clarifies, "Gender is a 'corporeal style', an act (or a sequence of acts), a 'strategy' which has cultural survival as its end, since those who do not 'do' their gender correctly are punished by society. [...] Gender performatives that do not try to conceal their genealogy, indeed, that go out of their way to accentuate it, displace heterocentric assumptions by revealing that heterosexual identities are as constructed and 'unoriginal' as the imitations of them (66).

Whether or not Martha tries to act like men deliberately is a matter of question; however, there is a remark made by her in the play which implicates that, at least at times, she is aware of the fact that she is performing a gender different from what is expected. This is when she tells George, "I'm loud, and I'm vulgar...and I wear the pants in the house because somebody's got to!" Thus, it could be implied that she is subversively parodying masculinity.

Butler (1993) argues that "for a 'man' performing femininity or for a 'woman' performing masculinity [...] there is an attachment to and a loss and refusal of the figure of femininity by the man, or the figure of masculinity by the woman" (235). It seems as if although Martha is attached to the figure of masculinity (as we see her attachment to her father and George), at the same time, she tries to refuse it by parodying masculinity through her vulgar language, harsh behavior and also her "wearing pants". As a woman who lives in a patriarchic society, one who has to prove herself as a human being through males and is being under the influence of an authoritative father figure, not only her existence is tied to and dependent on the men of her life, but also she blames her unhappiness and dissatisfaction on the same men. Thus, at times, she takes on imitating masculinity.

In *Imitation and Gender Insubordination* (1997a), Butler writes that drag, according to Esther Newton, is not a copy of some true gender, rather it "enacts the very structure of impersonation by which any gender is assumed" (306). Drag is not an act of appropriation assuming that feminine belongs to female and masculine belongs to male, rather it suggests that there is no proper gender. Drag does not imitate any original or primary gender, as gender itself is a kind of imitation with no original (306).

This is in line with the previous assertion that, in *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf*, any models of proper gender and any stereotypes regarding proper gendered behavior is denied. Martha exhibits the fact that masculine does not belong to male, and she can be the one who wears the pants in the house.

On the other hand, as it was already said, Butler suggests that as a subject refuses to grieve the masculine as a possibility of love, it forms a masculine gender through heterosexual melancholy, and when the feminine is excluded as an object of love and this exclusion is never grieved but always preserved, then, a feminine gender is formed through the incorporative fantasy which inaugurates the process. In other words, masculine and feminine genders are formed through their refusals to grieve same-sexed objects of love. "The truest lesbian melancholic is the strictly straight woman, and the 'truest' gay male melancholic is the strictly straight man" (Butler 1993: 235). Thus, when Martha appears to perform drag (or behave masculine although she is a woman), it is due to the fact that her gender is formed through her refusal to grieve the lost love of her deceased mother. In this regard, George resembles her in having lost parents and sharing the pain of the lack of a child. It can explain why George appropriates feminine behavior at some points in the course of the play.

6. Subjection and Power

Martha's father appears to be a figure of power in the play. It seems as if Martha has idealized her father and he has a great influence over her. She refers to her father many times in the play. She draws on what her father thinks, believes and says. She always boasts that her father is the president of the department, like she is seeking her identity through her father, and wants her husband to be capable of giving her the same identity. She talks about a boxing match in which her father has beaten George.

At the root of melancholia, lie the operations of power and a psychic subjection in terms of regulatory effects of power. Subjection is a paradoxical notion in that it is a form of power. The common definition of power as something that presses on the subject from the outside, "subordinates," "sets underneath," and "relegates to a lower order," is only a part of what power does. The other part is related to the perception of power as an entity forming the subject by providing the condition of existence and "the trajectory of its desire;" therefore, power is not only what we oppose, but also what we depend on for our existence. "The customary model for understanding this process goes as follows: power imposes itself on us, and, weakened by its force, we come to internalize or accept its terms;" however, we are dependent on those very terms for our existence since there are discursive conditions through which we articulate ourselves as subjects. These discursive conditions are those which we never chose, but they inaugurate and maintain our agency. Subjection, thus, is "the process of becoming subordinated by power as well as the process of becoming a subject;" in other words, the subject comes to existence through a primary submission to power; hence,

submission is a condition of subjection. Butler goes on to conclude that "power that at first appears as external, pressed up on the subject, pressing the subject into subordination, assumes a psychic form that constitutes the subject's self-identity" (1–2). Referring to the same issue, Lloyd clarifies that for an individual to continue as a subject, one has to submit to the very power that subordinates them; it is to say that the individual's submission to power plays a role in their formation as a subject (97).

Martha's self identity is in part formed through her submission to her father, and later on, her submission to the male dominated society. Her formation as a subject is related to her realization of the role of her father in her life. "Daddy" provides Martha with a condition of existence so that she depends on him for her existence, this is because the subject comes to existence through a primary submission to power and Martha's father is the first male figure she has submitted to. He is the one who sent her to a school away from home after her mother's death, and later annulled her marriage with the man she loved. Martha's self-identity is, indeed, partly formed in the process of her submission to the power of her father as a ruling and dominating element in her life, a father who is a representative of the wider male dominated culture encompassing the women's lives. This is the culture that reinforces the idea that a woman's virtue is in submission. This is an ancient belief that can be traced to Aristotle who holds that in nature, the relations of ruling and being ruled occur as some have greater responsibilities and authority, so there exists a natural dominance and subordination in the natural world. As such, men are the naturally ruling element and women, the naturally ruled (Lovibond 12–13).

7. Conclusion

In *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf*, a play wherein the audience's mind is intrigued by the depiction of gender roles and identities of two unhappy couples in a three-hour slice of their life, one can identify Butlerian conception of gender performativity, and the related notions of drag, parody, subversion and melancholia. The characters in *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf* present to the audience a gender which is not intrinsic to them. Not only they perform gender, but also their gender is performative. This is to say that they are acting in some way, and their role playing is crucial to the gender they present; however, they are also behaving, talking, and walking in a way that fortifies an impression of being a man or a woman. Gender is culturally formed and institutional powers try to keep subjects in their gendered place, but gender is also a domain of freedom and agency in that the violence which is imposed by the ideal gender norms can be resisted.

Thus, the characters' gender is performed and performative. When one can get the impression that Martha is a woman and George is a man, it is due to the fact that they are reiterating a set of norms producing the impression that they are a man and a woman. These are the norms imposed by the power structures and discourses of the society. They seem to have been eternally at work to form our identity, and have penetrated into our mindset to the extent that we consider them as natural, while in reality they cannot be placed outside culture. However, there are times when Martha takes on a performance which astonishes the audience as it seemingly does not match her gender. This is when she involves herself in acting out, and tries to have a gender presentation which, in some way or another, expresses her dissatisfaction. Hereby, she takes on a subversive gender performance; she resists the discourses and institutional powers that have led her to the position where she is.

Martha really likes to have a child, a fact that places her in the milieu of conformists. Here, she represents the tendency typical to intelligible female subjects living in a heterosexual patriarchal society. She is repeating the discursive norms that have shaped her identity before she came on the stage to the extent that she cannot realize that her unhappiness and dissatisfaction is due to her submission to the very ideal gender norms imposed upon her. This is also true about George; the ideal masculine gender is realized in a man's ability to have a family and provide for them. Yet, George does not have a son, neither has he a wife who gives him the impression that he is the one in power; rather, his wife is a dissatisfied woman who underestimates his position as a man and claims dominance.

However, Martha's performance of masculinity, George's occasional femininity, Nick's hidden impotency and fragility, and Honey's refusal of motherhood beneath her ultra-feminine appearance all are suggestive of Butler's conception of gender as a cultural phenomenon which is not intrinsic to human beings, and is capable of being reproduced, reinvented, recreated, and even subverted. They depict the Butlerian fact that there is no fixed gender; rather, each individual fluctuates within a vast continuum the extremes of which are pure femininity and sole masculinity.

REFERENCES

Bottoms, Stephen (2005) (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Edward Albee.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Butler, Judith (1997a), "Imitation and Gender Subordination," in Linda Nicholson (ed.), *The Second Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory*. London: Routledge.

Butler, Judith (1997b), *The Psychic Life of Power*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Butler, Judith (1993), *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex."* London: Routledge.
Butler, Judith (1999), *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. London: Routledge.
Dent, Mike, and Stephen Whitehead (eds.) (2000), *Managing Professional Identities: Knowledge, Performativity and the "New" Professional*. London: Routledge.
Dircks, Phyllis T. (2010), *Edward Albee: A Literary Companion.* Jefferson*:* McFarland.
Hough, Amie Marie (2010), *An Exploration of Selected Concepts from Judith Butler: With Application to the Understanding of Gender Identity in Social Work Practice with Marginalized Female Adolescents*. Diss., University of British Columbia.
Kittredge, James Fredrick (2006), *Chasing a Myth: The Formulation of American Identity in the Plays of Edward Albee.* Diss., University of Arizona.
Kundert-Gibbs, John (1998), "Barren Ground: Female Strength and Male Impotence in *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf* and *Cat on a Hot Tin Roof*," in Katherine H. Burkman and Judith Roof (eds.), *Staging the Rage: The Web of Misogyny in Modern Drama*. Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.
Lloyd, Moya (2007), *Judith Butler: From Norms to Politics.* Cambridge: Polity.
Lovibond, Sabina (2000), "Feminism in Ancient Philosophy, the Feminist Stake in Greek Rationalism," in Miranda Fricker, Jennifer Hornsby (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Salih, Sara (2002), *Judith Butler*. London: Routledge.
Stenz, Anita Maria (1978), *Edward Albee: The Poet of Loss*. The Hague: Mouton.
Stoller, Silvia (2012), "Expressivity and Performativity: Merleau-Ponty and Butler," *Continental Philosophy Rev*iew 43: 97–110.
Weales, Gerald (2005), "Edward Albee: Don't Make Waves," in Harold Bloom (ed.), *Modern American Drama.* New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 21–44.
Zwagerman, Sean (2010), *Wit's End: Women's Humor as Rhetorical & Performative Strategy*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Parisa Shams graduated as the top student from the Master of English Literature Program at Shiraz University in Feb. 2013. Her MA thesis focused on investigating the themes of gender and power in the work of Edward Albee, drawing upon gender theories of Judith Butler. Along with her ongoing project of juxtaposing Albee's drama and Butler's philosophy, she has conducted research in other areas such as classical drama, Romantic poetry, and Jungian psychoanalysis. Her latest articles are "Mystical Alchemy in the Poetry of Donne and Milton" (Aug. 2013), and "Power Struggle in the Zoo Story" (Jan. 2013). She is especially interested in drama, gender studies, and comparative study of philosophy and literature.

Farideh Pourgiv is Professor of English Literature at the Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Shiraz University, Iran. She is the author of a number of textbooks and papers, the latest papers are "Nabakov's Ada and The 1001 Nights" in *Marvels and Tales* (2012) with Shafiee-Sabet and "Martha the Mimos: Femininity, Mimesis and Theatricality in Edward Albee's Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf" (2012) with Hoorvash. Her areas of interest and research: Women's Studies, Children's Literature, comparative literature.

Addleton Academic Publishers

Journal of Research in Gender Studies
Volume 3(2), 2013, pp. 101–127, ISSN: 2164-0262

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CULTURE OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY'S CURRICULUM: *A PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVE TOWARD CONCEIVING A HOLISTIC AND INCLUSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF KNOWLEDGE-FORMS THROUGH ALTERNATIVE MEDIA*

JAMES M. MAGRINI
magrini@cod.edu
College of Dupage, Glen Ellyn

ABSTRACT. This study explores the epistemological culture of the Western philosophy curriculum. Is it the case that female students are immersed in a curriculum that privileges male-centered values, despite claims to equality, equity, and justice? Herein, I focus on academic discourse in relation to identity, gender, and ways of thinking and reasoning that emerge from Western philosophy, a discourse that is said to devalue and exclude certain forms of knowledge, which might be linked to ways of thinking and feeling associated with women. This study examines one possible way to potentially address this destructive trend in education by considering alternative media and forms of pedagogy, which might enhance the educational experience for all students, both male and female. As in van Manen's (1990) phenomenological method for action sensitive pedagogy, I asked female students to generate phenomenological "texts," through interviews and protocol writing, from which "themes" were drawn for analysis and interpretation – thus uniting the qualitative practices of phenomenology and hermeneutics.

Keywords: phenomenology; philosophy; gender studies; French feminism; epistemology; curriculum

In this paper I explore, in a phenomenological-hermeneutic manner, the *epistemological culture* of the curriculum of Western philosophy. If we are to trust the post-modern feminist philosophers, female students are immersed in a curriculum that, proximally and for the most part, despite claims to liberal inclusiveness, equity, and equality, privileges academic discourse endorsing *phallocentric* and *logocentric* values. The potential exists that the

traditional epistemological model wherein philosophy's pedagogy is grounded indoctrinates female students into an asymmetrical discourse of knowledge/power, which subjugates, oppresses, and, in many instances, silences the female (*feminine*) voice, her unique ways of feeling and thinking. Herein, I focus on academic discourse in relation to identity, gender, and ways of thinking and reasoning that emerge from Western philosophy, which, as feminists argue, is a discipline that defines itself through the process of marginalization by engendering an "epistemological culture" that devalues and excludes certain knowledge forms in the classroom, which might be linked with ways of thinking, feeling, and being associated with women, namely, the type of reasoning linked with emotional-cognition.[1] This paper examines one possible way in which to address this potentially destructive trend in education by considering alternative educational media and forms of pedagogy, which might enhance the educational experience of all students, both male and female.

The paper falls into the following sections:

(1) a brief look at methodology and concerns;
(2) an explication of post-modern feminist critique as related to my concerns;
(3) the presentation of student generated "phenomenological" texts through *protocol writing* and *interview*;
(4) the interpretation of student generated texts as related to the "theme," or "meaning-structure," of the biological-ontological modality of sexual-difference;
(5) speculation on how educators might engender a just and equitable epistemological culture within the classroom through the inclusion of alternative media and interpretive hermeneutic practices.

1. The Methodological Approach

My inquiry begins by posing the following questions: (1) Is the epistemological culture of education perpetuating gender roles and influencing the formation of identity? (2) Is self-identity constructed epistemologically in terms of what is given, privileged, repressed, rejected, and excluded? (3) Do traditional methods of pedagogy in philosophy insidiously engender, reinforce, and perpetuate, *logocenteric* and *phallocentric* (male-dominated) ideals and values? (4) What are the potential implications of exploring this topic for improved educational praxis and education reform? Combining description, interpretation, and analysis, using *protocol writing* and *interviews*, I attempt to interpret and deepen the understanding of both my female students' educational experience and that of my own experience as a male educator. In line

with van Manen's (1990) "Human Science" research, students generated two forms of original phenomenological texts that were both reflective and reflexive: (1) *protocol writing*, which is in essence "the generating of original texts on which the researcher can work" (63), and (2) *interview*, which is used to explore and gather "experiential narrative material" that serves as a resource for "developing a richer and deeper understanding of a human phenomenon," along with serving as a "vehicle to develop a conversational relation with a partner (interviewee) about the meaning of an experience" (66). I then revisited their written responses, posing clarifying questions, or "depth questions" (*meaning questions*), attempting to reveal for thematic analysis the tacit elements of the "feminine" educational experience. By searching out points of convergence, I isolated thematic issues for interpretation and analysis: "Phenomenological themes," as van Manen states, "may be understood as the *structures of experience*. So when we analyze a phenomenon, we are trying to determine what the themes are, the experiential structures that make up that experience" (79). This methodology allowed me to concretize and give form to the ontological structures residing beneath surface of learning in order to diagnose a potential problem with education's contemporary conception of "knowledge forms" and perceived ways of learning in the curriculum as related to feminist literature from both the Marxist (Jaggar, 2010) and French philosophical-literature tradition (Cixous, 1986; Irigaray, 1993; Le Doeuff, 1986).

The female research participants are undergraduates in my Western philosophy course, which serves to fulfill their general humanities credit for graduation. They represent the fields of liberal arts, science, and nursing; half of the students participating have taken the college's sociology course, *Gender and Power*. Although these students are not familiar with the systematic philosophical perspective of critical theory or psychoanalytic feminism, they are acquainted with the problems and issues linked with gender biasing. I am well aware of the pedagogical relationship that I have established with the females in the study, for they are, more importantly than subjects of my work, students who will be with me through a 16-week course on Western philosophy. This in advance presupposes a caring relationship within the lived space of the classroom wherein I am ultimately responsible for and beholden to their learning and development as young adults.

Phenomenological-hermeneutic research allowed me to assume the unique role of both researcher and participant, thus I not only observe and analyze, more importantly I stand pedagogically within their lives. This I hope will provide a deeper understanding of my role, as a male educator, within the female students' experience of education in light of curriculum problems that often remain concealed and go unexamined, and thus remain *as* problems. Phenomenological-hermeneutic research is an involved and participatory

form of research because it always begins with our own experiences of the world as they might relate to others. van Manen (1990) writes: "My own life experiences are immediately accessible to me in a way that no one else's are," but he is careful to point out, that the researcher must be aware that "one's own experiences are also the possible experience of others" (54). This is a crucial point, for as stated, phenomenology ultimately seeks themes, or structures of meaning, which might be common to lived experience in general, and thus there is always an inter-subjective, or trans-subjective, aspect to phenomenology. Phenomenology is also *inter-subjective* in another way, in that it always "needs the other (for example, the reader) in order to develop a dialogic relation with the phenomenon and thus validate the phenomenon as described" (11). Prior to reviewing the students' *protocol writing* and *interviews*, I present the feminist philosophy that informs my reading and interpretation. Doing so will allow the reader to clearly understand the themes around which the essay is gathered.

2. Unpacking the Feminist Philosophical Perspective

Irigaray (1993) classifies Western philosophy, and beyond, language itself, as *logocentric*, *phallocentric*, and *dualist:* the language emerges from the "symbolic order" as a male dominated phenomenon and process, and is grounded in a hierarchical view wherein binary opposites function in an asymmetrical relation of power wherein one is dominant and the other is repressed: "The linguistic code, like the modes of exchange, like the system of images, and representation, is made for masculine subjects" (91). This notion emerges from Derrida (1981), who writes of the permanent linguistic-conceptual schema emerging in terms of the *metaphysics of presence*, that "assigns the origin and power of speech, precisely as logos, to the paternal position" (76). Contributing to this post-modern discussion of language is Le Doeuff (1986), who renders discourse in her own terms and relates it directly to epistemological issues; therefore, it is, according to her, appropriately an epistemological problem. However, beyond this, as Jagodinski (1992) points out, it is also an ontological issue, for "gender is not just another level that besets the post-modern age along with class, color, and age. It is foundational and goes much deeper," this is because gender classification holds the potential to determine our Being-in-the-world in an inauthentic manner (178). This position can be understood in terms of the hierarchical, binary oppositional relationships, which structure the way that we interpret, understand, and discourse about the world.

Writing on the state of contemporary education, Jagodzinski states that our institutions are governed by discourse that is "being reduced to an either/or logic, "0" or "1" binary computer mentality" (178). Cixous and

Clement (1981) analyze the binaries of the linguistic-conceptual schema in terms of polar opposites wherein one term is given priority, e.g., activity/ passivity; speaking/writing; high/low; day/night; the second term is always associated with the marginalized, devalued notion of the gendered female (63–65). Gender, according to Grumet (1988), refers to "sexual identity as it is experienced, acknowledged, and experienced by the individual," and because it is grounded in the "lived world" it is embodied, and it gives the impression that it is natural, and what "appears to be 'natural' acquires the status of being fixed," we equate gender erroneously with an order of physical reality, gender appears to possess an essential and immutable nature (46). However, as Foucault (1980) points out, it is, along with epistemic categories, contingent on the unique emergence of power in a place at a given historical moment, and regimes of power always have their existence within the context of the social body. "Power," writes Foucault, "reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies, and inserts itself into their discourses, learning processes and every day lives" (38–39).

Questions of identity, epistemology, and ethics immediately arise, as related to both the male and female, and these issues, which emerge from our social-political practices are alive within and enact a profound effect upon our educational practices, for if we are to trust Althusser (2001), educational institutions efficiently reproduce the reigning ideologies and ideals of the state most effectively. There is a tendency within gender bias discourse to "dichotomize" the world, and we experience this effect in the curriculum, and, as Grumet (1988) argues, as a direct result of gender/sex classification, sexual identities are shaped, and this is evidenced in the "different treatment given to male and female children in elementary school and secondary school classrooms," and we see this by merely examining the "images of adult males and females in school texts" (45). Jaggar (2010) relates the binary opposition within thought and discourse to epistemology, which due to the lingering influence of positivism, sets up the dichotomous relationship between objective and rational knowledge and subjective irrationality, or emotionality. This translates into the privileging of reason above other, supposedly less reliable ways that we know the world. Reason is associated with the dominant male perspective and the form of cognition linked with the emotions is devalued and linked with the subordinate perspective of the female. "The influence of the emotion," writes Jaggar, "is usually seen only as distorting or impeding observational knowledge," and not as containing an important cognitive element (217).

Despite the claim that philosophy's "subject of knowledge" is gender-neutral, transcendental, and beyond personal subjectivity, it is in fact decidedly *masculine*. Such a view promotes the "conception of epistemological justification indicating the silencing of the other, especially women, who are

denied culturally as the bearers of emotions and so are perceived as more 'subjective,' biased, and irrational" (219). Within this social context, or what I refer to as the *epistemological culture*, structured by prevailing regimes of power, woman are outsiders, they are marginalized voices, with their own epistemic discourses that reside on the periphery of the male-dominated center. As Jardine (2005) articulates, attending to the excluded processes of thought and emotion holds implications for a renewed thinking about our epistemic categories, for it is possible that when acknowledging the presence of these "marginalized voices and wisdom that we in modern societies *could* decide to grant power to articulate what we would be willing to accept as knowledge" (12). I will return to this important issue later, for now we must begin from the current historical locale, and Jaggar (2010) pulls no punches when reminding us that we are

> beings that have been created in a cruelly racist, capitalist, and male-dominated society that has shaped our bodies and our minds, our presumptions, our values and our emotions, our language, and our systems of knowledge (223).

This paper is informed by Derrida's (2004) critique of feminism, which "resists the movements that tends towards a narcissism of minorities," which might be interpreted in terms of movements that seek merely to reverse the poles of the binary in such a way that the minority, or marginalized, the position that was devalued, assumes the dominating role, or becomes the new "center" of power (21). He suggests that all movements should be accompanied by critical deconstructive readings, because feminist philosophy also holds the potential to become institutionalized, along with the concomitant danger of becoming authoritarian, and with this inherent propensity, the danger exists of creating new and additional forms of alienation and marginalization. Thus, there is a reason that I am not including thinkers from so-called "liberal" feminism, which is focused on the notion of "equality" and begins from the starting point that Western society is permeated with male-dominated values. The problem with liberal feminism, according to French psychoanalytic tradition, is that when women seek equal rights, equal paying jobs, and the like, they do nothing to deconstruct the *phallocentric* linguistic-conceptual schema, our epistemic categories remain male-oriented, wherein the female merely seeks to assume the "male's role," play the male's game on *his* turf and operate according to *his* rules. Wicks (2005) succinctly outlines the problem in the following manner:

> So if a woman uncritically struggles to gain a powerful social role, then she could easily find herself obliged to behave in accord with masculine values. But insofar as such a woman supports such values, she would lose her specific identity as a woman (260).

I am concerned with a deconstructive reading that focuses on the "specific identity" of the female in terms of *sexual difference*, and here I am not referring to the gender-role bias, but rather to a more primordial condition, a more original, ontological way of *Being-in-the-world*. Irigaray (1996) argues that questions about sexual difference are the most pressing and universal questions we can ask, for sexual difference is antecedent to race, class, and religion: "The problem of race," she writes, "is a secondary problem and the same goes for other cultural divisions – religious, economic, and political ones" (23). Equality, in terms of liberal feminism, amounts to the "annulment of the difference in sexual subjectivity" (65). Irigaray pushes for a new and unique understanding of equality, wherein equality is understood in terms of *difference*. "It is urgent and indeed imperative," she states, "that equal subjective rights be given to men and women: 'equal' meaning, of course, different" (65).

Grumet (1988) echoes these thoughts when stating, "Sexual difference is not a mere anatomical decoration on the surface structure of personality but central to that personality's experience of the world" (46). It must be noted that Irigaray and Grumet do not reduce sexual difference to the realm of the biological, for I have identified three components included in this notion of sexual difference, which resist such a pure and erroneous reduction: (1) It is ontological because it is a specific and basic way of *Being-in-the-world* wherein one's unique Being is an issue; (2) It is epistemological because our existence depends on the ways men and women understand, interpret, and discourse uniquely about their Being; (3) It is emotional and cognitive because we are always already embodied beings who live most authentically as humans immersed in the world at the level of the 'experiential.'[2]

3. Exploring the Marginalized

I begin from the historical position outlined by Jaggar (2010) previously and focus on the marginalized perspective of the female in education. This notion of looking to the margins in order to understanding the center, and eventually, to attempt to de-structure it, is a common theme in philosophy and sociology (Edgerton, 1989; Irigaray, 1993; Jaggar 2010), for the marginalized are, in many instances, "in a position to know more about the group, culture, society, or other forces that keep them far from the center than can members of the center know about the margins" (Edgerton, 1989, 38). Jaggar (2010) intensifies this line of reasoning when stating that marginalized positions, because they "perceive the world differently from its portrayal in conventional descriptions," may be able to provide reliable insights into the fact that "something is wrong with the way alleged facts have been con-

structed," providing an accurate view to the way things are (221). With this new form of understanding, she believes that it might be possible for an agency to emerge that might challenge the dominant conceptions of those who seek to obscure the views and perspectives of the subordinated and oppressed. She suggests that it is to the neglected female perspective that those seeking liberation should look, for it is most specifically the

> perspective on reality that is available from the standpoint of the subordinated, which in part at least is the standpoint of women, is a perspective that offers a less partial and distorted and therefore more reliable view. Subordinated people have a kind of epistemological privilege insofar as they have easier access to this standpoint and therefore a better chance of ascertaining the possible beginnings of a society in which all could thrive (222).

Attempting to understand this subordinated position of females of which Jaggar writes, the following questions were posed to the students. Through follow-up interviews three themes emerged as related to each question, which were subsequently analyzed and interpreted in relation to the feminist positions outlined above as they might be related to practical instruction. It must be noted, in relation to van Manen's (1990) phenomenology, that the "texts" generated were not grounded in *pure* "lived world" description, but already contained the students' *interpretations* of the experiences they were describing:

1. *Describe your personal educational experience (in college or high school) with the media, or artifacts of education, i.e., the texts, literature, and films instructors incorporate as teaching tools. Describe how women are for the most part portrayed or presented for study. Is this portrayal consistent with your experience as a female? Why or why not?*

The students began with "female" imagery from their experience with courses in comparative literature. For example, the character of Hester Prynne from Hawthorne's *The Scarlet Letter* was described as a marginalized outcast, a "woman of society who took the blame for both her and her man's actions." In a puritanical community of the mid-1600s, deeply religious and patriarchal, the character's sin results in her banishment, which induces painful suffering and disrupts her life and the life of her child. It was clarified that this occurred because Hester was judged by standards that were not her own, standards that were set by an obsessively paranoid religious, patriarchal society. But there is a knowledge that accompanies the shameful alienation from the society that Hester experiences. Her banishment results in a form of knowledge and enlightenment, which allows her to speculate on the impoverished role of women in the society of her day. This literary reference was contemporized in the following example, as it might be seen in the

"real" experience of being a woman: "When men sleep around they are considered 'studs' but when women do it they are 'sluts'." This indicates that students felt that still today, as in the late 1600s, women are still being judged, praised, and condemned according to a male standard of value.

The images of women in popular media were also discussed, i.e. "the "airbrushed women of advertisements, which portray women as nothing more than an object to look sexy next to some totally irrelevant product." These women were also viewed as marginalized, in this instance viewed and classified as sex objects according to a male standard of so-called "female beauty." It was stated that these images of women were demeaning and the students were "repulsed" by this type of portrayal, stating, "I don't want to guzzle down beer because some bimbo is holding the bottle, nor do I want to buy the clothes she's wearing." What asked about the "self-identity" of the women in the advertisements, the students observed that the women "were trying to dress and act the way men want them to, not being true to themselves as women," thus indicating the women were merely acting, adopting a persona that was really of a male construction. This was the consensus of the female students as expressed in this powerful declaration: "I am not on this earth so men can compare my thoughts, feelings, and actions to theirs and then judge me crudely." This statement presupposes that the females indeed had a vision of self-hood that was uniquely female, which was irreducible to what others, men in particular, thought and this was explained in terms of having one's own life and purpose as a woman, but in no way was this notion of "woman" strictly reducible to assigned gender roles.

2. *Attempt to define "gender" and consider the following: Are gender roles (male/female) natural, or biological, or are they a result of social construction? If they are social constructions, do you think that they might in any way hold the potential to determine male and female identify in an inauthentic manner? Why or why not?*

Gender as social construct was defined in the following terms: "Gender is the set of characteristics that people associate themselves with, and not what they biologically are, but what they perceive themselves to be in terms of male and female roles." The dangers of gender biasing were identified as doing potential damage to "children's self-identity" when parents and those in authority, "force children to conform to these gender identities, which serve no other purpose than to reiterate social ideals, giving them what they feel is a basis to judge people and draw boundaries." When asked for clarification, it was stated that adopting and acquiescing to gender roles in fact held the potential to do damage to all people in society with respect to authentic notions of male and female self-identity. "Just because you are

biologically born a female doesn't mean you have to act according to a gender classification. When people do not act 'as they should' according to gender roles, they are looked down upon and become outcasts. By doing this society misrepresents what it means to be 'female' and what it means to be 'male' because they wrongly assume that sex difference is accurately represented within gender roles."

However, it was also pointed out that in certain instances, gender roles appear traceable to the biological/physiological constitution of the male and female and seem "natural," as something other than a pure social construction: "Some gender roles seem to fall in certain directions according to biology with respect to our 'cave man' days: men do the hunting while women are at home. In that situation, it makes sense that a man, with usually more body mass and muscle would take on a harder, more dangerous task, while a woman, potentially pregnant or with young child, would stay in safety caring for the child and herself." A distinction was made by the students with respect to this point, while the above example, as related to the so-called "cave man days" seemed "natural," instances in contemporary society where parents wanted their boys to "wear blue and play with tools and trucks" and their girls to "wear pink and like cooking and dress-up," did not "make sense in the least," and in these cases, "were not natural in the least."

Gender as a social construct is what each person makes of it, "and when people decide to accept this, the pressure of living in such a judgmental society will be slightly lifted." Thus, emancipation and human agency were dependent on recognizing that gender roles as socially constructed categories. Thus, when asked for clarification and elaboration, the students stated that recognizing that gender roles were a social construction might represent one way in which to empower people to break free from these ideological and hegemonic bonds.

3. *Describe your personal experience of the content, scope, and sequence of our Western philosophy course. Do you feel that the text, the course, and instructor exclude feminine philosophical viewpoints? If yes, does this trouble you in any way? Do you see any negative implications associated with such an oversight? Explain.*

The students expressed the following: "At one time, philosophy, like many other activities, studies, and theories, was considered to be for the minds of men alone […] When men were first claiming 'turf' it is not a stretch to see that they would have innovated the subject and provided the first in many viewpoints." The students were well aware that our course in Western philosophy traced its "roots" to ancient Pre-Socratic thought and felt that there was a lack of "female philosophical viewpoints studied in Western phi-

losophy." However, they were not overly disturbed or "bothered" by this lack of female philosophical presence, and rationalized this in terms of our course being focused on "important 'first' viewpoints," which just happened to be in the beginning male viewpoints. The course and text included the work of Martha Nussbaum, Virginia Held, and Ayn Rand, and incorporated documentaries on contemporary feminist thinkers such as Judith Butler, and linguist Avital Ronnel. However, the students were clear on the following point: "Teachers should not change the course content just to include women for the sake of including women. When learning about ancient Greek philosophers, and what they believed about women, it's easy to understand why there was no real feminine perspective in ancient philosophy." Students believed that although women were excluded from philosophy in the past, "female philosophical views are now valued," adding that "modern instructors should not be punished for the follies of the past," all of which indicates that for the students interviewed the male-dominated binary, the hierarchical opposition, as described by feminist thinkers, is not an issue that concerns them.

4. Rethinking the Male and Female in Terms of the Biological-Ontological Modality of Sexual-Difference

Analyzing the students' responses through the framework of feminist philosophy, I focus on the phenomenological theme of difference between men and women, but not through a social critique of gender, which lives as a categorization, a social construction, determining the roles of the "sexes." Rather, I'm concerned with something far more original, as related to a state, or way of Being-in-the-world, i.e., the initial existential experience of men and women encountering each other as different kind of beings. These encounters are irreducible to the realm of the biological (empirical) because they include, perhaps most importantly, the ontological (experiential) aspects of those beings, and many such aspects defy our complete comprehension, because men and women are *sexual others*, and, in many ways, unknowable *others* primarily because they differ sexually.

The students' educational experience as described consisted of encountering women who were portrayed through a distinctly oppressive *male gaze*. Females in literature and mass media were portrayed as "objects" of/for pleasure, as marginalized beings, stripped of their own thoughts, feelings, and identity and forced to conform to a male-constructed value system. "In such a culture the woman remains at home, and is the object of use and exchange between men. She is used for reproduction and for the material maintenance of life" (Irigaray, 1984, 64). It is also crucial to note that the female is being defined in terms of a male value system, and in this system women lose the potential for the enactment of their authentic self-

hood and function in terms of a lack or absence – a sense of incompleteness pervades the feminine experience of the world. Wicks (2003), drawing from Freudian psychology, claims that the female is conceived as a "castrated-male," as a flawed and incomplete being. It must be noted that when Wicks incorporates the term "sexuality" below, he is referencing an authentic notion of self-hood that is linked with this term as a potential way of *Being-in-the-world*:

> In this male-privileging and women-negating characterization of women's sexuality, we can see once more how at a basic level of personal definition. Men's sexuality is privileged, while women's sexuality is subordinated, if not invalidated" (262).

Next, in line with the foregoing analysis, the students demonstrated the understanding of gender as a social construct while simultaneously intimating the biological and ontological differences between men and women, i.e., the insight that each enacts a different and unique Being-in-the-world. This indicates that men and women, each in their respective primordial ways of existing, interpret, understand, and discourse about the world in different ways. Here, the crucial revelation occurs that the ontology of the human, in terms of "sexual difference" as defined by Iragaray (1993), is an authentic *difference* between males and females, which is always antecedent to gender classification. Importantly, these responses indicate the concern for the marked difference between men and women as opposed the universal aspects of humanity that males and females share and participate in equally. Sexual difference includes structural differences in male and female bodily forms (biological) as well as differences in psychology, ways of reasoning, and the capacity for emotional responses. As stated, this is the concern for understanding the female's unique Being-in-the-world, and in the case of females, "they should become free subjects while remaining, or becoming, women, and not in endeavoring to become men" (77).

Lastly, the students recognized the distinctly patriarchal roots of Western philosophy, but believed that contemporary female philosophers contributions to the discipline were valued. The understanding of the Western conceptual and linguistic schema, which functions in terms of the hierarchical binary associated with the *metaphysics of presence*, remained obscured from the students' view. The fact that women are still being judged through a comparison against superior male vales, as the students clearly indicated, presupposes and drives home Irigaray's (1993) argument: "Man," as she writes, "has been the subject of discourse, whether in theory, morality, or politics. And the gender of God, the guardian of every subject and every discourse, is always masculine and paternal, in the West" (6–7). Despite what students claimed about contemporary educators not being punished for the sins of the past, if we are to trust the feminist thinkers referenced throughout, these

injustices against women and the marginalized persist, and they continue, and indeed are further perpetuated through the processes of formal education. Thus, I am forced to acknowledge my participation, as representative of the so-called power "center" of epistemic production in shaping the epistemic landscape of the curriculum, as one who is conducting the inquiry from behind the so-called "male gaze." For this reason, I attempt to arrive at a sense of self-understanding by investigating the uniqueness and radical otherness of the female perspective as it lives in the margins, with the hope of better understanding ways in which I might potentially contribute to the *transvaluation* of contemporary values that marginalize female students.

The differences in the ways male and female students approach philosophy are apparent in the classroom and this difference is linked to moral reasoning (Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984). When working through ethical prompts incorporated as part of the lesson, the male perspective is invariably focused on abstract rights, duty, and indelible principles of justice – males favor *deontological ethics*. The female perspective is more concerned with practical relationships, individual rights, circumstances, and the character and motive of those involved in the moral scenario – females favor morality linked to the *ethics of care*. It is possible to read Gilligan in a manner similar to Noddings and claim that the female's "caring attitude" is not only different, it is superior to the male's attitude, and thus run the danger of falling into what I described earlier as another form of essentialism, which as opposed to deconstructing the binary of male/female, merely reverses the hierarchy of value in favor of the feminine. For the purpose of this essay, it is best to interpret Gilligan in a manner similar to Pojman (2011), who argues against the position of relativism in terms that are expressly non-binary: "As I read Gilligan, her point is not that female values are better than male values […] but that we should recognize that each develops differently" (166).

This is an important indicator about the type of discourse that might be needed in order to effectively preserve the difference in the ways males and females interpret and understand the world, themselves, and each other. If Irigarary's (1991) claims regarding the incommensurability of the male and female intellectual-emotional perspectives, their respective ways of Being-in-the-world, is correct, then *I shall never take the place of a woman, and never will a woman take mine*. Whatever "identifications are possible, one will never exactly fill the place of the other – the one is irreducible to the other" (117). Then how is an understanding of the other possible? How might this notion of knowledge of the other be conceived, and beyond, reconceived? How might the knowledge of the *other* contribute in an indispensable way to one's self-knowledge, and beyond, the general educative process? To begin to formulate a rejoinder, Edgerton (1989) outlines the type of discourse that might serve as an authentic means of communication,

or "conversation," which might allow us to gather multiple perspectives of self and other as both separate and connected (38). It is a conversation that transcends binary oppositions and reification in discourse and resists the urge to grant the status of superiority to either center or margins.

Importantly, Edgerton points out that authentic discourse avoids the mode of dialectic reasoning, for the dialectic synthesis produces "victims." This is because the synthesis of the Hegelian dialectic functions through omission and rejection, rather discourse should be about "incorporating differences and discovering oneself in the other," through a respect for and a preservation of differences (ibid. 44). I pursue this line of thought focused on conversation, or encounters, with others in a way reminiscent of Edgerton's notion of "translation," which occurs through the *difference between* myself and others and leads to, when the conversation is authentic, a *difference within*, which are "differences generated by socially and culturally produced psyches within 'singularized' subject-positions" (ibid. 46–47). Within authentic discourse we experience a sense of "wonder," or the "surprise of otherness," and any "translation" that

> sets up the conditions of knowledge-within-difference would proceed through some degree of awareness regarding collective and individual histories of the movement and ambivalence of desire, of exploitation and privilege, and the possible relationships among these (ibid. 47).

I relate Edgerton's findings on culture and self-identity to Irigarary's (1993) ethics of sexual difference, or the "morality of the sublime," which draws on what has been stated about sexual difference. Irigaray views the encounter between men and women in terms of communing with "the unknowable other," and if we are to "arrive at the constitution of an ethics of sexual difference, we must at least return to what is for Descartes the first passion: *wonder*" (78). The wonder of which she speaks is the emotional awe felt in the presence of *others* who reveal themselves in encounters as if for the first time, in terms of their supreme mystery, and as she states, this "wonder, surprise, and astonishment in the face of the unknowable ought to be returned to its proper place: the realm of sexual difference" (78). This notion of approaching the other, in a manner that respects the other's *radical alterity* can never be overcome through assimilation in knowledge, "might allow them to retain an autonomy based on their difference, and give them a space of freedom or attraction, or possibility of separation or alliance" (76). This theoretical relationship of men and women in discourse does not include the idea of oppression, the superiority of either men over women or women over men. Rather, they "stand as equally sublime to each other and equally incomprehensible to each other," and to reiterate, equality here refers specifically to the notion of "difference" (Wicks, 2003, 265). Within this

relationship "dispositions toward manipulation, oppression, objectification, disrespect and exploitation of persons of the opposite sex would be virtually non-existent" (ibid., 267).

To begin thinking about facilitating this form of discourse in the classroom, I avoid the addition of more female philosophers to the curriculum, e.g. a course of study wherein females are given equal coverage, as if increasing their presence will in some way rectify the injustices described. Rather, I focus on the different ways in which males and females communicate their ideas about all the philosophers we study, both male and female thinkers. This calls for a reevaluation of the language we use to "translate" our philosophical ideas, which includes an epistemological reassessment of knowledge forms in the curriculum, focused on how we articulate our thoughts, and perhaps more importantly, the manner in which we interpret the texts of philosophy through communal dialogue. Espousing a critical ontology for education, Kincheloe (2003) claims educators must be concerned with "developing new forms of self-awareness and an understanding of consciousness construction," which might be expressed through the development of and appreciation for "the autopoietic (self-producing) aspect of the 'self' in order to gain a more sophisticated capacity to reshape our lives" (47). What might this type of poetic inscription, in terms of dialogue, writing, and thinking look like in philosophy's curriculum? Indeed, for van Mannen (1990), phenomenology is a "poetizing activity," in which language "speaks the world rather than abstractly speaking *of* it" (13), and in doing so, creatively brings a new way of understanding things to life.

5. Enhancing Just and Equitable Discourse within the Community of the Philosophy Classroom

Traditionally, the philosophy curriculum privileges discourse grounded in the *epistemological culture* established by early empiricists such as Locke and Hume, in terms of the duplicitous epistemological model consisting of tautologies (analytic truth) and statements of fact (empirical truth). In the extreme, this model puts in question any legitimate speculation on issues arising from metaphysics, aesthetics, and ethics. It is possible to state that these areas of study are epistemologically *marginalized*. To unpack this statement I turn to Wittgenstein's (1922) distinction between what can be *said* and what can only be *shown*. When Wittgenstein suggests that we must be silent about that which we cannot speak, he refers to issues that cannot be logically expressed through "meaningful" propositions. If this is so, the issues cannot be logically sound, i.e., we cannot in meaningful ways "speak" about them.[3] Thus, no propositions, either true or false, can be uttered about matters of a religious, aesthetic, or ethical nature. It is impossible to speak

logically and hence philosophically, about these aforementioned issues because they reside beyond the boundary, or "cage," of propositional discourse. It must be noted that the marginalization of certain subjects within philosophy's curriculum does not happen explicitly, for I regularly teach units in metaphysics, religion, and ethics. However, it is clear that when analyzing the claims of the metaphysicians and theologians, they cannot be substantiated or validated within the epistemological model described above, and therefore appear spurious, and in the extreme, outrageously illogical and utterly absurd – *meaningless.*

Normally, I do not ask the student, "How do you feel about proposition (*p*)?" Rather, I ask, "Is proposition (*p*) defensible? If so, what evidence can you provide?" With these questions is the dual-concern for the value of knowledge forms and the devaluation of knowledge forms. In light of the ground covered, the type of knowledge being devalued in the philosophy curriculum is associated most primarily with the woman's way of *Being-in-the-world*. Traditional philosophical discourse either ignores women or denigrates them through the inclusion of imagery that associates them with all that is irrational and antithetic to clear-sighted reasoning, which remains exclusively the province of the male. According to Irigaray's (1993) analysis of language and the modes of communication she associates with the female, women are situated in the world with others in a mode of being that is strongly influenced by the emotions and the experiential aspects of existence, e.g., as part of their sexual identity, women are more "in touch" with and "sensitive" to "the qualities of people, of things, of the action taking place" (77). Jaggar (2010), writing on the link between the emotions and reason argues that the emotions cannot be separated from the processes of cognition, and that "emotional" forms of understanding are not inferior to rational modes of cognizing the world. Jaggar seeks to restore "the interdependence of faculties that our culture has abstracted and separated from each other: emotion and reason, evaluation and perception, observation and action," for she suggests an epistemological model that is non-hierarchical, non-binary, and anti-foundational (224). In her holistic epistemological view, "each of these faculties reflects an aspect of human knowing inseparable from the other aspects" (ibid., 224).

Attempting to return the feminine voice, which refers to "the individual's relationship to the meaning of her/his experience and hence, to language, and the individual's relationship to the other" to the conversation, in reconceiving and reconstructing the *epistemological culture* of the classroom, I move to consider forms of writing and reading philosophy that deviate from the norms of academia through engaging non-traditional media for instruction (Brtizman, 1989 quoted in Connelly & Clandinin, 1990, 126). With this in mind, it is possible to imagine a curriculum wherein a multiplicity of

ways of knowing and communicating commingle and merge. In this final section I include some thoughts on how to potentially innovate the philosophy curriculum in a practical manner based on the theoretical ground covered thus far. Below I consider several possibilities for enhancing the students' experience within the philosophy classroom: (1) I outline non-traditional media that inspire epistemological encounters with multiple forms of knowing and understanding, and (2) I explore activities that call for interpretation rather than the application of formal logic, i.e., activities that are hermeneutic in nature, which makes space for personal voice, i.e., autobiography and the intellectual-emotional biography of the student.

I begin by relating the thoughts of educators on the subject of art and the imagination, wherein "art" is linked with *marginalized* practices because it elicits and inspires "feelings and intuitions which daily life does not have a place for and mostly seems to suppress" (Donaghue, 1983 as quoted in Greene, 1995, 28). As related to this essay, it is possible to state that art is marginalized because of its unique epistemological standing, its form of emotional understanding lies outside the boundaries of philosophy's traditional epistemological model. This line of thought on the alienation of art is traceable to Adorno (1974) and the notions of *culture industry* and the autonomy of art. "With the fusion of economic and political power in late capitalism, art is alienated; it is presented as mere commodity," i.e., in presenting art as a commodity, its authentic power to inspire human agency is overlooked (Emerling, 2005, 44). However, despite being viewed as a commodity, art "maintains an autonomy that gives it a critical distance from which it can observe and critique the socioeconomic sphere" (ibid., 44). In short, art holds the potential to inspire human agency, and this is precisely what Greene (1995) insinuates in her critique of traditional knowledge forms in education: if art resides in the margins ("alienated") in relation to

> the conformist, the respectable, the moralistic, and the constrained, and if that marginality can be affirmed, then it is possible to view even mainstream art forms [whereas Adorno only considered the avant-garde] as something other than carriers of messages from men in power and norms of the majority once we go below their surfaces and act for ourselves on these intuitions of freedom and presence that we find (28).

It is possible that this practice of looking to margins so as to reveal inequitable power-relationships might be protracted into an examination of an alternative medium for doing and teaching philosophy, namely, the art of cinema – *philosophy through film*.[4] Although it is a fairly common practice to incorporate literature into the philosophy curriculum, it has only recently become acceptable to structure the entire curriculum around film and filmic analysis. Film is more immediate than literature, and it is something that

the majority of our students can instantly relate, as I argue, because their *consciousness of fiction*[5] is highly developed in this day and age of mass communication. "To view philosophy through film can animate ideas and place them within a human context, for film and philosophy have similar interests and concerns, and film can provide a unique and imaginative way to engage philosophy by showing the basic issues of human life in a moving way" (Porter, 2009, 10). Litch (2002) echoes these sentiments and adds that narrative cinema is by nature "philosophical," as a creative medium for problem solving, inspired by ultimate issues, films "present and defend an answer to one of philosophy's classic questions" (3).

Novitz (1987) links knowledge associated with narrative art forms to what he terms "fanciful imagination," which is the person's ability to "fabricate or invent by combining ideas, beliefs, words, or physical objects howsoever they choose," and through this process, which emerges from our experience with literature, poetry, and film, new forms of human understanding emerge (27). This type of fanciful imagination is absent from the philosophy classroom as described above, and while philosophy stresses active reasoning, it does not "generally ask for the imaginary constitutive, perceptual, moral evaluating and emotionally sophisticated participation appropriate to many works of art" (John, 2003, 332). Earlier I introduced the notion of "emotional cognition," here I want to build on that understanding in terms of knowledge in art, and Gonzalez (1998) contributes to this discussion with his notion of "non-propositional knowledge" that he equates with the dialectic and dialogue of Plato. To have propositional knowledge is to know *that* certain predicates are true of X, and knowledge is non-propositional "when it *cannot* be identified with knowing what can truly be asserted *of* its object" (7). Non-propositional knowledge is knowledge of something "whose nature or essence cannot be reduced to a set of properties; its unity cannot be resolved into any multiplicity through analysis" (ibid. 8). Knowing X in a non-propositional manner is at once a *knowing X* in such a way that it defies articulation by means of the proposition, e.g., knowing *how* to play baseball is not the same type of knowledge wherein we assert propositions about baseball. Gonzalez suggests that such non-propositional knowledge might be linked with self-knowledge (ibid., 8).[6]

As described by Plato (1997) in *Letter VII* this form of knowledge might be equated with authentic philosophical understanding of self and Being: This knowledge is not "something that can be put into words like other sciences" i.e., it is non-propositional in nature and can neither be affirmed nor invalidated through traditional epistemological forms of verification nor passed along through didactic methods, for it is more akin to an emotional and perceptual experience, which appears "suddenly, like light flashing forth when a fire is kindled, it is born in the soul and straightaway nourishes

itself" (1659). Might this type of understanding be equated with the experience of art, most particularly works of fiction? It appears as though both Novitz and John would respond in the affirmative, for Novitz claims that art shows us *how* to undergo something, for when we experience the trials and tribulations of the characters within fictional circumstances, they "turn out to have some basis in, or cohere with, our future or past expectations" (Novitz, 1987, 120). John (2001) clearly grounds this form of understanding in the perceptual aspects of our Being-in-the-world, which leads to practical "know-how," facilitating greater modes of perception and sensitivity to the world and others, preparing us to "notice and feel in a more acute way" (336). Embracing this notion of perceptual understanding broadens our epistemological horizons, for the encounter with film shows "traditional knowledge models of propositional knowledge to be inadequate," as limited, and as is my concern, sexist and exclusionary (John, 2003, 339). Education requires a theory of knowledge that embraces such things "as knowing how to perceive, imagine, and feel aptly, and knowing what a certain experience is like," as it's lived through (ibid., 339).

The experience with film would include approaching the instruction of ethics in a new way. Traditional ethical instruction incorporates moral prompts, or "case studies," which are employed to inspire speculation and discourse, all of which work toward the end of gaining a proper understanding of the ethical life. Ironically, as Nussbaum (2000) points out, these traditional ways of studying ethics tend to incorporate a detached form of philosophical contemplation, and this is representative of the inauthentic drive to capture in pure thought, the so-called "objective state-of-affairs," moral or otherwise, while transcending human subjectivity. According to Nussbaum, this form of detached thinking, which is at a "godlike" remove from concrete realities of our emotional interpersonal relationships, detaches itself from the immediate lived-context of our life and from the sentient, visceral, and immediate nature of our practical affairs, thus precluding the understanding of the intimate, legitimate connection between authentic philosophical thought and the emotional life. Whereas tradition instruction focuses on teaching rational principles for moral behavior and the examination of meta-ethical theories, film would open the way for imaginative and emotional moral encounters through the world of fiction, through the emotional world represented in the medium of film. Narrative fiction allows students to "perceive morally relevant elements of experience, to have morally substantive and emotional responses and to take up morally challenging perspectives in imagination" (ibid., 335).

This form of aesthetic engagement facilitates the development of a sense of moral responsibility, "we learn in the sense of getting training or practice in *doing* things which are central to a morally responsible life" (ibid., 335).

With this in mind, it is possible to see how this form of understanding, or non-propositional knowledge, reminds us of the supreme importance of the emotions in the experiential unfolding of our Being-in-the-world. As opposed to clouding our ethical decision making-process and judgments, as is consistent with traditional Western philosophy, such as the *deontological* system of Kant, the emotions, according to Jaggar (2010), hold the potential to provide valuable insight into our ethical interpersonal relationships, for we change emotionally as we conceptualize and re-conceptualize the world, and our emotional changes inspire new ways of understanding. Thus, not only are the emotions linked with legitimate ways of knowing, the "appropriate emotions may contribute to the development of knowledge," and in turn the "growth of knowledge may contribute to the development of appropriate emotions" (ibid., 223). This is the symbiotic relationship between epistemology and ethics that is at the heart of Jaggar's feminist philosophy, which she describes in terms of a "continuous feedback loop between our emotions constitution and our theorizing such that each component modifies the other and is in principle inseparable from it" (ibid., 223). Through the interpretation of film, which I suggest should unfold through hermeneutic activities, there exists the movement between understanding and ethical interpersonal development, which might be termed the *epistemological-ethical* continuum of discourse, or interpretation. We not only recognize the unique emotional make-up of others, we can also learn to become more ethically sensitive to emotional responses of the marginalized.

The encounter with film opens the curriculum for discourse wherein understanding is constructed and formed through the ever-renewed process of interpretation within the context of learning, this as opposed to the *essentialist* (pre-procedural) view of knowledge residing at an objective remove from the subject. Hermeneutic interpretation offers the potential encounter with a form of understanding, which is irreducible to either the type of knowledge we acquire through analytic methods or empirical techniques. The understanding we develop through hermeneutic interpretation is akin to existential, meditative understanding of our Being in communion with the Being of others, it a process of "translation" and "transcendence," wherein we learn about things in ways that are never complete (Davey, 2005). Hermeneutic interpretation calls for a preparatory mode of attunement, for prior to any actual translation/interpretation we must first approach the task of translating ourselves to the other, to what she/he is uniquely speaking, thinking, and feeling (Krell, 1984, 3). When interpreting a "text" – works of art, historical artifacts, social institutions, educational resources, other human beings – we "first arrive on its foreign shores and, like Hermes on Ogygia, stop to contemplate before we can return with some fitting memento of it to the land of our own language" (ibid., 3). Authentic translation represents a

passage through the foreign in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of both the other and self, and this journey is never completed in terms of assimilating the other in knowledge. It is a form of "conversation," as alluded to earlier, that seeks above all else to sustain and maintain the notion of difference, by *listening* in advance, attuning ourselves, to the call of a voice that is radical in its alterity.

Although Edgerton (1989) does not directly address hermeneutics, it is possible to understand hermeneutic interpretation through her reading as representing a dialectical process, but certainly not in the Hegelian sense of the term, for in hermeneutic activity there is no epistemic closure in dialectic synthesis, rather it is reminiscent of Heidegger's (1977) description of the counter-striving movement between *world* and *earth* as related to the *Riss* of the work of art, wherein "opposition" and radical difference manifests as strife between the two. However, this is not to indicate an eristic and agonistic competition, wherein "discord and dispute" lead to "disorder and destruction," rather strife in this context of *truth-happening* represents an "essential striving" where the "opponents raise each other into the self-assertion of their natures," into their own unique ways of Being-in-the-world (49). I relate this notion of striving to learning within hermeneutic activities, conversations which are thereby enhanced by preserving and embracing sexual identity, in terms of irreducible difference, in terms that are uniquely male and female, as related to the specific ways of thinking, feeling, and understanding the world they share. Irigaray's (1993) notion of the "irreducible other" is helpful in imagining the autonomy based on difference that inspires sublime moments of *wonder* in the face of radical alterity, which might be linked to "self-knowledge." As Greene (1995) writes, "To be yourself," or perhaps better, to *become* yourself, "is to be in process of creating a self, an identity. If it were not a process there would be no surprise. The surprise comes along with being different consciously different as one finds ways of acting on envisioned possibilities. It comes along with hearing different words and music, seeing from unaccustomed angles, realizing that the world perceived from one place is not the world" (20). And such self-transformation depends on the encounter with the other, to whom we are in advance beholden, who must remain *as* Other, beyond the bounds of complete comprehension.

Prior to understanding ourselves as individuals we need recognize that self-knowledge is grounded in our social encounters with others, which occurs through "horizons," or contexts, of meaning. Gadamer (1989) calls the historical view to the world our "horizon" and this locates us within a context wherein past, present, and future are interdependent. We depend on the past, as *heritage* or tradition, in order to project an authentic historical future. Our development as humans represents the expansion of our horizon through interpretive acts wherein we essentially encounter those things and entities

that are different, or radically Other, than ourselves, and the context of our horizon includes the fore-knowledge and fore-understanding we possess as historically rooted beings with "pasts" that we bring to the context of the dialogue, or our engagement with texts, each of which possess their own unique horizon. When these horizons merge or fuse, new possibilities emerge which would not have been possible otherwise. The authentic lived experience of learning includes making space for students' reflective and reflexive activity, which includes autobiography and the lived world of the student's emotional and intellectual experience as indispensable components of the educative process. It is possible to imagine the continuous feedback loop between knowledge and the emotions of which Jaggar writes occurring within the fusion or commingling of horizons, in this case between center and margin.

Hermeneutic activity lives at the level of autobiography, and to embrace autobiography, in terms of the student's unique intellectual and emotional life-story, which includes thinking on narratives and "life-stories," as integral to the process of learning, opens opportunities and possibilities in which students acquire a deeper vision of things, and through the processes of translation, transcendence, and appropriation of the hermeneutic learning experience, authentic education might return the student to her "lived world" with a new sense of self-understanding. Grumet (1992) stresses that autobiography should never be conceived as monadic, for all self-knowing is "self-as-knower-of-the-world" within the world with others (33). By embracing the contributive effect of autobiography to the learning process, we are already engaging in the communal activity of interpretation through "conversation" with others: "Autobiography is a story that is told to someone," and in autobiography, every notion of self is "necessarily preceded by a relation to another" (ibid., 36). Clearly, for me, the interpretive encounter with my students, which represents our intellectual and emotional life stories converging, opened my eyes to a new way of perceiving my pedagogical craft and responsibility.

As opposed to analyses that work from axiomatic or empirical models, with their drive for categorical epistemological validation, hermeneutics resists the desire for finality, completeness, and control; it renounces the lust to reduce the power of language to functioning and meaning in a singular, linear fashion and recovers the view of life as inherently problematic, mysterious, question-worthy, and difficult (Jardine, 1992). By its nature hermeneutic interpretation "prevents understanding from ever completing its task. In short, "the necessity that inspires and brings understanding to its task," namely, to the recognition and enlightenment that its task "can never be fulfilled" (Davey, 2005, 13). And, certainly, this notion of "difficulty" or the impossibility of ever securing a single correct interpretation relates to

the profundity of film as art as discussed previously, for the power of art lies inherently in its ability not only to mean in a multiplicity of ways to a variety of individuals and communities, but as well, to cut across cultural and religious boundaries in ways that "analytic" philosophical texts and treatise fail to accomplish (Heidegger 1971; Gadamer 1989; Greene 1995; Nussbaum 2000).

Closing Remarks

A running critique of French feminism is that it is esoteric and obscure and, like the tradition in philosophy it is critical of, perhaps too content to remain at an abstract theoretical remove from the lived experience of the female, despite its claims to the contrary. While I respect the work of such literary thinkers as Cixous (1981), who advocates in direct opposition to male forms of communication an emancipatory feminine form of writing that unfolds in the "language of a thousand tongues which knows neither enclosure not death," a form of writing which makes "the single-grooved mother tongue reverberate with more than one language […] a desire for the swollen body, for language, and blood" (256). Taking her work as a whole, it is difficult to see how such radical ideas might manifest in the realm of educational praxis, especially in the curriculum of Western philosophy. If one listens and heeds her rallying cry, perhaps it would be best for all parties involved to simply eradicate the philosophy program in its entirety! But of course, this will not do. For this reason I have attempted to render feminist philosophy in terms that are accessible to educational professional and practitioners so they too might be inspired by their thoughts of human emancipation. This phenomenological-hermeneutic study represents a process of learning in communion with my students, a discourse between educator and student, which has provided a thinking in the direction of potential responses to the problem of female alienation within the epistemological culture of the curriculum in the form of new activities, unique and innovative ways of approaching learning, which might serve to inspire a more authentic unfolding and enactment of a just and equitable praxis within the classroom.

If the claims of the French feminists are correct, and I "feel" as if they hold a certain truth-value, I am implicated in and am therefore responsible for perpetuating an oppressive world-view that shapes the lives of my students, most particularly female students, in ways that are detrimental to their developing an authentic sense of identity. How deeply philosophy is implicated in contributing to the stultification and repression of the authentic identity of my female students and the extent to which it must pay just, academic recompense represented both the founding and guiding thought of this paper. As a teacher of Western philosophy to undergraduates in an

institution of higher learning, this represents a legitimate concern, which demanded to be approached and thought through in a careful and emotionally sensitive manner. Responsibility included the attempt to pay just recompense through "reform," not a grand scale, of course, but on the smaller and more intimate level of the classroom. Hopefully, and not in an inconsequential manner, I have inspired creative ways to rethink the curriculum through the consideration of knowledge-forms and the inclusion of media and activities not traditionally considered. Perhaps educators will find some inspiration in the interpretive gestures, moving from theory to potential praxis, comprising this essay, not only for the betterment of the philosophy curriculum, but as related to other fields of study as well.

NOTES

1. In line with the *cognitive* view of aesthetics, Best (1987) argues against the subjectivist view of the emotions and outlines the interdependency between reason and emotion in terms of aesthetic knowledge. He describes it as a form of perceptual-emotional knowledge that emerges through encounters with art and literature, which might be understood in terms of emotional-rationality, a legitimate form of autonomous knowledge: "I am not really arguing even for the *close* relation of feeling and reason," states Best, "but rather that artistic feelings *are rational in kind*" (74). Other thinkers have espoused similar claims about emotionality and cognition, e.g., Goodman (1969); Novitz (1987); Nussbaum (2000); and John (2003).

2. It is crucial here to note the difference between "empirical" and "experiential" in philosophical discourse. Empirical refers specifically to knowledge obtained from and checked by perception and sensation. It is possible to link empirical knowledge with a purely biological mode of existing. Whereas "experiential" refers to the grand spectrum of human experience, which includes, in addition to empirical knowledge, understanding gleaned through insights and intuitions, which are obtainable through modes of introspection and discourse with others. Experiential aspects of our existence are never reducible to the "biological," and importantly, are bound up with the epistemological-ontological ways in which we understand, interpret, and discourse about Being-in-the-world.

3. It must be noted that although I reference Wittgenstein's philosophy as it emerges from the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, the philosophers of *The Vienna Circle* obscured his intended meaning. Thus, what I discuss above is the result of their flawed, or at least questionable, reading of Wittgenstein. Using Wittgenstein's philosophy *The Vienna Circle* adopted a hard-line anti-metaphysical stance and employed for epistemological validation the "verification principle," which when applied rendered many of the problems and responses of philosophy untenable, e.g., claims of a metaphysical, aesthetic, and normative nature were excluded from the philosophical discussion. The so-called "positivist" trend in contemporary education and research, as witnessed in social efficiency ideology, is traceable to this 1929 philosophical movement of *logical positivism.*

4. It is indeed possible to conceive film *as* art through the analogy of literature *as* art. Smith (1995) argues that film achieves the following "aesthetic" criteria: (1) film fits the *formalist* tradition of "purposiveness without purpose," which is the "notion that aesthetic objects are distinctive because of the manner in which they are cut loose from practical ends"; (2) film inspires engagement with the spectator in terms of a distinctly "aesthetic experience," wherein the "disengagement from practical purposes enables aesthetic objects to be used for purely *perceptual* or *contemplative* purposes; roughly speaking, the aesthetic object becomes an occasion for reflection rather than action" (365). It must be noted that herein I adopt a "cognitivist" view of art, or film, in that, my claims are grounded in the understanding of film as a work of art that draws the spectator in, as participant, into the truth-happening of a unique and legitimate *noetic* experience.

5. This concept is drawn from Vernant's (1990) writing on the aesthetic experience of audiences to early Greek tragedy, and he also relates it to nascent spectators of cinema, "when the seventh art was in its infancy" (243). Here I am relating it to the contemporary epoch in that it indicates the capacity and capability to understand that what one is watching (as related to film) is a realistic and fictional portrayal of events, and one possesses the necessary ability to allow one's consciousness to be freed in such a way as to give oneself over to the work in order to be enraptured in an altered state of consciousness. Spectators have the autonomous ability to "enter into the game, understanding that what can be seen on stage belongs not to the plane of reality, but to what must be defined as the plane of theatrical illusion. A consciousness of fiction is essential to the dramatic spectacle; it seems to be both its condition and product" (244).

6. In Continental philosophy thinkers are attuned to radical re-readings of classic texts in such a way as to break new ground in interpretive discourse, e.g., Gonzalez (1998) identifies three forms of knowledge that coexist within Platonic discourse and Hyland (2006), in his work on Continental Platonist readings, identifies no less than six forms of knowledge commingling in the dialogues. Such re-readings open the door for a new understanding and radical re-thinking of traditional philosophy, and these types of readings should inform, as they are informed by, feminist thought such as it has been presented in this essay.

REFERENCES

Althusser, L. (2001), *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Cixous, Hélène (1981), "The Laugh of the Medusa," in E. Marks and I. de Courtivron (eds.), *New French Feminism*. New York: Schocken Books.

Cixous, H. (1986), "Sorties" in H. Cixous and C. Clement (eds.), tr. B. Wing, *The Newly Born Woman*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Davey, J. (2006), *Philosophical Hermeneutics: The Unsettling Disquiet*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Derrida, J. (1981), *Dissemination*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Edgerton, S. H. (1996), *Translating the Curriculum: Multiculturalism into Cultural Studies*. New York: Routledge.

Emerling, J. (2006), *New Theory for Art History*. New York: Harper-Collins.
Foucault, M. (1980), *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*. New York: Pantheon Books.
Gadamer, H. G. (1989), *Truth and Method*. New York: Continuum.
Gilligan, Carol (1982), *In A Different Voice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Gonzalez, F. (1998), *Plato: Dialectic and Dialogue.* Chicago: Northwestern University Press.
Greene, M. (1995) *Releasing the Imagination: Essays on Education, the Arts, and Social Change*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Grumet, M. (1992), "Existential and Phenomenological Foundations of Autobiographical Methods," in W. Pinar and W. Reynolds (eds.), *Understanding Curriculum as Phenomenological and Deconstructed Text*. New York: Teacher's College Press.
Grumet, Madeleine (1988), *Bitter Milk: Women and Teaching*. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press.
Heidegger, M. (1977), *Language, Poetry, Thought.* New York: Harper-Collins.
Hyland, D. (2006), *Platonic Readings from the Continental Tradition*. Albany: SUNY Press.
Irigaray, Luce (1996), *The Ethics of Sexual Difference.* Trans. Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. Gill. London: The Athlone Press.
Jaggar, A. (2008), "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology," in Donald Able (ed.), *Fifty Readings in Philosophy*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Jagodzinski, J. (1992), "Curriculum as Felt through Six Layers of an Aesthetically Embodied Skin: The Arch-Writing on the Body," in W. Pinar and W. Reynalds (eds.), *Understanding Curriculum as Phenomenological and Deconstructed Text.* New York: Teachers College Press.
Janesick, V. (1991), "Ethnographic Inquiry: Understanding Culture and Experience," in Edmund Short (ed.), *Forms of Curriculum Inquiry*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Jardine, D. (1992), "Reflection on Education, Hermeneutics, and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics as a Restoring of Life to its Original Difficulty," in W. Pinar and W. Reynalds (eds.), *Understanding Curriculum as Phenomenological and Deconstructed Text*. New York: Teacher's College Press.
Jardine, G. M. (2005), *Foucault and Education.* New York: Peter Lang.
John, E. (2001), "Art and Knowledge," in B. Gault and D. M. Lopes (eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*. New York: Routledge.
Krell, D. (1984), *Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy* (translator's introduction), San Francisco: Haper-Collins.
Le Doeuff, M. (1986), *The Philosophical Imaginary*, London: The Athlone Press.
Litch, M. (2002), *Philosophy through Film.* New York: Routledge.
Noddings, N. (1986), "Fidelity in Teaching, Teacher Education, and Research for Teaching," *Harvard Educational Review* 56(4): 496–510.
Noddings, N. (1984), *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education.* Berkeley: University of California Press.
Novitz, D. (1987), *Knowledge, Fiction, and Imagination.* Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Nussbaum, M. (2000), *Love's Knowledge.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Plato (1997), "Letters," *Plato: The Complete Works*, J. M. Copper (ed.), Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing.
Pojman, L. (2010), *Discovering Right and Wrong.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Porter, B. (2009), *Philosophy through Film.* Cornwall-on-Hudson: Sloan Publishing.
Smith, C. (2005), "Epistemological Intimacy: A Move to Autoethnography," *International Journal of Qualitative Research* 4(2): 2–7.
Smith, M. (1995), *Engaging Characters: Fiction, Emotion, and the Cinema.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Van Manen M. (1990), *Researching Lived Experience: Human Science for Action Sensitive Pedagogy.* Albany: SUNY Press.
Vernant, J. P. (1990) *Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece.* New York: Zone Books.
Wicks, R. (2003) *Modern French Philosophy.* London: One World Books.
Wittgenstein, L. (1922) *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.* London: Routledge.

James M. Magrini is an adjunct professor of Philosophy and Ethics at College of Dupage, Glen Ellyn, IL. In 2012–2013 he was named "Outstanding Part-Time Liberal Arts Faculty Member." He has published in such journals as *Philosophy Today*, *Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations, Analysis and Metaphysics, Philosophical Writings*, and *Educational Philosophy and Theory*. Routledge Press is publishing his book, *Social Efficiency and Instrumentalism in Education: Critical Essays in Ontology, Phenomenology, and Philosophical Hermeneutics* (2014).

Journal of Research in Gender Studies
Volume 3(2), 2013, pp. 128–133, ISSN: 2164-0262

GENDER POLITICS AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

IOANA-BIANCA BERNA
bianca.berna@yahoo.it
National School of Political and
Administrative Studies, Bucharest

ABSTRACT. In the present paper, I focus on the political limitations of EU gender equality policy making in the Western Balkans, the legacy of the wartime victimization of Bosnian women, the gender dimension of social capital, and factors linked to the post-conflict situation and transition. The overall results provide strong evidence for the reduction of gender-based violence, the coherence of the EU's gender equality approaches to the Western Balkans, different types of social realities of women, gendered patterns of civic participation, and the re-traditionalization of gender roles in society.

Keywords: Western Balkans; gender; women; EU; violence

1. Introduction

Over the past decade, there has been increasing evidence describing the socio-cultural significance of the occurrence of mass rape against Bosnian Muslim women during the inter-ethnic conflict, gender equitable constructions of masculinity for young men, the need for a greater participation of women in politics at decision-making positions, and the patriarchal social relations that exploit and marginalize women. The purpose of this article is to gain a deeper understanding of the social networks generated through the participation of gender associations, the specific gender norms that contribute to violent behavior among young men in Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia, the difference in the level of participation, power and social influence between women's and men's groups, and the role that male socialization plays in promoting and supporting violence.

2. The Coherence of the EU's Gender Equality Approaches to the Western Balkans

In terms of mere legislation, the principle of gender equality has grown in propensity with the European integration process. The EU has been involved in a complex activity for the stabilization (Hunter, 2013a) and the progressive integration of the Western Balkans. The countries of Western Balkans represent a highly unfavorable political context for the EU as a gender equality promoter. The EU accession process has been a great opportunity for advocating the improvement of the situation of women, especially in the labor market. Transnational exchanges promoting contacts among women's associations are a source of exchanges of knowledge and "good practices," and moral support that arises from being part of a network. Laws guaranteeing equal opportunities for women have been adopted, but women in both countries face disparities in terms of jobs, wages and political representation. Poor implementation can primarily be attributed to the lack of good governance (Prager, 2013) in Western Balkans states. (Spehar, 2012)

Family is the main source of social capital in contemporary Serbia. The birth of a child requires change of all extant relations in the familial networks of both partners. Alternative unions in Serbia are globally marginalized. In most marital families the household budget is formed as a shared fund. The social capital of cohabitations and extramarital families is lower than that of marital unions. A legalized marriage possesses higher levels of social capital. Family is the main support of sociability, as it makes possible the bringing together of different types of resources and capital (Nicolăescu, 2013b), and gives its members a feeling of belonging and togetherness. Lowered fatality and a longer life in combination with low fertility lead to the aging of the population. Each new generation of women is one third smaller than the generation of their mothers. Gender equality and democratization of family relations are some preconditions for increase in birth rate. (Bobić, 2012)

The countries of the Western Balkans face high levels of violence, crime and human insecurity. Domestic violence is the most widespread form of violence throughout the region, whereas women are the primary victims. Governments in the region have developed specific legislation against domestic violence, introducing legal measures, and penalizing it *ex officio*. Services to protect victims of domestic violence are mostly provided by women's groups and funded by international donors. Professionals are not properly trained to implement specific legal provisions on domestic violence. Victims of domestic violence do not have prompt and safe access to justice and proper protection. Domestic violence is a widespread problem in the region, aggravated by post conflict tensions. Every fourth "ever-partnered woman" has experienced physical or sexual violence. In the Western Balkans domestic violence is

fuelled by increased intolerance and discrimination of minorities and marginalized groups. All governments have made significant progress in penalizing domestic violence and introducing legal measures to protect victims. The national authorities have increased the involvement of social services (Yuan, 2013) aimed at protecting victims of domestic violence. Access to justice is available to victims of domestic violence, but it is not as safe and prompt as demanded by international standards. Governments in the region have not instigated public awareness campaigns on domestic violence. Centers for social work have an outstanding role and impact as state institutions dealing with victims of domestic violence. Law enforcement institutions lack data on armed domestic violence. There is a need to improve current legislation and practice with regard to decreasing the use of firearms in domestic violence. (Dokmanovic, 2007)

3. The Re-traditionalization of Gender Roles in Society

Croatia and Macedonia belong to a region where the implementation of democracy has faced long-term obstacles. There are three levels of impact where Croatian and Macedonian EU accession processes have been beneficial in the gender policy context: (i) introduction of new gender legislation, (ii) introduction of institutional mechanisms for the advancement of gender equality, and (iii) women's movements' strengths and legitimacy. The Croatian and Macedonian governments have set up national machineries for the advancement of women. Women's organizations from Croatia and Macedonia are actively participating in the debate addressing the impact on women of EU accession. The lack of gender awareness may affect the implementation of EU gender equality directives. Croatia and Macedonia have made significant progress in terms of reform of gender equality legislation, but implementation of the legislation and policy needs close scrutiny, increased resources and real commitment. (Spehar, 2012)

With the exception of Kosovo, fertility in Eastern Europe affected by masculinization of births is below two children per woman. Modern prenatal sex selection methods have become available since the opening of the Eastern European countries' borders and the development of a market economy. In the Western Balkans decades of socialism eradicated many of the most flagrant forms of gender discrimination in society (Sánchez de Madariaga, 2013) and did little to reduce inequalities within the family unit. The discriminatory practices made possible by modern technologies (Cremers, 2013) reveal the true extent of gender inequalities. the withdrawal of state control (Kunnanatt, 2013) led to a breakdown in solidarity. The family structure provided its members with guaranteed security, financial support and housing. The countries of Eastern Europe affected by a skewed sex ratio are sparsely

populated. Eastern Europeans characterized by strong patriarchal values are testing a system of demographic laissez-faire on a local scale. (Guilmoto and Duthé, 2013)

Gender-based violence (GBV) results in devastating effects on mental and reproductive health and emotional distress, perpetuating broader structural inequalities that limit social justice and equity. Gender norms, inequity and power relationships (Nicolăescu, 2013a) increase women's vulnerability to violence. Gender norms and male socialization lead to inequitable attitudes and behaviors toward women and girls. In the context of post-conflict situations, identities of nationality (Fost, 2013), ethnicity and religion and experiences of war are important categories in the construction of masculinities and gender-based violence. (Matkovic Puljic et al., 2007)

4. Different Types of Social Realities of Women

Social capital is a medium (Hunter, 2013b) for networking individual and common good (Bacalu, 2013), and the source of solidarity and welfare for all individuals regardless of their participation in its production, being made operative through the concepts of trust, norms and networks. When related to issues of gender equality, bridging groups are inclusive across the sexes. bonding groups reinforce close-knit networks (Pera, 2013) among people sharing similar backgrounds and beliefs. The position of women in modern society is undergoing a significant change. Women's groups and networks have increased the level of capital possessed by women. The activity of women's groups and networks in Serbia has led to increasing chances that social capital will be more in the hands of women. The fundamental values concerning human rights of women are part of the general social values. Women's groups and networks have contributed to the increase of social resources and democratic values in Serbia. Women's groups have been more stable and have shown a higher degree of inner solidarity than other NGOs in Serbia. The activity of women's groups and networks in Serbia has influenced the positive steps in designing the modern Serbian society. (Žunić and Gavrilović, 2012)

The culture of impunity which allowed the mass rapes to take place holds sway over Bosnian society. The task of reconstruction has necessitated the need to (re)establish democracy. Bosnia-Herzegovina has been plagued with the legacy of the civil war and the tasks of reconciliation and reconstruction. Reconciliation has required a fine balancing act between socio-cultural "remembering" and "forgetting" of the war. Individual women's experiences of wartime rape have been marginalized and silenced. "Forgetting" certain events from the past is dangerous for preventing the re-emergence of inter-

ethnic violence. Violence acts to destroy and rupture individual and social bonds of trust and coexistence. (Todorova, 2011)

In Albania and Kosovo, domestic violence is prosecuted as a general crime of assault, infliction of physical injuries or rape. In Albania, civilians are not allowed by law to possess and carry firearms, except for hunting weapons. Police officials make investigations into the applicant's personality by interrogating their marital partner or ex-marital partner. A reported threat with a firearm is grounds for confiscation. In Montenegro, police are not allowed to make requests for protection measures, and courts request data about a firearm only if it is used or is intended to be used in a criminal act. In Macedonia, a person applying for a license must not have been sentenced for a criminal offence or for disturbing public order and peace with elements of violence. In Croatia, illegal possession of a firearm is as significant a crime as domestic violence. Police have to check that no circumstances exist indicating the misuse of firearms. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the issue of armed domestic violence is ignored by all relevant institutions. In Kosovo, a license will not be issued to a person who has a record of violent behavior. (Dokmanovic, 2007)

5. Conclusions

The current study has extended past research by elucidating the widespread use of mass rape against Bosnian Muslim women, family transformation in contemporary Serbia, the implications of equality policies for the Croatian and Macedonian gender equality context, and the types of social capital produced by female networks. As a result of these earlier research findings, this study sought to determine bonding and bridging as the functions of social capital of women gathered in women's groups, Bosnian society's response to the legacy of wartime rape, the vulnerability of the inter-relationship between gender and ethnicity, and the contribution made by women's networks in the fight against violence in the family.

REFERENCES

Bacalu, Filip (2013), "The Role Language Plays in Social Behavior," *Analysis and Metaphysics* 12: 154–159.

Bobić, Mirjana (2012), "The Application of the Concept of Social Capital in Understanding Marriage and Family in Contemporary Serbia," in Predrag Cvetičanin and Ana Birešev (eds.), *Social and Cultural Capital in Western Balkan Societies.* Belgrade: CECSSEE-IPSTUB, 41–58.

Cremers, Jan (2013), "Non-financial Reporting and Reference to Workers' Representatives," *Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice* 5(2): 50–89.

Dokmanovic, Mirjana (2007), *Firearms Possession and Domestic Violence in the Western Balkans: A Comparative Study of Legislation and Implementation Mechanisms. Belgrade:* SEESAC.

Fost, Joshua (2013), "The Extended Self, Functional Constancy, and Personal Identity," *Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations* 12: 47–66.

Guilmoto, Christophe Z., and Géraldine Duthé (2013), "Masculinization of Births in Eastern Europe," *Population & Societies* 506: 1–4.

Hunter, Murray (2013a), "Capabilities throughout the Organization Lifecycle," *Psychosociological Issues in Human Resource Management* 1(1): 37–107.

Hunter, Murray (2013b), "Imagination May Be More Important than Knowledge: The Eight Types of Imagination We Use," *Review of Contemporary Philosophy* 12: 113–120.

Kunnanatt, James Thomas (2013), "Globalization and Developing Countries: A Global Participation Model," *Economics, Management, and Financial Markets* 8(4): 42–58.

Matkovic Puljic, Vlatka, Adrijana Husic, Anne Eckman, Aparna Jain, Sarah Degnan Kambou, Doris Bartel, John Crownover, Milena Prvulović, and Srđan Dušanić (2007), *Exploring Dimensions of Masculinity and Violence*. Washington, DC: Care International, ICRW.

Nicolăescu, Eugen (2013a), "Developments in Corporate Governance and Regulatory Interest in Protecting Audit Quality," *Economics, Management, and Financial Markets* 8(2): 198–203.

Nicolăescu, Eugen (2013b), "Understanding Risk Factors for Weaknesses in Internal Controls over Financial Reporting," *Journal of Self-Governance and Management Economics* 1(3): 38–43.

Pera, Aurel (2013), "The Social Aspects of Technology-enhanced Learning Situations," *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations* 5(2): 118–123.

Prager, Jonas (2013), "The Financial Crisis of 2007/8: Misaligned Incentives, Bank Mismanagement, and Troubling Policy Implications," *Economics, Management, and Financial Markets* 8(3): 11–56.

Sánchez de Madariaga, Inés (2013), "Advancing Gender Equality in Research and Innovation in Europe and Beyond: COST Network and GenderSTE," *Journal of Research in Gender Studies* 3(1): 131–143.

Spehar, Andrea (2012), "This Far, but No Further? Benefits and Limitations of EU Gender Equality Policy Making in the Western Balkans," *East European Politics & Societies* 26(2): 362–379.

Todorova, Teodora (2011), "'Giving Memory a Future:' Confronting the Legacy of Mass Rape in Post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Journal of International Women's Studies* 12(2): 3–15.

Yuan, Shengjun (2013), "Educational Policies and Economic Growth in BRICS: Comparative Perspectives," *Knowledge Cultures* 1(3): 32–44.

Žunić, Natalija, and Danijela Gavrilović (2012), "Women's Groups and Networks as a Source of Social Capital," in Predrag Cvetičanin and Ana Birešev (eds.), *Social and Cultural Capital in Western Balkan Societies*. Belgrade: CECSSEE-IPSTUB, 91–106.

Ioana-Bianca Berna, PhD, is a researcher at the CSEEA-SNSPA, Bucharest.

Addleton Academic Publishers
Journal of Research in Gender Studies
Volume 3(2), 2013, pp. 134–139, ISSN: 2164-0262

GENDER DIFFERENTIATION IN COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

AUREL PERA
aurel.pera@ucv.ro
University of Craiova

ABSTRACT. Considerable research attention has focused on gender differences in social behaviors, biological and sociocultural processes that influence the psychology of women and men, and sex differences in consumer navigation strategies. The theory that I shall seek to elaborate here puts considerable emphasis on the effects of social experience on men and women, gender differences in social values and regulatory goals, the sexually divergent adaptations for gathering and hunting, and gender differences in emotional responding.

Keywords: gender; cognition; social behavior; process; emotion

1. Introduction

The mainstay of the paper is formed by an analysis of the nature of the interaction between gender, rumination, and reappraisal, gender differences in value priorities, and the interrelation of biological, social, emotional, and cognitive events in constructing and maintaining gendered behavior. The results of the current study converge with prior research on gender differences in the emotional experience of gratitude, the role of biology and culture in shaping gender differences, and sex differences in spatial abilities and object location.

2. Cognition and Social Behavior

Most people do not possess the intellectual virtues countenanced by responsibilism or inferential reliabilism. Most people lack intellectual courage and are at best intellectually courageous in the face of non-unanimous dissent. Intellectual courage can overcome pluralistic ignorance (unpopular norms

remain in force even when they are despised by a large majority). Pluralistic ignorance is a social disorder of our own creation. The intellectual courage to express thoughts, judgments, and opinions is a specification of social courage. Courage is a fragmented collection of local traits, and is not the sort of trait that most ordinary people possess. Our *inferential* dispositions are especially suspect. The availability bias leads people to overestimate the probability of events and properties they are familiar with (people tend to infer based on availability). People are disposed to use a variety of heuristics to arrive at their inferential beliefs (these heuristics are not reliable enough to lead to knowledge). Knowledge is only generated by factitious attributions when the attributor intends to make a factitious attribution. Public attributions can be more effective than non-public attributions. Public announcements serve as a basis for common knowledge. (Alfano, 2013)

Khalidi defends an epistemic conception of natural kinds, asserting that natural kinds are picked out by those categories that appear in our completed scientific theories. The properties associated with natural kinds should not always be microphysical. There can be degrees of naturalness when it comes to kinds. Khalidi's methodology aims to reach reflective equilibrium between our metaphysical commitments and the findings of scientific inquiry. Projectibility is a diagnostic feature of natural kinds (the properties associated with natural kinds are involved in causal relations with one another). The projectibility of natural kinds reflects their *causal* nature. (Khalidi, 2013)

Self-concept is importantly implicated in factitious intellectual virtue. Social expectations play a key role in generating factitious intellectual virtue. Responsibilist but not reliabilist intellectual virtues are susceptible to factitious attribution (reliability is not necessary for knowledge). People do not typically know the contents of factitious virtue attributions initially. Factitious virtue is generated in part by the actions and expectations of the attributor. Some of the intellectual virtues are susceptible to factitious attribution. Attributions of intellectual virtues and vices tend to function as self-fulfilling prophecies. We should think of virtue as a triadic relation among an agent, a social milieu, and an environment. People may become so habituated to factitious virtue that they eventually acquire full virtue. Social distance is a function of three dimensions: interaction, information, and group identity. Norms should be defined with one eye on the flourishing of people and societies and the other eye on empirical reality. (Alfano, 2013)

At least one kind of mind-dependence of many social (and other) kinds ought not to preclude a realist attitude towards them. Alternative formulation of realism towards kinds should advert to their causal efficacy rather than their mind-independence. Real properties and natural kinds participate in real causal patterns. To understand the natural world we need to identify similarities that depend on shared causal properties. Many biological kinds are individuated according to etiology or causal history. The relevant notion of

normalcy can be articulated without commitment to a *nonbiological* notion of normativity or value-ladenness. Natural kinds pertain to scientific *domains*. Disjunctive categories do not correspond to natural kinds. (Khalidi, 2013)

3. Gender Differences in Social Behaviors

Nature refers to biological structures and processes, whereas nurture refers to sociocultural influences. Psychological flexibility is constrained by a female –male division of labor (Hunter, 2013b) that varies in form across societies (human biology interacts with the environment to produce a division of labor). The division of labor (Cremers, 2013) is perpetuated through social psychological processes (Nicolăescu, 2013a) involved in forming gender role beliefs. Gender roles encourage most adults to conform to these shared beliefs, and are internalized as personal standards for individuals' behavior. (Eagly and Wood, 2013) The dimensionality of gendered personality means that masculinity and femininity are truly a continuum. The dimensionality of gender does not address the social or biological basis of differences between men and women. Sex is one of the most readily observed human traits, forming an easy and common basis for categorizing other persons. The dimensionality of gender indicates that average differences between men and women are inappropriate for diagnosing gender-typical psychological variables on the basis of sex. (Carothers and Reis, 2013)

A romantic partner's success hurts men's, but not women's, self-esteem. The success of the partner might harm men's self-esteem more than women's. Self-esteem might be impacted when one fails to fulfill the roles ascribed to one's gender. Men and women's self-esteem is differentially impacted by a romantic partner's success or failure. Feedback about a romantic partner's performance can influence one's own implicit self-esteem. Thinking about a partner's success might lead to decreased implicit self-esteem for men. Men's implicit self-esteem is lower when a partner succeeds than when a partner fails. A romantic partner's success in her life could lower men's implicit self-esteem and alter men's perception about their romantic relationship in the future. Understanding the influence of a partner's success or failure on the self helps understanding what makes a successful relationship in the long run. (Ratliff and Oishi, 2013)

4. Biological and Sociocultural Processes that Influence the Psychology of Women and Men

Men and women differ in their emotional reactivity. Emotional state has a direct effect on language comprehension. Understanding emotional language

produces a simulation of the emotion, the simulation produces components of the emotional state, and there are gender differences in reactivity to emotions of sadness and anger that are reflected in differential preparation for action. (Glenberg et al., 2009) In order to understand gender differences in emotional responding, one should study the unique contributions of emotion and emotion regulation and include measures that go beyond self-reports of emotional experience. Men and women do not differ on either self-reported negative affect or amygdala reactivity to the unregulated negative pictures, and may differ in automatic but not deliberate emotion regulation (when regulating their emotions, men might engage more automatic, less deliberate processes than women). When using cognitive-based therapies to decrease negative affect in the context of affective disorders, gender differences may be relevant. Men may use cognitive regulation with less effort than women, whereas women may use positive affect in the service of down-regulating negative affect to a greater extent than men. (McRae et al., 2008)

Women and men value the expression of gratitude differently (the expression of gratitude serves as a moral motivator). Women are more attuned to emotions and behaviors (Sánchez de Madariaga, 2013) with the aim of creating and sustaining meaningful social relationships. Women are generally more emotionally expressive than men, and are expected to derive greater benefits from the experience and expression of gratitude. Men may find gratitude to be less familiar and more discomforting compared with women. Men are less practiced at expressing emotions in the context of socializing. Men value power, novelty and stimulation (Pera, 2013), and achievement as more rewarding than intimacy. Social-cognitive processes including social norms and personal value priorities (Bacalu, 2013) influence gender differences in emotional experiences. The willingness to be emotionally expressive functions as a mediator of gender differences in relations between gratitude and well-being. Emotion expressiveness in women is a critical mechanism connecting well-being and gratitude. Women experience greater fluctuations in the satisfaction of basic psychological needs compared with men, and interpersonal events may exert a stronger influence on feelings of autonomy and relatedness for women than men. Compared with men, women are more likely to be altruistic and help out others. Gratitude increases the probability that the benefactor will act prosocially (Nicolăescu, 2013b) toward the beneficiary. Women compared with men are at an advantage to reap more benefits from the experience and expression of gratitude. (Kashdan et al., 2009)

Sex differences in spatial abilities stem from the pervasive sex differences in the propensity of hunting versus gathering behavior. Men have provided meat by way of hunting, whereas women have provided vegetative matter through the act of gathering within the local vicinity. Men would be more likely to want to obtain the resource (Kunnanatt, 2013) and return as quickly as possible. Cultural and social norms (Hunter, 2013a) impact on

people's shopping experiences and behaviors. Shopping is a chance to increase one's mate value (clothing can visibly improve one's appearance and attractiveness). Physical attractiveness is more of a priority for women than men (shopping might directly link to efforts women make to better themselves). Shopping locations are safe places for women, being public locations and often having some form of security to monitor problems. Shopping is a form of foraging in the modern consumer environment. Humans modify or extend existing behaviors (Fost, 2013) to suit the new situation (Prager, 2013), and modern shopping behaviors are an adaptation of our species' ancestral hunting and gathering skills. Shopping has significantly more in common with gathering than it does with hunting. Women have a greater tendency, than do men, to view new locations as opportunities for shopping. Both men and women may purchase products (Yuan, 2013) in an effort to enhance their mate value. (Kruger and Byker, 2009)

5. Conclusions

The findings of this study have implications for neural bases for gender differences in emotional reactivity and regulation, sex differences in the consumer shopping experience, and the hormonal and neural mechanisms involved in social interaction. This paper seeks to fill a gap in the current literature by examining gender differences in the processing of emotional language, biological and sociocultural processes that influence the psychology of women and men, the development of sex-specific spatial abilities, and gender differences in emotional reactivity.

REFERENCES

Alfano, Mark (2013), *Character as Moral Fiction*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bacalu, Filip (2013), "The Role Language Plays in Social Behavior," *Analysis and Metaphysics* 12: 154–159.

Carothers, Bobbi J., and Harry T. Reis (2013), "Men and Women Are from Earth: Examining the Latent Structure of Gender," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 104(2): 385–407.

Cremers, Jan (2013), "Non-financial Reporting and Reference to Workers' Representatives," *Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice* 5(2): 50–89.

Eagly, Alice H., and Wendy Wood (2013), "The Nature–Nurture Debates: 25 Years of Challenges in Understanding the Psychology of Gender," *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 8(3): 340–357.

Fost, Joshua (2013), "The Extended Self, Functional Constancy, and Personal Identity," *Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations* 12: 47–66.

Glenberg, Arthur M., Bryan J. Webster, Emily Mouilso, David Havas, and Lisa M. Lindeman (2009), "Gender, Emotion, and the Embodiment of Language Comprehension," *Emotion Review* 1(2): 151–161.

Hunter, Murray (2013a), "Capabilities throughout the Organization Lifecycle," *Psychosociological Issues in Human Resource Management* 1(1): 37–107.

Hunter, Murray (2013b), "Imagination May Be More Important than Knowledge: The Eight Types of Imagination We Use," *Review of Contemporary Philosophy* 12: 113–120.

Kashdan, Todd B., Anjali Mishra, William E. Breen, and Jeffrey J. Froh (2009), "Gender Differences in Gratitude: Examining Appraisals, Narratives, the Willingness to Express Emotions, and Changes in Psychological Needs," *Journal of Personality* 77(3): 691–730.

Khalidi, Muhammad Ali (2013), *Natural Categories and Human Kinds*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kruger, Daniel, and Dreyson Byker (2009), "Evolved Foraging Psychology Underlies Sex Differences in Shopping Experiences and Behaviors," *Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology* 3(4): 328–342.

Kunnanatt, James Thomas (2013), "Globalization and Developing Countries: A Global Participation Model," *Economics, Management, and Financial Markets* 8(4): 42–58.

McRae, Kateri, Kevin N. Ochsner, Iris B. Mauss, John J. D. Gabrieli, and James J. Gross (2008), "Gender Differences in Emotion Regulation: An fMRI Study of Cognitive Reappraisal," *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 11(2): 143–162.

Nicolăescu, Eugen (2013a), "Developments in Corporate Governance and Regulatory Interest in Protecting Audit Quality," *Economics, Management, and Financial Markets* 8(2): 198–203.

Nicolăescu, Eugen (2013b), "Understanding Risk Factors for Weaknesses in Internal Controls over Financial Reporting," *Journal of Self-Governance and Management Economics* 1(3): 38–43.

Pera, Aurel (2013), "The Social Aspects of Technology-enhanced Learning Situations," *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations* 5(2): 118–123.

Prager, Jonas (2013), "The Financial Crisis of 2007/8: Misaligned Incentives, Bank Mismanagement, and Troubling Policy Implications," *Economics, Management, and Financial Markets* 8(3): 11–56.

Ratliff, Kate A., and Shigehiro Oishi (2013), "Gender Differences in Implicit Self-Esteem Following a Romantic Partner's Success or Failure," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 105(4): 688–702.

Sánchez de Madariaga, Inés (2013), "Advancing Gender Equality in Research and Innovation in Europe and Beyond: COST Network and GenderSTE," *Journal of Research in Gender Studies* 3(1): 131–143.

Yuan, Shengjun (2013), "Educational Policies and Economic Growth in BRICS: Comparative Perspectives," *Knowledge Cultures* 1(3): 32–44.

Aurel Pera is Assistant Professor PhD at University of Craiova.

Addleton Academic Publishers
Journal of Research in Gender Studies
Volume 3(2), 2013, pp. 140–146, ISSN: 2164-0262

INTERVIEW WITH SUE THOMAS ON THE TECHNOFEMINIST APPROACH AND *CORRESPONDENCE*

MUKADDER ERKAN
mukaddererkan@yahoo.com
Ataturk University
SÜMEYRA BURAN
sumeyra@atauni.edu.tr
Ataturk University

This interview is a part of the Scientific Research Project of Atatürk University carried on by Professor Dr. Mukadder Erkan and Research Assistant Sümeyra Buran. Sümeyra Buran interviewed with Thomas for this project on the TechnoFeminist approach and *Correspondence* by Sue Thomas. Thomas welcomed and hosted her in a very kind manner, and they talked at the subject about three hours. The following is just a part of the interview; the rest will be issued in other relevant works.

March 19, 2013
Sue Thomas's office at De Montfort University in Leicester

Sümeyra Buran: You are both an academician and a novelist. Which one do you prefer? Certainly both have some advantages and disadvantages. Could you share your feelings or thought about this double career?

Sue Thomas: One small correction first – I used to be a novelist but my last novel, *Water*, was published in 1994 and I have now eschewed novels. Today I read and write only nonfiction. I can longer enter into the 'pact' of a novel, I'm afraid. And reality is just so much more interesting!

I fell into academia by accident. It's a long story, but basically I wanted to be a writer from the age of about 10 or 12 and from that age read very widely, dipping into all sorts of authors I didn't really understand such as James Baldwin and D.H. Lawrence. My favorite poet was Dylan Thomas, to whom I was devoted. But my education was very disrupted by the family moving around the UK and I had an unsettled childhood which made me a

rebel outsider at every school I attended, not helped by the fact that my family was Dutch and had slightly different cultural norms which also made me stand out a little. When I was around 14 I encountered literary criticism for the first time, and was horrified by it. I saw it as pulling the wings off the butterfly and refused to participate! The end result when it came to exams was that I did very well in terms of creativity and writing skills (what they called English Language) but failed English Literature and therefore was not allowed to study English at a higher level. My original plan had been to study English at university and then become first a journalist and then a novelist – rather naive!

So when I could not study English, I went to Art College instead. I was looking for places where it was acceptable to be different, I guess. I didn't finish my art course and ended up working in a bookshop and other places. It was only in my mid-30s when my marriage broke up and I found myself a lone parent with 2 small girls that friends persuaded me to go back to studying. I studied Humanities (English and History with computing), and had the chance to take a creative writing course. This is when I got back on track with writing and began my first novel. I was 37. After that, academia offered me the chance to earn money and so I developed a career there, eventually becoming a research professor. But I've never really fitted in there either – I guess my colleagues are the same people I didn't fit in with at school! Now at age 61 I am switching to freelance consultancy with my pension as a safety-net and I suspect this will feel much more comfortable.

So I was lucky in that academia of the 1990s and 2000s gave me a good income, prestige, nice pieces of kit (computers etc.) and a very useful travel allowance, and in that way it helped broaden my experience and generate many of the things I write about. Intellectually, it has sharpened my thinking and exposed me to all kinds of ideas I would have been unlikely to encounter elsewhere. On the negative side, however, academia in the UK is now an increasingly unpleasant place to be as it has become subject to massive funding cuts and onerous audits of teaching and research which stifle creative adventure and make lecturers, researchers and students play too safe. No doubt this will all settle down in a decade or so, and of course adversity is always a breeding place for innovation, but right now I would not recommend it as a career path. I think I'm very lucky to have hit retirement age at this time. I feel sorry for colleagues still struggling there.

Sümeyra Buran: Could you please explain how you were born as a novelist? Namely tell us please about your fiction-writing adventure.

Sue Thomas: At the end of *Hello World: travels in virtuality* I describe the following:

> An image from my childhood keeps returning – is this my lodestone for virtuality? As a family we frequently visited Hadrian's Wall, the Roman divider which stretches across the Northern waist of England. I am sitting on what was once the wall of a guardhouse or a shop or living quarters or even the famous House steads latrines. I am 8 or 9 or 10. I am sitting on the wall and around me cluster the lightly translucent shapes of people. Centurions, foot-soldiers, camp-followers, servants. Translucent is wrong. They are not really visible at all. They are simply a consciousness around me. Many of them are talking in foreign languages, not just variations of Latin but also Germanic, Frankish, and even Celtic. They wear robes or tunics and open leather sandals. Their toenails are broken and rough. Auden's imagined voice runs through my head 'I'm a Wall soldier and I don't know why'. I am in a time shift, so acutely conscious of these people that my skin is tingling. I share the same space with them, but we do not share a time. I long to burst through and be where they are. I long to know what it is to **be** them. Other people come and go around and through us, taking photographs and carrying picnic boxes, but they are more shadowy than my historical companions. With my contemporaries, I share only time at that moment, not space.

The moment above illustrates my consciousness as a writer, and there were many moments like that in my growing up. My decision to express them in fiction probably came from the youthful misapprehension that fiction is the best way to express complex ideas – by creating an invented character and enacting them through that person. In my view, my attempts to do this in three novels (one unpublished) and a number of short stories were clunky and unsatisfying. It was only in *Hello World*, when I threw those people away and wrote in my own voice as me that I began to feel comfortable. The truth, and this sounds awful, is that unlike most novelists I am not much interested in what makes people tick, I'm interested in ideas and experience. So novels were not so much an adventure as a detour for me!

Sümeyra Buran: Can you identify yourself with one of your characters in *Correspondence*? Why?

Sue Thomas: Having said all that about my dislike of fiction, I have to confess that all three people in *Correspondence* – Shirley, Rose, and the narrator – are parts of me, and writing them helped me understand that. But maybe I could have done the same thing in psychotherapy! The novel *Water* is even more me. I would say it's much more directly biographical, but the strange thing about that book is that some of it came true several years later. It turned out to be very Jungian. I haven't yet been brave enough to think all that through but maybe one day I'll write about it.

Sümeyra Buran: Who and what has had an influence on *Correspondence*?

Sue Thomas:
• difference, coming from a foreign family, feeling like an outsider, other people who are outsiders, not fitting in, not knowing how to fit in;
• California, for its spirit, its unEnglishness, its openness;
• being conscious that there is much more to our world and universe than the here and now – not sure about a linear continuum, but understanding this brief moment in the context of history and the future is very important to me;
• all kinds of science fiction, especially Star Trek, especially Next Generation;
• In my teens I loved reading Dylan Thomas, John Steinbeck, James Baldwin, Voltaire, Aldous Huxley;
• In my middle years: Gabriel Garcia Marquez, John Lennon, Michael Jackson (huge fan!), Laurie Anderson, Bjork, Ursula le Guin;
• These days I'm mostly inspired and influenced by what is going on in the West Coast tech community. I'm also interested in environmental psychology, and in ways to combine the two. I want to find out how to be both wired and well.

Sümeyra Buran: What can you tell us about the futures that you're portraying in this novel?

Sue Thomas: It was never meant to be about futures, although of course the medical procedures and her [the cyborg woman, online game composer character, *You*] actual job were not available at the time it was written.

Sümeyra Buran: How did you come up with the title *Corrrespondence*? What does it refer to? Is the title a kind of correspondence or conversation of a cyborg woman with a machine or with people in cyberspace or virtual realities? Is that a kind of correspondence between women and cyberspace, machine, the Internet, or the technology? In the novel, there is a direct contact between the reader and the writer; and Marie plays the role of guide or mediator between the cyborg woman, composer/writer and the players/readers. In real life, there cannot be a direct correspondence/conversation/contact between a woman and a man, that is to say, men cannot understand and enter the world of women without a guide. Therefore, is there any irony with the title like that: there cannot be any correspondence between men and women in real world but in cyber space?

Sue Thomas: The term correspondence does not have any feminist meaning in the book. It refers to what might be described as the phenomenological correspondences between our relationship with nature and our relationship with computer/programmed space. I didn't realize it at the time but it is really about the experience of the sublime, online and offline, physical and

virtual. *Correspondence* was an early attempt to understand it but I got to grips with it better in *Hello World* and *Technobiophilia*, which of course were written much later.

Sümeyra Buran: Feminist science fiction criticizes such kind of classification as technology and science are under the authority of patriarchy. Cyber-feminism is interested in the relation between gender and digital culture and it pays attention to the ways in which cyber technologies affect women's lives. You created a digital World that allows for new type of relation between woman and machine, computer. Like a cyberfeminist do you think that you created a post-human woman with superpower? Some Cyberfeminists like Sadie Plant and Donna Haraway think that new technologies open radical possibilities for women, do you agree with this? I mean you know women increasingly use, produce and consume technologies even complex ones, so do you think that they become more efficient consumers, producers and users?

Sue Thomas: This is a very loaded question! I have never thought of the protagonist as having superpower, and the idea rather amuses me! I guess technically she is post-human but this idea was not known to me when I wrote the book, only afterwards. I do agree that new technologies have opened radical possibilities for women, but they have also done this for the whole of society. Everything is in flux now as a result.

Sümeyra Buran: Donna Haraway describes cyborg as "a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction" and you create your woman character as the hybrid of woman and computer machine by blurring the boundaries between virtual reality and real life (Haraway, 1991: 149). Do you think that your cyborg woman fits with this definition?

Sue Thomas: No. I have never found Haraway's cyborg idea personally useful because she is most interested in using the concept for feminist theory whereas I am much more interested in the practicalities and the technology. Completely different worlds. Just because a woman author writes about a cyborg person that does not mean she is writing a feminist polemic.

Sümeyra Buran: Judith Wajcman argues that "There has been a tension between the view that technology would liberate women – from unwanted pregnancy, from housework, and from routine paid work – and the observe view that most new technologies are destructive and oppressive to women" (Wajcman, 1991: 13). Do you agree with her? You create your cyborg woman free from general accepted women roles, you create her as strong as a machine that she can work 24 hours online and does not need a sofa to sit, to eat and drink, and even day by day to sleep so much. Wajcman also states

that "severing the link between femininity and maternity, like these new body technologies, disrupts the categories of the body, sex, gender and sexuality. This is liberating for women, who have been captive to biology" (Wajcman, 2004: 4). Do you think that you deconstruct woman subjectivity with your cyborg woman because you eliminate femininity and maternity from your cyborg woman as it is difficult to talk about any sex for cyborgs except their appearance?

Sue Thomas: I'm not clear why you say we cannot talk about sex for a cyborg. I would have thought it would be possible if the functionality were there. I created her to be free of the constraints of ordinary life but didn't give much thought to her gender. She is just a person.

Sümeyra Buran: Sadie Plant in her *Zeros and Ones* argues that technology is not a patriarchal system in which masculine identities regard female identities as nothing, a zero. There is a close relationship between women and machines, Zeros now have a place. She asserts that "women seem far 'better prepared, culturally and psychologically' for the new economic conditions which emerged at the end of the twentieth century" (Plant, 1997: 42–43). In the same way, Wajcman regards women "as superior programmers on relying information and as more skilled communicators" (Wajcman, 2004: 64). Do you agree with them because in your novel, you create your cyborg woman computer composer as unique, number one in her job? In one of the pop ups Marie says, "Women make the best compositors, although there are a few men who make a living at it" and even claims that "Bereaved mothers are the best candidates of all. This is because they have no demands on their imaginative resources their faculties are well developed and in need of an outlet" (Thomas, 1991: 17). Do you think that women should work hard to find a place in male's World or should get rid of their maternity in order to get acceptance or to be more successful? Your cyborg woman is controlled by a male boss who watches her every step and tries to intervene her, that is, your woman character is free but did you create her under the authority of a man although her boss cannot do and earn anything without her?

Sue Thomas: I imagined that women would be better at this job because they have more empathy sometimes though I wonder if that is really true. With the 'boss' element it occurs to me now that I may have been working through my own issues about men who teach and watch over you. I had recently had a tutor at college who I felt quite in awe of, and my Dad, a very strong character, had died suddenly a couple of years before. Maybe that's what it was about.

Sümeyra Buran: Finally, do you call yourself as a feminist or cyberfeminist writer?

Sue Thomas: No! Just a writer :)

Sümeyra Buran: All the information you talked about are really useful for our project. Thank you very much for your patience and on the record interview. It is really a great pleasure for me to have a nice conversation with you.

Sue Thomas: Thanks for these questions – it was interesting working through them! And thank you so much for enjoying *Correspondence.*

REFERENCES

Haraway, Donna (1991), "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century", (1985), in *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature.* London: Free Association.

Plant, Sadie (1997), *Zeros + Ones: Digital Women + The New Technoculture.* London: Fourth Estate.

Thomas, Sue (1991), *Correspondence.* Woodstock, New York: Overlook.

Wacjman, Judy (1991), *Feminism Confronts Technology.* Cambridge: Polity.

_____(2004), *TechnoFeminism.* Cambridge: Polity.

Mukadder Erkan, Prof. Dr., is the head of the Department of English Language and Literature at Ataturk University.

Sümeyra Buran, Research Assistant, is a Ph.D. student in the Department of English Language and Literature at Ataturk University.



British writer **Sue Thomas** was born Susan-Jane de Vosin in 1951. Her parents were both Dutch but they settled in England, where she was born and grew up. Computers and the Internet have been her major concern of writing since the late 1980s. She has spent most of her time online living digital life and wired world. She has written her memoir of life online in her *Hello World: travels in virtuality* (2004), a travelogue. Her first book, *Correspondence* (1992), was short-listed for Arthur C. Clarke Award for Best Science Fiction Novel. Her second novel, *Water* was published in 1994. She has also edited *Wild Women: Contemporary Short Stories by Women Celebrating Women* (1994), *The Noon Quilt* (with Teri Hoskin, 1999), and *Creative Writing: A Handbook for Workshop Leaders* (1995). Thomas was Professor of New Media in the Institute of Creative Technologies at De Montfort University (2005–2013). She studies biophilia, social media, transliteracy, transdisciplinarity and future foresight. She took voluntary severance from De Montfort University and moved to the south coast of England, Bournemouth. Thomas is now focused on digital well-being and digital nature about which her latest book is concerned, *Technobiophilia: Nature and Cyberspace* (2013), published in London: September, and in New York: November, 2013 by Bloomsbury Publishing. (*photo*: **Sümeyra Buran** and **Sue Thomas**)

Addleton Academic Publishers
Journal of Research in Gender Studies
Volume 3(2), 2013, pp. 147–153, ISSN: 2164-0262

BOOK REVIEWS

Pythagorean Women: Their History and Writings
Sarah B. Pomeroy (Hunter College & The Graduate School, CUNY)
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013, 172 pp.
ISBN: 978-1-4214-0956-6

Pomeroy focuses on the social history of women who were Pythagoreans. Pythagoras was the first philosopher to include women in his community. Women are equal to men, are given the same education, follow the same rules of conduct, and deserve the same respect. Pythagoras required men to stop consorting with women to whom they were not married. Pythagoras's female disciples should eschew precious jewelry and cosmetics. Pythagoras did not approve of any infidelity. Harmonia is a fundamental Pythagorean concept and has normative force, applying to the entire cosmos and everything in it (a cosmos is an ordered world system). Pythagoras emphasizes the importance of cosmic order and its normative implications for a disciplined way of life. All nature is akin, even though there are differences within nature. There is a cosmos, an orderly world system, and mathematical analysis can help us to understand this order. The Pythagorean doctrine of reincarnation allows for long-term rectification of injustice in ways that are not open to different worldviews.

Pythagoras insists on simplicity of dress and manner for early Pythagorean women. The Neopythagorean women were willing to perpetuate Pythagoras's strictures on female dress. The lifestyle advocated by Pythagoras was favorable to women, but women were less likely to be noticed by historians. Pythagoras's program for men could not be successful without women's participation. Pythagoreanism offered an attractive way of life for women. Wives were obliged to make the majority of the accommodations necessary for a harmonious marriage. The Pythagorean women had to learn the unique rules governing the domestic life of Pythagoreans. Women had no say in framing the sumptuary prescriptions in Athens or in Magna Graecia. The laws of Solon curtailed women's influence and restricted their opportunities to meet with other female members of the family. By their lack of adornment and simple attire, Pythagorean women would stand out from the crowd. Women are most suited for piety. Pythagoras proposes a single standard for the sexual behavior of husband and wife, advocating strict monogamy for

both. Pythagoras approves of orderly marital sexual relations, recommending that sexual intercourse take place only in the winter. Conjugal relationships should be temperate for the good of the married couple and for the benefit of the baby who might be conceived. The relationship a man enjoyed with his wife, children, siblings, and relatives should be characterized by friendship. Mothers as well as fathers deserve honor (among the gods there are both mothers and fathers). Parents of both sexes compete for the love of their children. The Neopythagoreans approve of many aspects of the Spartan system of education.

Pomeroy pursues the aspects of Pythagorean philosophy that can be related to the letters and treatises that apply a Pythagorean principle of harmonia to the social conditions of women's lives. The treatises and letters of advice by Neopythagorean women are comparable to canonical works of Greek philosophy, focusing on practicability and the importance of flexibility in the application of principle to practice, and developing the philosophy with new theory, especially with respect to methodology. Neopythagorean women were innovative with respect to Pythagorean philosophy but remained true to its basic tenets, insisting on the role of moral character and practical consideration of how character is to be developed. Moral excellence concerns feelings and emotions as well as action. One cannot begin the process of habituation soon enough. The Neopythagorean women may or may not believe in the immortality of the soul, and speak from the standpoint of their subordinate social position as women (those who had the leisure to write philosophy were from an elite class). The Neopythagorean women writers work out the normative implications of Pythagorean principles for the actual contexts of human life. Social practice in the Hellenistic times of Neopythagorean women included restricted social roles for women. The Neopythagorean women were more numerous than those associated with any other philosophical school. Women wrote shorter and fewer works and often kept them in private or published them under a pseudonym. There are uncertainties about where and when the Neopythagorean women wrote their letters and other prose.

In sum, there is considerable theoretical support for the notion that Neopythagorean women philosophers' letters and treatises constitute the only extant body of Greek prose literature by women in the pre-Christian era. The Neopythagorean women's letters reflect their economic ease. The texts by women discuss private and philosophical matters, adherence to Pythagorean doctrine imposing a uniformity on their work. A large portion of the work by women deals with the proper conduct of women. The texts of the Neopythagorean women authors reflect the realities of the strongly patriarchal Greek society. The Neopythagorean letters and treatises are the earliest extant examples of literary Greek prose by women. The women were neither

secluded nor forbidden to meet with men who were not their relatives. The majority of the Neopythagorean texts are letters (the texts are didactic). The recipients of the letters generally face domestic problems. The Neopythagorean letters are addressed to a specific reader while offering advice to be read by any woman in need of it. Women exercise authority over their own appearance and over their children and household slaves. The letters of Neopythagorean women discussing adultery are both private and public. Most of the letters are a form of communication between two women. Sometimes the description is overt, and the writers' stance is sympathetic.

On Pomeroy's view, the Neopythagorean letters show a judicious blend of the graceful and plain styles. The Neopythagorean women authors do not give the girls an inferior education. Many of the letters and treatises count as philosophy. Upper-class women would often dictate to male scribes. The letters from women to women are consistent with Pythagoras's teachings and consistent with each other. There are no internal contradictions in the advice about conjugal relations. The letters emphasize the effect of husbands' behavior on their wives. The "other woman" is the subject that recurs most frequently in these letters. Letters pay special attention to the response of wives to unfaithful husbands. The husband who engages in an extramarital sexual relationship inflicts mortal pain on his wife's psyche. The betrayed wife should preserve her inner harmony and not lower herself to the level of her husband and his mistress. The Neopythagoreans married within the community, and women enjoyed access to their natal families. The soul has no sex and women may be as rational as men. Letters of advice from woman to woman are found in Greek literature only among the Neopythagorean documents.

Pomeroy's highly informative and carefully argued book touches on significant elements of the Neopythagorean women authors. It is a welcome addition to the literature, opening up much fertile ground for future work.

Reviewed by George Lăzăroiu, PhD
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies in
Humanities and Social Sciences, New York

Transnational Identities of Women Writers in the Austro-Hungarian Empire

Ramona Mihăilă (ed.) (Spiru Haret University, Bucharest)
New York: Addleton Academic Publishers, 2013, 260 pp.
ISBN: 978-1-935494-57-7

Pour parler d' « identités transnationales » au XIXe siècle, nul territoire européen ne semble plus approprié que l'empire austro-hongrois. Constitué

d'une véritable mosaïque de peuples (tchèques, slovaques, slovènes, croates, serbes, polonais, ukrainiens, bosniaques, italiens, roumains, allemands, hongrois), cet empire se caractérise en effet par des frontières internes erratiques et poreuses n'offrant aucune résistance à la circulation des langues, des ethnies et des influences culturelles : c'est dire que tout un chacun, homme ou femme, et sans même avoir besoin de se déplacer, est d'emblée confronté au multilinguisme et au multiculturalisme. Le cas de l'écrivain Jelica Belović Bernadzikowska, serbe de par son père, allemande de par sa mère et polonaise de par son mari, n'est qu'un des exemples les plus typiques ici analysés.

Comment la voix (essentiellement littéraire) des femmes se fait-elle entendre au sein de ce bouillon de culture ? Telle est la question à laquelle ce livre tente de donner des réponses.

L'entrée et l'établissement des femmes dans la République des Lettres sont contemporains du réveil de la conscience nationale et de l'effort qui lui est consubstantiel de canaliser l'indétermination identitaire. Dans ce contexte en effet, il semble que les hommes aient favorisé l'écriture des femmes – à condition toutefois que celles-ci entrent dans le cadre par eux prédéfini : prendre la plume en tant que femmes qui ne cherchent pas à s'approprier les thématiques masculines, prendre la plume en tant que représentantes de leur langue vernaculaire, prendre la plume en tant que mères, épouses et éducatrices de la nation. Un grand nombre de femmes écrivains semblent *a priori* accepter ce rôle : pensons par exemple à Maria Rossetti, directrice d'un journal rédigé en roumain intitulé *La mère et l'enfant*, pensons encore aux récits publiés par des femmes dans le journal croate *Danica* ou à l'essai *L'émancipation des femmes et ses conséquences probables* de l'autrichienne Adele Crépaz. De même la hongroise Polyxéna Wesselényi ou la polonaise Maria Wirtemberska, dans leurs récits de voyage, optent pour une écriture qui, selon les standards établis par les hommes, est immédiatement repérable comme féminine (importance accordée aux sentiments et problèmes politiques systématiquement passés sous silence).

Néanmoins, les femmes qui se plient aux directives des hommes n'en essaient pas moins de mettre en place des stratégies pour obtenir une place égale à celle de l'homme; l'on constate en particulier que, plutôt que d'aller dans le sens d'une stabilisation de leur « identité transculturelle », les femmes l'exacerbent par une collaboration et une recherche de références parmi les femmes des autres peuples de l'empire (cf. l'admiration de Maria Rossetti pour les polonaises, ou encore celle des premières femmes écrivains slovènes pour les femmes de lettre tchèques). En outre, certaines d'entre elles procèdent à une revalorisation quasi philosophique du travail domestique, notamment de la broderie – considérée par une Jelica Belović ou une Svetlana Slapčak comme étant un élément intrinsèque de la culture slave, à savoir «comme une manière d'écrire qui exprime la complétude de l'être»; d'autres, quant

à elles, se saisissent du prétexte de la dignité de leur fonction de mères, d'épouses et d'éducatrices pour élèver des revendications en faveur d'un système éducatif amélioré pour les femmes.

Un certain nombre de femmes plus radicales dans leur conception de l'égalité ne s'embarrassent plus de stratégies et osent même le pas de quitter l'empire pour aller étudier en Suisse (cf. Zofka Kveder), ce qui accentue encore leur « identité transculturelle ». Les portes de l'université dans l'empire ne s'ouvrent en effet aux femmes qu'au tournant du siècle (l'université de Vienne accepte les femmes à partir de 1900).

Si l'activité émancipatrice (surtout littéraire) de l'ensemble des femmes de l'empire austro-hongrois semble se caractériser par une solidarité féminine hors du commun, il est cependant révélateur que les femmes issues des nations opprimées de l'empire n'aiment pas se réclamer ouvertement du modèle émancipatoire des femmes germaniques (mais il est évident que ce modèle reste le plus influent, car le plus visible et le plus accessible). Au fil de la lecture de ce livre, et sans doute à l'insu des auteurs qui ont chacun travaillé séparément sur leur article, on s'aperçoit que, bien qu'il ne soit lui non plus jamais clairement avoué, un autre modèle gagne en importance : le modèle français. Les noms de Mme de Staël et de George Sand sont en effet régulièrement mentionnés, quoique comme en passant : on apprend ainsi que la slovène Pavlina Pajk ou la roumaine Eugenia Scriban vouaient un véritable culte à Sand, ou encore que Mme de Staël faisait l'objet d'une très grande admiration de la part de Polyxena Wesselényi et de la roumaine Maria Flechtenmacher. L'image de l'« identité transculturelle » de l'écrivain femme dans l'empire austro-hongrois ne cesse donc de gagner en complexité.

L'essentiel des contributions de ce livre se caractérise par son originalité et la haute qualité de sa réflexion. Dans ce cadre stimulant, on regrette cependant que certains articles rédigés en anglais n'aient pas fait l'objet d'une relecture par des natifs.

Corinne Fournier Kiss, PhD
University of Fribourg

Gender Studies: The Woman Inside and Outside the Box
Ruxandra Teodorescu, Ramona Mihăilă, Onorina Botezat (eds.) (Spiru Haret University, Bucharest)
Bucharest: Printech, 2013, 329 pp.
ISBN: 978-606-521-613-6

The Woman Inside and Outside the Box locates itself, by virtue of its title, in the context of Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar's groundbreaking work in gender studies, *The Madwoman in the Attic*. Like its predecessor, it discusses

the pervasiveness of female confinement, while encouraging a breakout. The critical works anthologized in this 2013 volume extend many of the core themes of Gilbert and Gubar's work and impressively expand the former's diversity. The articles deal with important gender issues in Middle Eastern, Asian, European, Eastern European and North American cultures. They range from the military to religion and address concerns from preschoolers to old age, covering fields in architecture, literature, drama, and film and game-playing.

Within the major divisions of this anthology – "East and West; Differences and Similarities"; "Forbidden Gender Issues in Literature"; "Concepts of Femininity and Masculinity" – the volume introduces us to influential women thinkers we should know about, but probably don't like Rosa Mayreder, an Austrian critic and activist from the early part of the 19th century and Sofie Nadeje, a Romanian writer from the same era who is likewise famous for her work in women's emancipation. A more recent female critic on gender is represented by the article on twentieth-century U.S. "feminist philosopher" Nancy Harstock who takes on Richard Rorty and Michael Foucault for inadequately addressing diversity, thus relegating the stigmatized Other to a collective, "carrying the mark of the plural" (47).

The Woman Inside and Outside the Box opens with a historical contextualization of the feminist movement at the turn of the last century which is extremely interesting and helpful in setting the scene not only for Mayreder's work, but also for much of what follows in this critical work. Mayreder's firm conviction that gender types are fictitious seems at once to dismiss and affirm the need for gender studies. For believing in such concepts, as is the norm, has consequences for women's lives, one important one is the establishment of normality and its opposite. Mayreder dedicates herself to fight against the "tyranny of the norm." (47). This is the motto of the Rosa Mayreder College in Vienna as well. The second work of the volume complements the first nicely as it shifts readers from Mayreder's essays to her fiction and adds a comparative element, namely, a Romanian counterpart, Sofie Nadeje. Our context continues to build with "Feminine versus Feminist in Romanian Contemporary Society" which names other important unknowns in the feminist movement such as Romanian Alexandra Cantacuzino who was a member of one of the first International Suffrage Alliances (Rome, 1923). A "history of feminism in images," crucial to any sense of "herstory," comes through a reading of Tracey Chevalier's *Falling Angels*. Further discussions of being in or out of boxes and gender histories occurs in "From Plato to Kristeva," which taces the evolution of androgyny.

Many of the essays in the volume pick up Gilbert and Gubar's theme of the taboos associated with the role of females taking up the pen. Mayreder was accused of not being a "real" woman, and thus risked, "gambling away"

her whole life (7). That writing was once considered "heresy" and sometimes aligned with witchcraft as is noted in "Woman's Role as a Religious construction in Puritan America." This article recalls to our minds Edmund S. Morgan's story about a brother who reprimands his sister for such an improper activity: "your printing of a Book, beyond the custom of your Sex, doth rankly smell" (68). Women who went against this stricture – many of the subjects in this volume – by necessity were forced to adopt pseudonyms. Even Mayreder wrote under the name Franz Arnold (18). Of course, pseudonyms were convenient for other reasons as well.

One of the consequences of gender boxes is madness, hysteria, or anger, as Gilbert and Gubar, as well as the editors and many of the writers of this current volume, remind us. This theme is enunciated in a new way in the gender discussion related to the unreliable female narrator of Kazuo Ishiguro's *A Pale View of Hills*.

This anthology also shows through its discussion of arts, education, military, and science how dedicated women and men have persisted in the fight against "the tyranny of norm" and have succeeded in changing it to such an extent that we can speak finally of the overthrowing of normality as a rather negative thing, as does the author of "Women in Margaret Atwood's *The Handmaid's Tale*"(208). This article asks us to recall what has been gained and also warns that we must be vigilant in our day-to-day lives, least we allow erosion to overtake the advances we have forged. As a reminder, this article shows how the characters of Atwood's novel "all share the fault for their lost freedom and the genre in which they tell their stories stands for the mistakes they did on the way, the things they overlooked and all these elements combined brought them to the present situation." Atwood's book is, as said, a truly "haunting book" which cautions us to heed gender discrimination wherever it occurs, whether in preschool and in other tools of learning and/or entertainment, tools such as MMORPG (multiplayer online role playing games), cinema, theater etc.

Finally, *The Woman Inside and Outside the Box*, like its predecessor, should be praised for enlarging the community and opportunities dedicated to the advancement of gender study issues and for all the efforts involved in bringing such a transnational volume to publication, efforts often underappreciated. The very existence of this volume stands as a tribute to collegial friendships. The task of getting inside the box, understanding what keeps us there so we can deconstruct the walls and freely transverse the territory takes such a transnational community, a community such as the one brought together here. It also requires constant commitment, the commitment embodied in this volume.

Barbara A. Nelson, PhD
University of Bucharest

ISSN 2164-0262